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Branch: Committee on a Permanent
International Criminal Court
DECEMBER 27, 1996
FOREwORD
This is the first report to be presented by the American Branch of
the International Law Association's Committee on a Permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court. The Committee met in March of 1996 and fo-
cused on some of the general issues and problems raised by the draft
statute adopted by the International Law Commission in 1994.1 It met
again in November 1996, and arrived at a consensus (or members
agreed to disagree) on a variety of issues, as set out in the First Re-
port which follows. Annexed to this report are special reports submit-
ted to the Committee on the proposed International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction, the definition of crimes in the statute, general principles
of law, the triggering mechanism for initiating proceedings, the com-
plementarity of the International Criminal Court with national legal
systems, cooperation of the International Criminal Court with national
legal systems and a report critiquing the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tri-
bunal. The Special Rapporteurs for each of these subjects prepared a
draft, the draft was circulated to the Committee members, comments
received, and, where the Rapporteur agreed, comments incorporated.
Although each special report involves a dialogue between the Rap-
porteur and committee members, the reports remain the work of each
Rapporteur. They are published here in order to inform the debate on
this issue that is taking place both within the International Law Asso-
ciation's membership and elsewhere.
Over the next year, the Committee will continue its work with two
goals in mind. First, it is expected that additional reports will be sub-
mitted for consideration by the Committee's membership. Second, the
Committee will issue a second report formulating its views on the is-
sues not discussed here.
The Chair would like to thank the special Rapporteurs for their
superb work, and thank all the members of the Committee for devot-
ing their time and energy to this project. Finally, a special thanks to
the International Law Association (American Branch) and in particu-
1. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Ses-
sion, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May-22 July 1994, at 51, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
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lar its President, Alfred Rubin, for the opportunity to address this
timely and important subject.
Leila Sadat Wexler
St. Louis, Missouri
December 27, 1996
Committee Report on Jurisdiction,
Definition of Crimes, and Complementarity
LEILA SADAT WEXLER*
1. In November 1996, members of the International Law Associa-
tion Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)
met in conjunction with other members of the human rights commu-
nity and experts on the proposed ICC over a two day period. Both a
feasibility study on the Organization of the International Criminal
Court: Administrative and Financial Issues, prepared by Thomas War-
rick, and the six reports submitted to the Committee by Christopher
Blakesley, Jeffrey Bleich, Jordan Paust, Michael Scharf, and Edward
Wise contained in this volume were discussed. In addition, M. Cherif
Bassiouni summarized the discussions held at the second session of
the Preparatory Committee. Subsequently, a report was prepared by
the Chair, circulated to the membership of the entire Committee and
revised accordingly. The Committee's recommendations and conclusions
are set out below.1
2. As a preliminary matter, the Committee unanimously endorses
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, and
hopes that the Court could be operational in the near future. Such a
Court could function both as a forum for the trial of war criminals as
well as an institution capable of constructing a framework for the es-
tablishment of justice and the international rule of law.
3. The Committee greatly appreciates the serious work accom-
plished by the Preparatory Committee to date, and urges the Prepara-
tory Committee to adhere to the resolution adopted by the Sixth Com-
mittee on November 29, 1996, by which it is proposed that the
Committee complete its work by April of 1998.2 The Committee hopes
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis; Chair and Gen-
eral Rapporteur of the International Law Association (American Branch) Committee on
a Permanent International Criminal Court.
1. The Committee's work program tracked the work of the Preparatory Committee
in 1996. Special Rapporteurs prepared reports on the issues of general principles of
criminal law, jurisdiction, definition of crimes, triggering mechanisms, complementarity,
cooperation of the Court with national legal systems, and a critique of the Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal. These reports have been submitted and discussed by the Commit-
tee, and are annexed to this report. The Committee will address the issues of the Court's
relationship with the United Nations, organization and budget, establishment, and re-
maining procedural issues in its subsequent work. See infra text para. 38.
2. On December 17, 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
resolution on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court which approved the
dates for the preparatory meetings in 1997 and 1998 as well as to hold the Diplomatic
Conference in 1998.
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that the Preparatory Committee will be able to adopt a work plan that
will permit it to arrive at a completed proposed text by this time.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
4. War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide: The
Court should, of course, have jurisdiction over each of these "core
crimes." The question remains as to their definition, as discussed
below.
5. Treaty Crimes: The Committee supports the inclusion within the
Court's initial jurisdiction of at least some treaty crimes,3 which might
include the unlawful seizure of aircraft (the 1970 Hague Convention),
aircraft sabotage (crimes defined in article 1 of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention), crimes against internationally protected persons (1973 Con-
vention), hostage-taking and related crimes (defined in the 1979 Con-
vention), the torture convention, and crimes against UN personnel.4
6. With respect to drug trafficking, the Committee was split. Some
members thought that it should be included. Although some States
have argued that the prosecutor of the international criminal court
would interfere rather than complement and support national investi-
gations, those members of the Committee supporting the inclusion of
this crime found this argument unpersuasive, given that the Court
would consider only drug offenses of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole, in cases in which a State had determined to cede
jurisdiction it might otherwise exercise to the Court. Moreover, they
did not consider defining this crime to be particularly problematic.
Other members of the Committee disagreed, contending that inclusion
3. As one member noted, however, the term Treaty Crimes' is potentially mislead-
ing because the prohibition of certain war crimes, genocide, and those crimes which the
Committee believes the Court's jurisdiction should be inherent, are also found in
treaties.
4. In addition to the crimes listed in the text, the ILC proposed the inclusion of the
apartheid convention, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, and
Maritime crimes. Some members of the Committee expressed support for the inclusion of
the apartheid convention. A majority of the Committee's members, however, objected to
its inclusion, noting that if South Africa had, itself, decided to employ the procedure of a
"Truth Commission" rather than criminal prosecutions to deal with the crimes of
apartheid, inclusion of the crime within the ICC's jurisdiction would seem to be
inappropriate.
Grave breaches and the crimes enumerated in Protocol I raise a different problem.
The Committee believes that these crimes should be within the Court's jurisdiction, but
not as a result of their status as treaty crimes. Instead, they should fall within the
Court's inherent jurisdiction. Indeed, as one member noted, the ILC's "treaty crime" list
does not sufficiently distinguish between different types of offenses committed against
treaties. A basic distinction may be drawn between crimes committed under color of offi-
cial authority and those crimes which do not necessarily involve official actors. At least
one member of the Committee expressed the view that if the list of treaty offenses over
which the Court will have jurisdiction is to be restricted, priority should be given to
those offenses, like torture, that involve official actors.
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of this crime within the Court's jurisdiction would be too problematic
given the strong opposition of certain States.
7. It is true that political objections, voiced by some States, to the
inclusion of treaty crimes have posed a potential obstacle to the Stat-
ute's ultimate adoption by those States. However, because the Court's
jurisdiction over treaty crimes will, presumably, be predicated on the
consent of the State (or States) involved, such objections do not appear
persuasive. Moreover, many smaller States would like treaty crimes
included, and would be more favorably disposed to ratify the Treaty
establishing the Court if they are included. In addition, the inclusion
of treaty crimes may permit the Court to assume a unifying role in in-
terpreting international criminal law. Finally, the bombing of Pan Am
103 and the resulting international stalemate among several members
of the United Nations over prosecution of the alleged perpetrators,
presents precisely the kind of case that befits prosecution by an inter-
national criminal court. The Court may thus provide a neutral forum
that would not otherwise be available to address a politically-charged
incident.
8. The objection has been made that the inclusion of certain treaty
crimes may trivialize the Court and diminish its moral strength by
having individuals on trial for relatively minor offenses at the same
time that major war criminals are being prosecuted. One method that
might avoid this problem would be to establish a special chamber of
the Court for certain treaty crimes. It was also pointed out that a
means must be found to filter cases to avoid States' dumping insignifi-
cant cases on the Court (such as is now contained to a limited degree
in Article 35 on admissibility and the Preamble).
9. Finally, although practical objections to the inclusion of certain
treaty crimes are not insubstantial (the need for intelligence sharing,5
a secure building, and additional security to protect the Court) neither
are they insurmountable. Reference may be made to the detailed feasi-
bility study of Thomas Warrick, in this regard.
10. Aggression: The Committee is split on the question of aggres-
sion. A majority of the Committee's membership believes that aggres-
sion should be within the Court's jurisdiction. Although aggression
may be difficult to include because there is no clear detailed legal defi-
nition, defining it does not seem an insurmountable task. A failure to
include it would, in the opinion of many, mark a retreat from the prin-
ciples laid down by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
which considered aggression to be the "supreme" international crime.
5. One member suggested that in cases involving treaty crimes, that might other-
wise not be brought before the Court because of a State's reluctance to share intelligence
information, a mechanism could be established whereby the State in question would pro-
vide a substitute prosecutor and thereby control the dissemination of the privileged in-
formation. A majority of the Committee's membership were opposed to this suggestion,
arguing that the Prosecutor must, at all times, remain independent of State control.
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Moreover, the possibility that the Court's establishment could deter
criminal behavior would be seriously weakened were aggression omit-
ted, those who started a conflict might be insulated from punishment.
It is certainly conceivable that, at least in democratic States, a general
or Chief of Staff may, in a particular case, feel that a certain military
action violates international law and raise objections before rather
than after the fact.
11. Some seconded the International Law Commission's (ILC) view
that the Security Council should make an initial determination of ag-
gression in order for the Court's jurisdiction to attach.6 This would pre-
sumably overcome States' political objections to the inclusion of this
crime, at least for States that were members of the Security Council.
12. Other members of the Committee do not believe that aggres-
sion should be included. They argue that its inclusion, particularly as
proposed, will undermine the Court's integrity by subjecting it to the
will of the Security Council. In addition, prosecutions for aggression
may smack of victor's justice and impair the Court's credibility. As one
member of the Committee pointed out, there is no "rule of law" if a
general rule does not apply to everyone. Moreover, in most cases in
which aggression occurs, it is not the aggression that needs to be pun-
ished but the crimes committed against life and property that accom-
pany it - there will always be war crimes and crimes against human-
ity where there is aggression. It was noted that at Nuremberg,
aggression was thought to be the "supreme" crime because it was a
world of States' power in which crimes against humanity were periph-
eral, a situation that is now fundamentally different. Finally, one
member noted in detail that, given the relatively unsuccessful history
of efforts to define aggression to date, defining it may well be an insur-
mountable task.
II. DEFINITION OF CRIMEs AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
13. The Committee strongly urges the Preparatory Committee to
define the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction in the Court's Statute.
While the Rapporteur for this issue agreed that this was not legally re-
quired by international law,7 it is, nonetheless, desirable. As the Rap-
porteur noted in his report to the Committee, a central reason for in-
sisting that punishment be imposed only by virtue of a law enacted
prior to the offense is the sense that fairness requires giving due no-
6. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Ses-
sion, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, May 2-July 22 1994, at 51, UN.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft
Statute].
7. For a thorough analysis of this issue, see Jordan J. Paust, Nullem Crimen and
Related Crimes, 25 DENV. J. IN'L L. & POLY 321 (1997) (demonstrating that enactments
and legislators are not required to create international crimes and that several States
have incorporated international crimes by reference or with general definitions).
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tice of what constitutes prohibited conduct and of what will happen if
the line between permissible and prohibited conduct is crossed.8 In ad-
dition, the principle of legality also rests
in part on the judgment that it is for legislators (or their interna-
tional equivalent) rather than judges to settle questions about what
kinds of conduct will be proscribed . . . that fixed rules are re-
quired if we are to realize the ideal of treating like cases alike, and
. . . that, especially in criminal cases, it is important to apply im-
personal rules articulated beforehand without regard to the partic-
ular persons to whom they will be applied.9
14. The question then arises as to how detailed the definitions
ought to be. While the Rapporteur noted that it would be impractical
to draft an entire criminal code that would be incorporated into the
Court's Statute, offense definitions and certain general principles of
criminal law should be set out in the Statute. Several countries, in
particular Canada, France, and Japan, have proposed texts to be incor-
porated into the Court's Statute, and it appears now to be a question
of harmonizing their proposals in order to arrive at a text acceptable
to States.10
15. To assist the Preparatory Committee in its work, members of
the Committee will consolidate the governmental proposals annexed to
the August Preparatory Committee Session Report and produce a har-
monized text. This harmonized text will include the specific elements
of the four core crimes to be included in the Statute and a part on gen-
eral principles of criminal law. These Committee members will con-
sider, among other things, general principles accepted by the major le-
gal systems of the world, as well as principles of legality, vagueness,
and overbreadth. Substantive crimes will be defined according to
treaty language, case law, the definitions used by those learned in the
law, and general interpretations of similar crimes found in the domes-
tic systems around the world.
16. For the same reasons, some members of the Committee feel
that, insofar as practical, treaty crimes should be defined in the
Court's Statute rather than simply incorporated by reference.'
8. Edward M. Wise, Report on General Rules of Criminal Law, 25 DENV. J. INTL L.
& POLY 318 (1997)
9. Id.
10. One member of the Committee disagrees. In his view, international law should
be the starting point for defining international crimes, and harmonization of national
proposals is thus inappropriate.
11. As one member noted, if the treaty language is vague, to the extent that the
treaty does not have "real" definitions in it, then referring to the treaty is little help in
determining an element of a particular treaty crime. On the other hand, it must be clear
that the definition in the Court's statute does not substitute its language for what is
contained in the treaty.
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17. Aggression: As noted in paragraph 10, most members of the
Committee urge both the inclusion of this crime and its definition in
the Court's Statute. In particular, these members of the Committee
support the inclusion of jurisdiction over acts of aggression, not just
wars of aggression. Although the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) judgment at Nuremberg specifically condemned only aggressive
war, international law has since evolved and international condemna-
tion of aggressive acts is now part of customary international law and
should be included as such.
18. Crimes Against Humanity: Discussions at the Preparatory
Committee meetings apparently now evidence a preference for the
Statute's definition of Crime Against Humanity to parallel the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) definition rather than the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defi-
nition of this crime by including the words "widespread or systematic"
as an element of the crime. 2 This is desired by States as a fiter that
would implement the principle of complementarity by permitting the
International Criminal Court to assume jurisdiction only in cases of
widespread or systematic abuses. Certainly, if such language is to be
added to the definition of the crime, States should be willing to elimi-
nate the regime of State consent currently envisaged by the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute, and replace it with a regime of inherent jurisdiction
(not subject to State consent), such as is now envisaged for genocide.
19. Although the Committee understands that murder does not, as
a general rule, rise to the level of an international crime, and that
some means must be adopted to distinguish crimes against humanity
from ordinary crimes, the proposed solution is unfortunate in that it
collapses the jurisdictional trigger and actus reus into one. One mem-
ber suggested that rather than including this language in the defini-
tion of the crime, the jurisdictional trigger be contained either in the
article on admissibility (currently Article 35, which provides the Court
may dismiss cases that are "not of such gravity to justify further ac-
tion by the Court") or in a non-definitional section of the Statute re-
garding crimes against humanity. Then, it will not be thought of as a
limitation on the nature of the crime, but on the Court's jurisdiction.
20. Finally, there is general agreement that the crime should be
defined with reference to specific acts,' 3 and that no nexus to armed
conflict should be required. Although there was some inclination to de-
viate from the arguably redundant language found in most modern for-
mulations of the crime (i.e., murder, extermination, etc .... ) it was
ultimately agreed that traditional formulations should be retained,
even if redundant, to avoid lengthy and fruitless discussions that
might result from an attempt to change them.
12. This phrase is not part of the customary definition. See infra text para. 19.
13. But see also, supra note 7.
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21. Genocide: In spite of the objections one might make concerning
the definition of Genocide in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention,
most notably, the lack of protection for political groups, the Committee
believes that the definition of genocide in the International Criminal
Court Statute should track Article 2 of the Convention. The current
definition already has the status of customary international law, has
been agreed to by a significant majority of the world's nations and,
thus, has the virtue of being practically universally accepted. One is-
sue that needs to be addressed, however, is the question of intent. It
was suggested that the mental state that would subject an upper level
policy-maker to responsibility for genocide differs from the standard to
be applied to individuals lower down on the chain of command, such as
a camp guard. Others, however, consider that genocide as such (with
the same general mens rea standard for each type of actor, tested cir-
cumstantially) can be different than dereliction of duty concerning
"policy-maker . . . responsibility" for acts of genocide engaged in by
others over whom one has authority or command.
22. War Crimes: In the 1994 ILC Draft, an attempt was made to
separate war crimes from the grave breaches system of the Geneva
Conventions and to adopt a new definition of "serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in armed conflict."' 4 Discussions during
the Preparatory Committee, while not yet conclusive, evidence a differ-
ent trend, which would, like the ICTY Statute, retain a two-tier cate-
gory for war crimes. Grave breaches and Protocol I would be retained
as a separate category, and would be within the Court's inherent juris-
diction. Other "violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict," and, in particular, violations of common Article 3 and Proto-
col II, however, would be prosecutable only if a consistent state policy
and practice could be established. Otherwise, consistent with the prin-
ciple of complementarity, jurisdiction would shift to national criminal
justice systems, unless national courts were unwilling or unable to act
fairly and effectively. 5 Although understanding the rationale for this
proposal, the Committee cannot endorse it. Indeed, several members
expressed deep concern about this issue.
23. First, although it is commendable that the Statute, as con-
ceived, would grant the Court inherent jurisdiction over grave
breaches, the limitations sought to be placed on all other serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war are problematic. Proving a state
policy to commit war crimes will be difficult and may raise insur-
mountable obstacles to international prosecution. If, for example, the
Prosecutor is asked to investigate a situation by the Security Council,
how will he or she conduct this kind of investigation? Presumably the
Prosecutor will have the burden of proof, but the evidence will lie in
14. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(c).
15. It would be inappropriate to require State policy or practice addressing war
crimes committed by insurgents or other non-state actors.
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the hands of the highest State officials. Suppose that the State officials
say that there is no such policy and that they are therefore pursuing
the investigation. May the Prosecutor, at that point, allege that the
national legal system is not "fair and effective" to recover jurisdiction
over the offenses? A "minitrial" may thus be required at a very prelim-
inary stage merely to establish the Court's jurisdiction. At the very
least, if this kind of definition is to be incorporated into the Statute's
provision on war crimes, it must be made clear that it is not an aspect
of the crime's definition, but the Court's jurisdiction.
24. Second, the Committee feels that the Court should have juris-
diction over "war crimes" whether they are committed in international
or non-international armed conflict and by state or non-state actors.
Consistent with its views on other matters, it also feels that the
crimes to be covered should be enumerated in the Statute. 16
25. Treaty Crimes: As with the four core crimes to be included in
the Statute, the Committee generally feels that, to the extent practica-
ble, treaty crimes should be defined in the Court's Statute, not merely
incorporated by reference.
26. At the same time, the Committee also feels crimes defined in
new treaties should be able to come within the Court's jurisdiction
without the need for convening a diplomatic conference each time. Pre-
sumably, this would be accomplished by having the Treaty itself refer
to the Court, and have the Conference of States Parties 17 accept the
extension of the Court's jurisdiction over the new crimes. This would
also apply to amendments to treaties. The Committee recommends
that a procedure for this be adopted from the outset.
III. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
27. The Statute of the Court should set out general principles of
evidence, rules of procedure and rights of the accused, including the
due process and the principles contained in Articles 9, 10, and 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Human
rights to due process provide a minimum set of guarantees that must
be respected by the Court. At the same time, however, these provisions
need not be detailed. Rather, they should be limited in the Court's
Statute to the setting out of general principles common to the civil law
16. In this regard, special mention was made of rape which is referred to in some of
the proposals made by governments to define war crimes. The Committee agrees that
rape should be specifically enumerated as a crime in the Statute. A specific conviction
for rape, as opposed to "inflicting bodily injury" or some other vague formulation may
have more deterrent effect, or, at least, serve to increase the stigma attached to the
crime.
17. The proposed Conference of States Parties is discussed in Thomas Warrick, Ad-
ministrative and Financial Issues of the International Criminal Court, 25 DENv. J. IN'L
L. & POLy' 376-77 (1997).
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and common law systems."' Detailed rules will be elaborated by the
Court (the Judiciary) and submitted to the Conference of States Par-
ties for approval.
28. The Statute, as currently drafted, does not indicate whether
the criminal trial procedure to be followed is to be more akin to a com-
mon law or civil law trial. As one member noted, depending on which
one is chosen, more will follow. Ultimately, the Committee feels that
rules will evolve from a mixed system. Merging aspects of both sys-
tems will need to be established by the Court on an ongoing basis,
with their decisions being guided by the general principles set out in
the Statute.
IV. TRIGGERING MECHANISM, STATE CONSENT, AND COMPLEMENTARITY
29. Who may initiate prosecution? The Committee supports the
general scheme proposed by the ILC to the effect that a State party to
the Statute and the Security Council may refer matters to the Court.19
There is also some support among the Committee's membership for
permitting the prosecutor to act on his or her own initiative and for
permitting the General Assembly to refer matters to the Court. Treaty
crimes, unlike the other four "core" crimes, will be referable only
where a Treaty applies 20 and the relevant States21 consent to the
Court's jurisdiction.
18. To assist the Preparatory Committee in its work, Fellows of the International
Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University will consolidate the proposals on
rules of procedure and evidence found in Volume II of the Preparatory Committee Re-
port on the Second Session and distill from them general principles common to both the
civil and common law systems.
19. For a discussion of whether a Security Council referral is pursuant to Chapter
VI or VII, see infra text para. 30.
20. Because genocide is in one sense a Treaty crime, the question arises whether
the Court would receive complaints from States that are parties to the Genocide Conven-
tion but not the Court's Statute. The ILC opted not to permit this in Article 25(1) of the
draft statute, noting that on balance,
this may encourage States to accept the rights and obligations provided for
in the Statute and to share in the financial burden relating to the operating
costs of the Court. Moreover in practice the Court could only satisfactorily
deal with a prosecution initiated by complaint if the complainant is cooper-
ating with the Court under Part 7 of the Statute in relation to such matters
as the provision of evidence, witnesses, etc.
1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Comment, at 89.
21. The ILC Draft is not completely clear on this, but under the current state con-
sent regime, set out in Article 21, the State having custody of the accused, (the "custo-
dial state"), the territorial state (where the act occurred), and any state having filed an
extradition request with the custodial state (unless that request is rejected) must con-
sent to the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case. In addition, the treaty must apply to
the conduct under investigation, meaning that the country of which the accused is a na-
tional or upon whose territory the crime was committed, is a party. See Article 39(b) and
comments thereto. Presumably, even if the consent regime drops out for the four core
crimes, some version of this consent regime will necessarily remain as regards to treaty
crimes.
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30. The Security Council: The Relationship of the Court to the Se-
curity Council is particularly problematic. Although, as noted in para-
graph 29, the Committee generally believes that the Security Council
should be permitted to refer matters to the Court. The Committee ob-
jects to proposed Article 23(3) which permits the Security Council to
block prosecutions if it is dealing with a matter under Chapter VII.
Preferably, the provision should be deleted. If retained, it should be
redrafted.2 2
31. Essentially, the Committee feels that the Court should be in-
dependent from the Security Council. In addition, Article 23(3) in-
troduces a substantial inequality between States which are members
of the Security Council and other states, as the Committee noted in its
comments to Article 23(3).2
32. Finally, it was pointed out that the Statute is not clear as to
whether the Security Council would be in any way required to use
Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI in order to require the Security
Council to enforce the jurisdiction of the Court. Indeed, it may be that
the Security Council wishes to preserve this ambiguity in order to re-
tain flexibility as well as political leverage in a particular situation.
33. State Consent and Inherent Jurisdiction: The Committee
strongly opposes the regime of State consent now contained in the ILC
draft. It is likely to be complicated and cumbersome at best, and to
cripple the proposed Court at worst, at least in cases in which the
matter has not been referred by the Security Council under Chapter
VII (in which case, the Security Council will presumably use its en-
forcement powers in aid of the Court's jurisdiction). Instead, States
that adhere to the Court's Statute should be deemed to have accepted
the Court's jurisdiction in all cases except Treaty Crimes, subject, of
course, to the limits of complementarity and other jurisdictional
preconditions.
34. The Preparatory Committee discussions have apparently
veered away from the ILC proposal to a system of essentially inherent
jurisdiction over all crimes, except aggression which would be subject
to a preliminary Security Council determination (see supra paragraph
10) and war crimes that are not grave breaches. This is a step in the
22. Should some version of Article 23(3) be retained, one Committee member sug-
gested the following language might render the Security Council more accountable than
the present text: "Whenever the Council makes a formal determination that the Court's
activity interferes with the Security Council's activities to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security it may request the Court to suspend its activities."
23. It also introduces inequalities between States that are permanent members of
the Council and other States, and may thus discourage adherence to the Court's statute
by some states. The Comments to the 1994 ILC Draft suggest instead a savings clause
in the Treaty to the effect that "Nothing in [this Statute] shall be interpreted as in any
way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and
powers of the organs of the United Nations." 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Com-
ments to art. 23(3).
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right direction, provided that, as discussed above, the definitions of the
crimes that are substituted for the regime of State consent neither
complicate nor narrow the Court's jurisdiction. In particular, serious
violations of common Article 3 and Protocol II should be within the
Court's inherent jurisdiction.
35. Complementarity: This still does not resolve the issue of com-
plementarity. It is self-evident that a relationship between State par-
ties and the ICC must be established and that a mechanism must be
put in place in order to distribute jurisdiction in particular cases be-
tween national tribunals and the Criminal Court.24 This might be a
unitary system in which either the international criminal court or na-
tional courts would always have primacy, or it might be a case-by-case
system that would link jurisdiction to particular factual situations de-
pending on the crimes charged. The ILC opted for a system in which
the Court would assert jurisdiction only where domestic jurisdictions
are either unavailable or ineffective. 25 Pursuant to Article 35 of the
Statute, any "interested State" may challenge the admissibility of a
case prior to the commencement of the trial, if a State (which has or
may have jurisdiction) is itself investigating a crime, or has investi-
gated a crime and, upon a decision apparently well-founded, concluded
that it will not proceed to prosecution.
36. The Committee generally agrees that the Statute should favor
domestic prosecutions, where available and effective.
To the extent that an ICC prosecution would merely duplicate the
efforts of a State (or would only marginally improve the likelihood
of successful prosecution), the expense, effort and possible offense
to a sovereigns judicial system, is probably not justified. In addi-
tion, given that State systems are generally better developed at
this point . .. the concept of the ICC as a supplemental court, at
24. As the Special Rapporteur noted:
[Clomplementarity questions . . . arise ... in cases where both the Court
and a State have not only the capacity, but the intent to prosecute the same
crime. [C]omplementarity presupposes that there is a subset of "interested
states" with an interest in prosecuting these cases.... To resolve whether
[an interested State] ... may claim precedence over the prosecution of an
international crime, the ILC Draft must address five issues:
(1)What factors define an "interested state" for purposes of challenging ICC
jurisdiction;
(2)As between two competent forums, the ICC and the domestic court of an
interested state, which forum has priority;
(3)What standard shall apply for determining the competency of a domestic
forum;
(4)Who has the burden of proof in determining whether a domestic forum is
competent;
(5)What institution will ultimately resolve whether a domestic forum is
competent and at what stage of the proceedings.
Jeff Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENv. J. INTL L. & PoL'l281-82 (1997).
25. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Preamble, text 3.
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least in theory, seems proper.26
However, the Committee strongly feels that it should be the Court, not
States, that determines whether a case is admissible.27 Notwithstand-
ing, it may be that Article 35 requires an amendment in order to more
clearly specify the situations in which the Court should find a case
inadmissible.
28
37. The Committee is aware of States' fears that the Court will be-
come a supranational entity and the various efforts made in the ILC
Draft to assuage this concern, including the regime of State consent
and the principle of complementarity which is understandable in this
regard. While at least some members of the Committee believe that
this supranationalism is inevitable (and, indeed a positive aspect of
the Court), the Committee, as a whole, understands the legitimate con-
cern States may have in preserving the integrity of their criminal jus-
tice systems, and indeed, their sovereignty as a whole. Nevertheless,
particularly as regards issues such as arrest and transfer, as well as
the collection of evidence, if requests from the Court were to be treated
as if they were merely requests from any other State, this would pose,
potentially, insurmountable problems for the Court's functioning. Evi-
dence could disappear, suspects could vanish - indeed, the very ad-
vantage that stems from having a permanent Court as opposed to an
ad hoc tribunal would largely evaporate. Thus, the Committee recom-
mends that requests from the Court, particularly as regards arrest and
transfer of the accused and the collection of evidence, should be on a
"fast track," treated not like any other State request, but specially and
quickly implemented. Indeed, States should be required to implement
such legislation as a condition of adhering to the Court's statute.
V. CONCLUSION
38. The Committee is confident in the view that none of the legal
issues raised by the Court's creation are intractable in nature. Consis-
tent with its charge, the Committee's report addresses key elements of
the proposed Court's Statute as opposed to undertaking an article by
article analysis of the 1994 ILC Draft. Subsequent reports will address
issues not commented upon here. The Committee hopes its work will
prove useful to the members of the Preparatory Committee in their de-
liberations and urges them to consider this report and the reports an-
nexed thereto in their discussions over the next year.
26. Bleich, supra note 24, at 289-90.
27. Similarly, the Committee feels that a State challenging the jurisdiction of the
Court (Art. 34) or the admissibility of a case (Art. 35) should bear the burden of estab-
lishing that a case is not admissible. See Bleich, supra note 24, at 291.
28. In addition, the difference between "jurisdiction" and "admissibility" is not al-
ways clear. It would be preferable if the Statute either employed a unitary concept or ex-
plicitly defined the relationship between these two ideas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. General
Some have said that the potential creation of an international
criminal court "could transform the United Nations into a third gener-
ation international organization capable of meeting the new impera-
tives of human security."2
1. Obstacles Abound3
The opportunity to create an international court that provides fair,
equitable, and efficient justice is rare and important. It requires exper-
tise in comparative and international law. Problems are serious, how-
ever. Failure to address the formidable problems could cause the Court
to run a risk of failure that could be disastrous for international law,
for the victims of the horrors that have occurred and that will occur,
and for the world. Failure could come in at least two forms: (1) the
Court could merely be a conduit for retribution after a pro-forma kan-
garoo court or (2) it will not have sufficient funding or expertise to
prosecute fairly, justly, and efficiently, so that all or most of the perpe-
trators will escape justice, unless national or regional courts take ac-
tion. International law may be disparaged as meaningless. The victims
of the horrific violations of the laws of humanity will have to live with
the knowledge that the perpetrators, who flaunted the laws of human-
ity in the most cruel ways, walk free. The perpetrators and their vic-
tims know that fact. The cause of justice and international law or the
cause of an international criminal court or set of courts could be set
back badly.4
This point is not to suggest that we should not go forward with
prosecuting those who commit atrocities. Rather, we should not do so
to make us feel good, but to succeed. Failure could harm not only val-
ues that we all hold to be important, but also could weaken interna-
tional law.5 The danger of failure is a mockery of international law giv-
ing impetus to those who suggest that it is not law at all! Now that
2. Richard J. Ponzio, Beyond 1995: Negotiating a New United Nations Through Arti-
cle 109, 20 FLETCHER F. WoRLD ArT. 149, 152 (1996) (footnote omitted).
3. See Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.
4. One member of the Committee felt that the risk of failure was overstated by the
author. In the views of that member, reading between the lines, the real fear of most
democratic governments (including our own) concerning the ICC is not that it will fail,
but that it will succeed - that is, that there will be established a tribunal that will be
independent enough to try to hold governments (including superpower governments) ac-
countable. The writer of this report feels that the fear indicated in this footnote rein-
forces the need to make certain that the court meets the highest standard of protecting
the rights of the accused. Otherwise it will provide a rationale for opposition or refusal
to participate.
5. My point is that pretending to do something is worse than doing nothing, so we
must not allow this to be mere pretense.
VOL. 25:2234
JURISDICTION, DEFINITIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY
the process has begun, we owe it to ourselves and to all humanity to
make it succeed. This report will attempt to provide some insight into
some of the problems facing the creation of an international criminal
court, so that we may understand and resolve them. This report will
analyze relevant portions of the Statute of the International Law Com-
mission (ILO) for the Creation of an International Criminal Court.6
Where appropriate, this piece will refer to the experiences of the Ad
Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I will focus on
the articles and issues that I find to be of interest or about which
there is some significant discrepancy among the Statutes or those
which pose serious policy-based or interpretive problems.7
2. Problems Caused by Trying to Merge Two Systems
Both the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ILC Draft Statute have at-
tempted to combine essential aspects of the so-called "adversarial" or
"common law" and "civilian" or "inquisitorial" systems. This effort is
6. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Ses-
sion, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May-22 July 1994, UN. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft
Statute]. The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3917th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] is currently function-
ing in the Hague, having indicted several persons at this writing. These indictments in-
dude the July 11, 1996, indictment of political leader Radovan Karadzic and General
Ratko Mladic for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia. They are each charged with ge-
nocide. See Marlise Simons, Broader Warrants Issued for 2 Bosnia Serbs, N.Y Times,
July 20, 1996, at 1, col. 1; Bruce Zagaris, Yugoslavia Tribunal Issues New Arrest War-
rants Against Karadzic and Mladic and Initiates Investigation against Serbian Presi-
dent,, 12 INT'L ENF. L. RpmIn Issue 8, at 312 (Aug. 1996). In addition, several other Bos-
nian Serbs have been charged with raping at least fourteen Muslim women. Indictment
of Gagovic & Others, Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), noted in the Aspen Institute,
Justice and Society Program, Int'l Human Rts. Update at 3 (Spring 1996). An investiga-
tion the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic currently is being undertaken by the
ICTY, The Hague, to determine whether he shares any responsibility for the atrocities
that occurred in Bosnia. See Zagaris, supra, note 6, at 314; Julius Strauss, Man of the
Sword Forged in Heat of Twisted History, THE EuROPEAN, July 18-24, 1996, at 3, col.1;
Stephen Kinzer, Hague Tribunal Weighs International Arrest Warrants for 2 Top Bosnia
Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1996, at A10; Jonathan Randal, Tribunal Hears Testimony
That Mladic Was at Bosnia Massacre Sites, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at A25, col. 4. Al-
though the continued viability of the ICTY remains uncertain, its prospects for success
and positive impact are improving.
7. To have jurisdiction, the Tribunal must find that there has been a violation of in-
ternational humanitarian law which entails individual criminal responsibility. Antonio
Cassese, President, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Memo-
randum, Definition of Crimes and General Principles of Criminal Law as Reflected in the
International Tribunal's Jurisprudence 5 (Mar. 26, 1996), at 5 [hereinafter Cassesse
Memorandum], sent to Members of Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court. See also The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-
5 (Trial Chamber) [hereinafter Tadic I], Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 Oct. 1995) (Appeals
Chamber) [hereinafter Tadic II]. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to % 2 of S.C. Res. 808 (S/25704, 3 May 1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's
Report].
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laudable and ultimately ought to be done. It must be balanced very
carefully, however, with attention being paid to subtlety and detail. In-
stitutions of different systems are not fungible. Conceptualization and
function and substance and process are often totally different in one
system from what they are in another. Examples abound: cross-
examination was allowed in the Nurnberg Trials, but most German de-
fense counsel had no experience and were incapable. Care and discre-
tion in choice and application are required. The defense team for Mr.
Tadic in the Hague seem to be doing quite well, but, as more and more
individuals are tried, education in general may be necessary. Counsel
and judges from diverse legal systems must be taught the essentials of
the various concepts, institutions, and procedures of the systems of
which they are not generally participants.
B. Legal Basis For and Authority to Establish an Ad Hoc Tribunal or
Permanent Court
Although the following section is not directly focused directly or
solely on jurisdiction, crimes or the triggering mechanisms, it is neces-
sary as a preliminary matter. Proper analysis of these topics depend
on the points made directly below.
1. Approaches
Several possible approaches are available: (1) tribunal created by a
statute - multilateral convention; (2) tribunal created pursuant to the
authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter (either permanent or ad hoc); (3) tribunal created pursuant to the
authority of the General Assembly alone (under Article 22) or com-
bined with that of the Security Council (per Chapter VII); (4) a tribu-
nal created by amending the U.N. Charter, specifically calling for its
creation, in a manner similar to the International Court of Justice.
Members of the International Law Commission debated the issue of
which method would be the most appropriate and efficient.
2. Possible Creation by the U.N. Security Council
The traditional, most authoritative, means to create a permanent
international criminal court would be by multilateral convention.8 The
Security Council, on the other hand, may have the authority, arguably,
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.9 The Security Council
took the latter approach, creating the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former
8. Secretary General's Report, supra note 7, 1 19; e.g., Charter of the Int'l Military
Tribunal or London Charter, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 (1945) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
9. See, e.g., Colin Warbrick, The United Nations System; A Place for Criminal
Courts?, 5 TRANSNATL L. & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 237 (1995); Roger S. Clark & Ved P. Nanda,
An Introduction to the Symposium on International Criminal Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNMp. PROBs. i (1995); Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.
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Yugoslavia. The ILC took the conventional approach in its recommen-
dation for a permanent court. It can be argued that the creation of the
Tribunals pursuant to the authority of the U.N. Charter and under the
auspices of the Security Council is done by treaty. One practical prob-
lem with this view, however, is that the U.N. Charter is not seen as
self-executing in the United States.
The Ad Hoc Tribunals, thus, operate pursuant to the authority of
Chapter VII. It may be maintained that nations which are members of
the U.N. have agreed ab initio to abide by the will of the Security
Council when it acts consistently with its authority under the Charter.
Are non-member nations also subject to authoritative decisions of the
Security Council? Are they bound by decisions of a Tribunal created
pursuant to the authority of the Security Council? What is the author-
ity under international law to require non-member states to abide by
such rulings? Does customary international law so provide?10 The Tri-
bunal and its proponents, of course, argue affirmatively."
3. Creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
The Secretary-General argued that the treaty approach would
take too long and would be too arduous. Security Council Resolution
808 required quicker action,' 2 so the Secretary recommended that
Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide the basis. 3 Chapter VII covers
"Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression." The creation of the ad hoc Tribunals was thus a
"measure to maintain or restore international peace and security, fol-
lowing the requisite determination of the existence of a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 4 All states would be
under a binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry
out an enforcement measure under Chapter VII. 15 The ad hoc ap-
10. See contra, e.g., GRGORY TuNm, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 123-33 (1974)
(international law is based on consent); G. vAN HoOw, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 76-82 (1983); Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.
11. Opposing positions are put elsewhere. See, e.g., presentation in Blakesley, Obsta-
cles, supra note 1. See also, BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at chs. 1 & 2; A.
D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS & PROSPECT
ch. 1 (1987); Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Law?, ch. 3 in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY (1994). See also, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 6.
12. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 20-21.
13. kd 23.
14. Id. 22 (emphasis added).
15. Id. 23. UN Charter article 41: "[t]he Security Council may decide what mea-
sures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its deci-
sions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such mea-
sures ... ." U.N. CHARTER, art. 41. Article 42 adds:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
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proach ought only to be a stop-gap, rather than a permanent approach;
it would be a mistake to have a series of ad hoc tribunals rather than
a permanent court or set of permanent (regional) courts. 6
C. Individual Criminal Responsibility - The Issue of Impunity
The following discussion is an aside, but it seems important to un-
derstanding issues of jurisdiction, crimes and triggering mechanisms.
1. Niirnberg Principle No. I
Niirnberg Principle No. I (1946) provides the basis for the creation
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
and for a permanent international criminal court for prosecuting viola-
tions of humanitarian law. It reads: "[Amny person who commits an act
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible there-
for and liable to punishment." As the IMT held, crimes against human-
ity are committed by human beings, not by abstract entities. The prin-
ciple retains its currency amidst the horrors of the "modern," post-cold-
war era.
Hitler emphasized the previous inability to prosecute or to sanc-
tion crimes against humanity, when at Niirnberg in 1936, he said,
"[a]nd who now remembers the Armenians?" 17 Indeed, it is particularly
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 42. It would seem that if use of force is allowed as a "measure" under
article 42, a fortiori, the creation of an ad hoc international criminal court should be.
Will the Ad Hoc Tribunal have authority to continue its prosecutions after "peace"
and "security are restored" in the former Yugoslavia? Authority to do so depends on
whether its mandate calls for more than restoration of peace. Articles 41 and 42 seem to
provide this authority. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to restore and maintain
peace and security. This seems to include the power to create an effective war crimes tri-
bunal to help restore or maintain peace and security. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1;
Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International
War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 270 (1994). The "life-span" of the tribunal
was "linked to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related thereto."
See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 28; U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII, especially
arts. 41 & 42, discussed infra. If this means that the Tribunal will cease to exist when
"peace" and security are "restored," it may pose a serious problem and would not pro-
mote justice or restore or maintain peace or security. The term "maintenance" of peace
and security should be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal may continue to function
as long as it helps to restore or maintain peace or security. This allows prosecutions to
occur after the conflict.
16. On the other hand, a sub-set of individuals in the International Law Commis-
sion have argued that the more appropriate approach would be to allow the Security
Council to establish a new tribunal or to extend the mandate of the Yugoslav tribunal.
17. J.F. WILLS, PROLOGUE TO Nf-REMBERG 173 (1982) citing Sir Ogilvie-Forbes' report
of August 1939, with enclosures of Hitler's speech to Chief Commanders and Command-
ing Generals, August 22, 1939, Great Britain, Foreign Office, DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939 (E.L. Woodward et. al., 3rd series, 9 vols. 1949-55).
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revealing that he would preface his policy of extermination of Jews,
Gypsies, Slavs and others by revealing that the absence of interest
from the world community, in effectively prosecuting such conduct and
in creating appropriate international structures to enforce this pro-
scription, gave him the comfort of knowing that he might get away
with it, as others had in the past. This sense of impunity breeds con-
tempt. The claimed dichotomy between peace and justice is a chimera.
It is not true and it is dangerous to suggest that somehow not punish-
ing those who commit atrocities lends itself to peace. Even if some sort
of "peace" erupts when one side or the other of a conflict wins, the fail-
ure to bring those who have committed atrocities to justice will fester
and breed the next set.18 A fair and competent tribunal will be careful
not to indulge self-destructive Robespierre justice.
2. The Essence and Purpose of a Tribunal
Beccaria knew that impunity, especially for certain horrific crimes,
impeded both peace and justice: "The conviction of finding nowhere a
span of earth where real crimes were pardoned might be the most effi-
cacious way of preventing their occurrence."'9 Individual criminal re-
sponsibility must be the cornerstone of any international criminal
court. It is the cornerstone of any prosecution of international crime.
Article 7 of the Ad Hoc Statute explicitly provides for individual re-
sponsibility.20 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute, however, never addresses
this primordial point, although its very existence is based on its as-
sumption. The creation of a permanent court reinforces the idea of in-
dividual criminal responsibility and provides a mechanism to fight the
tendency of some to feel impunity for conduct like the commission of
18. See BLAKESLEY, TERROmSM, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
19. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764), translated in JAMES FARRER, CRUMES &
PUNIsHMENTS 193-94 (1880).
20. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a
crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be in-
dividually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable mea-
sures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal respon-
sibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the In-
ternational Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
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extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture, and other gross vio-
lations of international criminal law. 21
II. CRIMEs - THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PENAL CODE
An international criminal code is crucial. The nature of interna-
tional society, the sophistication and transnational nature of modem
crime, and ever increasing interdependency among States all call for
the promulgation of a new code of international crime. It may be ar-
gued that the ILC Draft Code of Crimes is too controversial, vague,
and weak to provide the needed definition and codal coherency re-
quired to comply with the principle of lggalitg or nullem poena sine
lege. Some argue that customary international law is sufficient, but
others suggest that some "customary international law offenses" are
too vague. 22 It is important that any prosecution be based on offenses
that have specific, well defined elements. Cooperation can take place
at a bilateral level, but must also take place at the multilateral level.
The member states of the Council of Europe have realized that bilat-
eral cooperation alone is wholly insufficient. They have developed a
number of multilateral conventions on interstate cooperation in penal
matters.23 In recent times, the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.) has embarked on the same course of conduct, for the same
reasons.
III. STATUS AND LEGAL CAPACITY
Article 4 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute provides that the Court
would be a permanent institution. The United States would like it to
function only on an ad hoc basis.24 The ILC Draft provides for immu-
nity of its institutions from constraints usually imposed pursuant to
state sovereignty. It "shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be neces-
sary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its pur-
poses," in the territory of each State party.25
21. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESTABLISHING A JUST, FAIR AND EFFEcTrvE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL CoUR 2 (Oct. 1994).
22. I am among those of the latter group.
23. See, e.g., EUROPEAN INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, (Ekkehart,
Mfiller-Rappard, M. Cherif and Bassiouni, 3 Vols. 1987); CHRISTINE VAN DEN WYNGAERT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994); B. RISTAU & M. AB-
BELL, 3 INTL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (revised 1994); PHIL FENNELL, CHRISTOPHER HARDING,
Nico JORG, & BERT SWART, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, Chs. 18-
19 (1995).
24. Comments of the Government of the United States of America on the Draft Arti-
cles for a Statute of an International Criminal Tribunal 3 (June 1, 1994).
25. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 4(2).
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IV. JURISDICTION
A. Territorial & Temporal Competence
The jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is limited in time and
space. The first covers conduct occurring since January 1, 1991, in the
territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, includ-
ing its land surface, airspace, and territorial waters. 26 The second is
limited to breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda be-
tween January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.27 A permanent tribu-
nal would not be so limited. Article 4 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute
provides that "[t]he Court is a permanent institution ... [which] shall
act when required to consider a case submitted to it. The Court shall
enjoy in the territory of each State party such legal capacity as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its
purpose." The Court's temporal and territorial jurisdiction, however,
may be limited by the regime of state consent and the triggering mech-
anism used to bring cases to the Court, as described below.
B. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae - What Crimes are Covered?
1. Conventions, General Principles, and Customary International
Law
The sources of law and prescriptive jurisdiction for either an ad
hoc or a permanent international criminal court involve concentric cir-
cles of overlapping, possibly antagonistic or redundant prescriptive ju-
risdiction. Extremely complicated elements of proof and concomitant
jurisdictional prerequisites may tend to trigger even more conflict.28
On the other hand, treaty law, general principles of a jus cogens na-
ture and customary international law, as well as universal jurisdiction,
provide a system of laws prohibiting the conduct that most instinc-
tively consider to be serious crimes.29 These efforts must be articulated
clearly, as mentioned above in Part II. Generally, the statutes under
consideration in this report may be considered to cover crimes against
humanity, genocide, violations of the customary law of war, and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. These acts, in turn may include:
26. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 99 60-63; 1994 ILC Draft Statute,
supra note 6, art. 8.
27. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Commited
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwanda Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, arts. 2-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1598 (1994) [hereinafter Rwanda Statute].
28. See Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1, at 87-
90.
29. See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1 (attempting to establish
the parameters and nature of these offenses).
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inter alia; slavery; apartheid; unlawful human experimentation; tor-
ture; unlawful use of weapons; use of unlawful weapons; piracy, hi-
jacking, and sabotage of vessels and aircraft; attacks against and
seizures of internationally protected persons; hostage taking; destruc-
tion or theft of national treasures; theft of nuclear materials; cutting
international submarine cables; and environmental harm.
The language of the statutes, arguably, also could cover violations
of customary law relating to violations of human rights, the substance
of Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949. Although the ICTY Statute language does not include com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or Protocols I and II, the lan-
guage of the statutes also could cover violations of customary law re-
lating to violations of human rights, the substance of Protocols I and II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. The juris-
prudence of the Appeals Chamber, in Tadic, supports the inclusion of
common Article 3, within ICTY Statute Article 3.30 Protocol I is cov-
ered clearly in the ILC Draft and apparently in the Rwanda Statute,3 1
but not in that of the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Bosnia. On the other hand,
the ILC Draft's language does not specifically cover conduct prohibited
by Common Article 3 or Protocol II, which relates to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict. This deficiency is a seri-
ous one. Internal armed conflict may be the most wide-spread type of
violent conduct today. It may be considered a travesty that egregious
violations of humanitarian law may go unpunished due to this hiatus.
It is possible to argue, however, that the egregious internal conduct is
covered by customary international law or by jus cogens principles. 32
30. See Thdic Decision, U.N. Doc. LT-94-1-AR72, at 71, 137, 35 I.L.M., at 71; noted
in Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Developments: The
Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly, 90 AM.
J. IN . L. 491, 503 (1996).
31. UN Doc. S11995/134, at 3-4, % 12 (Secretary General's Report, regarding the
Rwanda Statute, noting that the Security Council decided "to take a more expansive ap-
preach to the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute of the Yu-
goslav Tribunal." Discussed in Akhavan, Current Developments, supra note 38, at 503-
504. The Report also suggests that the Security Council has included, therefore, "inter-
national instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of customary in-
ternational law or whether they customarily have entailed the individual criminal re-
sponsibility of the perpetrator of the crime.' Id. at 504.
32. See, eg., argument for the existence of a common core of values and, hence, a
common core of crimes, based on jus cogens, in BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISm, supra note 1, at
ch. 1; see also, Amnesty International, supra note 21; Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of
International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y. 499, 504-05 (1994) [hereinafter Paust, Applicability]; Jordan J. Paust, Customary
International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 59, 64-67, & authority in n. 42 (1990); OLIVER ST AL., supra note 1, at chs. 3,
16 & 17.
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2. The Principle of Ldgalitd or nullum crimen sine lege
Although both the Ad Hoc Tribunal's Statute and the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute ostensibly incorporate this principle, they also poten-
tially violate it. Article 39 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute provides:
An accused shall not be held guilty: (a) in the case of a prosecution
with respect referred to in article 20(a) to (d) [see infra], unless the
act or omission in question constituted a crime under international
law; (b) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred
to in article 20(e), unless the treaty in question was applicable to
the conduct of the accused; at the time the act or omission
occurred.
We will consider below, the deficiencies of both treaty and customary
international law, which ostensibly is included by reference or implica-
tion in the statutes. Essentially, the problem is that the elements of
the offenses arising out of general international law may be too vague
if their definition does not provide the elements required by interna-
tional criminal and human rights law. A person may not be convicted
of a crime without explicit and specific iteration (promulgation) of the
elements to be proved. Failure to do this will end-up making a mock-
ery of international criminal law and of the Tribunal.
The ICTY Statute, commentary to Article 1 (Competence of the Tri-
bunal), and Article 2, do a better job at providing more explicitly and
adroitly the elements of the proscribed conduct, although there are
still deficiencies. Article 1 proscribes "serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yu-
goslavia since 1991." The Commentary (really the Secretary-General's
Report on this point) provides that:
The international tribunal shall prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law ... While
there is international customary law which is not laid down in con-
ventions, some of the major conventional humanitarian law has be-
come part of customary international law.
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the
principle nullem crimen sine lege requires that the international
tribunal should apply rules . . . which are, beyond any doubt, part
of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not
all States to specific conventions does not arise .... The part of
conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond
doubt become part of international customary law is the law appli-
cable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Con-
vention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal of 8 August 1945 [Nfiremberg] [footnotes omitted].
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This analysis is correct, but it does not go far enough. It is neces-
sary that the particular offense be proscribed clearly (i.e., not vaguely)
by a treaty or by some other authoritative source of international law,
e.g., jus cogens principles or customary international law. The wording
of the commentary and of the statutes themselves may not measure
up. This deficiency pervades both Ad Hoc Statutes and the ILC Draft
Statute. The deficiency is potentially devastating! Professor Bassiouni
and other international criminal law experts who understand both the
international law and the criminal law issues, have resolved some, but
not all of the problems. Ad Hoc Statute Articles 2-5, provide an exam-
ple at some criminal law input and these articles are much better than
the prescriptions in the ILC Draft, which apparently were adopted
without much input from experts in the criminal law.
C. Crimes-Prescriptive Jurisdiction: Content of Humanitarian Law
and Catalogue of Offenses
1. The Ad Hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Article 1, Competence of the International Tribunal, reads: "The
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons re-
sponsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accor-
dance with the provisions of the present Statute."33 This authority
derives from the mandate set out in paragraph 1 of S.C. Res. 808
(1993). It is interesting to note that humanitarian law has tradition-
ally included the Hague and Geneva rules. Is the nature and content of
this changing? Article 2 then lists, as punishable offenses, committing
or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the relevant Geneva
Convention specified below:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
[apparently it must be both wanton and unlawful];
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
of a hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;3'
33. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, arts. 1-5; see also id. 33-49.
34. One cannot help but notice some potential for inconsistency here. In a military
trial in Bosnia, the defendants were convicted after confessing, but their confessions
were not corroborated and defendants claimed that they were issued under torture and
repeated beating, which seemed to be corroborated by medical evidence. If a trial is egre-
giously unfair, do the statutes of the Tribunals allow for prosecution of those who were
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(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian; and
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Article 3 specifies that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute
"violations of the laws or customs of war" and illustratively lists:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Article 4, Genocide, provides:
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this arti-
cle or of persons committing any of the other acts enumerated in
paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or relig-
ious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.
Article 5, Crimes Against Humanity, reads:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute per-
sons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
responsible for violations of rights in trials such as that which take place in war-ravaged
places? See Bosnia Convicts and Sentences to Death 2 Serbs, 9 INT'L L. REP. 147 (No.9,
Apr. 1993); John F. Burns, 2 Serbs Shot for Killings and Rapes, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 31,
1993, A6, col.4; David B. Ottaway, Bosnia Convicts 2 Serbs in War Crimes Trial, WASH.
PoST, Mar. 31, 1993, A21, col.1. Certainly, the fairness of the trials must be ensured, but
will prosecution for unfair trials apply to all sides? Jim Nafziger notes that, indeed, the
power of individuals in the U.N. Forces or in the employ of the Tribunal might be such
that it could be abused. The system should ensure the sanction of those who so abuse
their power. This is discussed infra at notes 110-112, and accompanying text.
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conflict, whether international or internal in character, and di-
rected against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) other inhumane acts.
Article 4 provides for jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and
Article 5 covers crimes against humanity. Note, the last item on the
list is "other inhumane acts."35 The Statute takes some license on
"crimes against humanity," adding some that are not included in the
Geneva Convention (IV), but which are in the Genocide Convention.
Although Geneva law covers inhumane or inhuman acts, these phrases
may still be too vague and imprecise. Does this vagueness pose a po-
tential violation of the principle or legality or nullum crimen sine lege?
Whatever conduct is covered must be clearly and explicitly proscribed
by relevant international law.6 The Rwanda Statute does not require
that the inhumane acts occur in armed conflict. With twenty-two cate-
gories of international crimes represented in 314 international instru-
ments enacted between 1815 and 1988, many of which do not properly
define in criminal law terms the offenses proscribed or provide their
elements, it is necessary that the offenses be codified or otherwise
clearly defined. Some of the vagueness may have been eliminated by
customary international law or by general principles arising out of do-
mestic refinement of the ambiguous terms of treaties. 3 7
Articles 2-5 of the ICTY Statute, provide that the Tribunal shall
have jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.38 The Secretary General's Report notes that only
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5 (I). The Rwanda Tribunal Statute, art. 6(c),
unlike the ICTY Statute, art. 5, requires expressly that the prosecution prove that the
enumerated "inhumane acts" be committed against a civilian population, "on national,
political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds." See discussion on Genocide, infra.
36. See, eg., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1942); quoted in the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Opinion, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 44 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 172, 220 (1947).
37. This is what the United States and many other countries did with hostage tak-
ing and hijacking, for example.
38. On crimes against humanity, see generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (1992); and Roger Clark, Crimes
Against Humanity, ch. 7, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Ginsburgs
& Kudriavtsev eds., 1990). See also Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nurem-
berg: Crimes Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTs. 547 (1996) (arguing that many of these crimes are defined clearly enough)
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crimes which have clearly and beyond any doubt become part of cus-
tomary law may be prosecuted. 39 How much this helps any legality
problem is still open to some discussion, but it is intended to include
the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in the Geneva Con-
ventions, the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, and the Regulations an-
nexed thereto.40 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948;41 and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945.42 It certainly would
include more, but this would have to be established and the elements
clarified.4 3
Although the ICTY Statute, Article 2, makes reference to Protocols
I and II and to the Geneva Conventions, a question still could be
raised as to whether the conflict on the territory of the Former Yugo-
slavia is international or internal and as to what exact impact this de-
termination will have.
Article 3 does not specifically address rape as such, but rape is
covered in other provisions, such as ICTY 5(g). Crimes against human-
ity were explicitly recognized in the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment
and in Control Council Law No. 10." These rules have clearly become
part of customary international law and indeed, articulate "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations."" Rape is not listed in
the Nairnberg Charter, but is listed in Control Council Law No. 10,
which also deleted "in execution of in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."" In Indictment of Gagovic & Others,
Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), the ICTY indicted eight Serbian
military, paramilitary and police men, charging them with raping four-
teen Muslim women. This is the first time that rape has been charged
as a specific and separate indictable war crime. The indictment details
[hereinafter Paust, Threats to Accountability].
39. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 1 34 & 35.
40. Hague Convention (No.IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and the Regulations annexed thereto, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
41. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
42. IMT Charter, supra note 8. Secretary General's Report, supra note 7, 37-49
spells out these various offenses.
43. See, eg., Paust, Threats to Accountability, supra note 38.
44. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, T 47. Letter from the late Frank C.
Newman to Professor Blakesley, September 21, 1993.
45. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, at art. 38, 91 1(c); BLAKESLEY,
TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
48. For a general discussion, see M.Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual
Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper No. 1,
(DePaul Intl Hum. Rts. Inst. 1996)]. Furthermore, "[a]trocities and offenses included but
not limited to [murder, etc.]" was substituted for "namely" and a specific list. Thanks to
the late Justice Frank C. Newman for this latter point. See also Paust, Applicability,
supra note 32, at 516-17; JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 1020-21 (1996).
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acts of sexual assault, charging the perpetrators with committing
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and of violating the laws or customs of war.
47
Crimes against humanity include crimes aimed at any civilian
population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are commit-
ted in an international or internal armed conflict. 4s Questions are
raised by some of the language of the ICTY Statute. Other inhumane
acts of a very serious nature, proscribed by relevant international law,
refer to such as wilful killing, torture, or rape against any civilian pop-
ulation on political, racial, or religious grounds. Does ICTY Article 5's
phrase "in armed conflict" mean during armed conflict? Why does Arti-
cle 5(1), unlike control Council Law No. 10, use the term "crimes" in-
stead of "atrocities and offenses" and "directed against" instead of
"committed against" and why does (2) delete "including but not limited
to?"49 Finally, to be consistent with Law No. 10, indicated above, Arti-
cle 5 of the statute should have concluded as follows: "(g) rape, or (h)
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or (i)
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds." In the conflict in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken
the form of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and widespread and systematic
rape and other forms of sexual assault, including forced prostitution.50
The tribunal, thus, has the authority to prosecute persons responsible
for the indicated crimes - murder; extermination; enslavement; depor-
tation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial,
and religious grounds; other inhumane acts - when committed in an
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character and di-
rected against any civilian population.5 1
2. The 1994 ILC Draft Statute
Article 20 provides that,
the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with re-
spect to the following crimes:
(a) genocide;
(b) aggression;
(c) serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict;
(d) crimes against humanity;
47. Indictment of Gagovic & Others, Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), noted in
the Aspen Institute, Justice and Society Program, Int'l Human Rts. Update at 3 (Spring
1996).
48. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, $ 47.
49. Again, thanks to Frank Newman.
50. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, $ 48. See Bassiouni & McCormick,
supra note 46.
51. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 49, citing ICTY Statute art. 5.
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(e) crimes, established under or pursuant to the treaty provision
listed in the Annex, which, having regard to the conduct alleged,
constitute exceptionally serious crimes of international concern.
The strategy of the ILC contemplated having the treaty as the instru-
ment for defining what was proscribed and punishable under the Stat-
ute. While accepting treaty as the primary source, it went beyond the
definitions in the treaty in incorporating by reference other crimes de-
rived from other sources. Other sources include: crimes under general
international law, and certain crimes "under national law," aimed at
enabling the so-called "suppression conventions." 2 These incorporate or
call upon notions of both customary international law and general
principles of international law. The "Mercenaries Convention" (not yet
in force) is excluded, but the Narcotics Convention, the Torture Con-
vention, and, the Genocide, Hijacking, crimes against internationally
protected persons, war crimes, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and Protocol I to the Geneva latter conventions and the Apartheid
Convention are all included.
The inclusion of the term offenses against "general international
law," which was in the prior draft, was controversial within the ILC
and was eventually removed. Some such crimes may still be included,
if one deems custom and general principle to be a source of criminal
law. These are crimes falling within "a norm of international law ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as being of such a fundamental character that its violation at-
tracts the criminal responsibility of individuals." 53 These are the so-
called common core of crimes.54 The referenced conduct is certainly
criminal, but the problem and controversy relate to the term itself and
the often vague and defective nature of the definition of these offenses
in international law. Specificity of elements and definition is not often
significantly improved by extant conventions. International criminal
law conventions have often been negotiated and drafted by interna-
tional lawyers sometimes unfamiliar with criminal law. Hence, the
rigid and rigorous requirements of criminal law and criminal justice
have often been wanting. Specific elements must be clear so that they
may be proved by the evidence. This undertaking requires generally an
actus reus and a mens rea, which combine to cause a specifically pro-
52. Crawford, supra note 1, at 143.
53. See Crawford, supra note 1, at 144; BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1
& 3.
54. For elaboration and analysis of the common core of crimes, see BLAKESLEY, TER-
RORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
305 (2nd ed. 1979); BAssIOUNI, supra note 38, at 470-98; Int'l Committee of the Red
Cross, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 To THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS 9J 3539 (1987). The problem of whether crimes established by custom are part
of U.S. federal "common law" is troublesome. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack A. Gold-
smith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997).
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hibited social harm. Crimes must be promulgated with specificity, ei-
ther in treaties or in implementing legislation or even in judicial inter-
pretation of the broad or vague standards so as to create sufficiently
clear and provable material elements. If the definition and elements
are wanting, however, conviction violates human rights law. The list-
ing of crimes in Article 20 (a)-(e) is some improvement but still not
sufficient.
With respect to war crimes, Article 20 of the 1994 ILC Draft Stat-
ute may be sufficiently broad to cover offenses prohibited under the
terms of Protocols I and II. It clearly covers Protocol I. On the other
hand, the ILC Draft's failure to include acts prohibited by Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions or by Protocol II is unfortunate.55 It
is possible that Article 20(c) of the ILC Draft, which reads: "serious vi-
olations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflict . . ." is
broad enough to include violations of humanitarian law in both inter-
national and non-international armed conflict.5
Article 21(1)(a) calls for inherent jurisdiction over genocide. Profes-
sor Wedgwood argues persuasively, however, that genocide is difficult
to define. 57 These offenses are intimidating to any judge and risk injus-
tice, because their complexity and difficulty increases geometrically
each time an element of proof is added, especially when each element
is vague.58 For example, argues Professor Wedgwood, the "specific in-
tent" element for genocide, "intent to destroy in whole or in part" a re-
ligious, ethnic, national, or racial group, is very difficult to establish.59
55. But see Paust, Applicability, supra note 32, at 511-12 & 512 n.40 (grave
breaches provisions can reach common Article 3).
56. See Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 11; Paust, Threats to Accountabil-
ity, supra note 38.
57. Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271. Article 3 of the Ad Hoc Statute refers to the
"violations of the laws or customs of war," which some argue has traditionally referred to
violations of humanitarian law in international armed conflict, essentially those offenses
stemming from the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, its annexed Regulations, and the
Geneva Conventions. See Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1, at 88; Amnesty Interna-
tional, supra note 21, at 12. Secretary of State (then-Ambassador) Albright and others
have argued that Article 3 of the Ad Hoc Tribunal is broad enough to include offenses
such as those covered by common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Ambassador Al-
bright, Statement, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 15 (25 May 1993), quoted in Theodor Meron,
War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
78, 82 (1994); PAUST ET AL, supra note 46, at 969, 975-76, 991-94. To cover the conduct
in Rwanda, the applicable standards must apply to offenses which occur in internal
armed conflict. For this to occur under the current Ad Hoc Tribunal rules, Common Arti-
cle 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II can be applied by extension
via customary international law orjus cogens, see Amnesty International, supra note 21,
at 12; ICTY, supra note 6, art. 4 (referring to Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol
II in a non-exhaustive list, and applicable as part of the "laws of war" or "humanitarian
law."). See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Nullum Crimen and Related Crimes, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& PoL'Y328 (arguing that it is neither difficult to define nor to prosecute.)
58. Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271.
59. Id. Note US. Reservations and Understandings Relating to the Convention on
VOL. 25:2
JURISDICTION, DEFINITIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY
The difficulty is evident, for example, in circumstances where a given
commander is charged with specifically intending to destroy, in whole
or in part, a relevant group, when the evidence indicates that his
soldiers ran amok. Generally, there will be no relevant contemporane-
ous statements from the commanders or from the soldiers.6 0 Proving
specific intent to kill is one thing; proving the specific invidious intent
required for genocide is another.
3. Distinction between "internal" and "international" conflicts
In October 1995, the Appellate Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal
affirmed the Trial Chamber's ruling, rejecting defendants Tadic's, de-
fense that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the conflict was
civil, not international, and noted that there has been a gradual blur-
ring of the distinction between the customary international law rules
governing international conflicts and those governing internal con-
flicts.61 President Cassese interprets: there has been a "convergence of
two bodies of international law with the result that internal strife is
now governed to a large extent by the rules and principles which had
traditionally only applied to international conflicts."62 To arrive at this
conclusion to protect the participants in hostilities by application of in-
ternational humanitarian law rules, the Appellate Chamber considered
the practice of various states and the interpretations and practice of
various international, including regional, organizations. 63 President
Cassese summarizes the Appellate Chamber's position as follows:
"[T]his convergence has come about due largely to the following four
factors: (1) the increase in the number of civil conflicts; (2) the in-
crease in the level of cruelty of internal conflicts; (3) the increasing in-
terdependence of States; and (4) the influence of universal human
rights standards."64
Genocide, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 779, 782.
60. Id. Of course for criminal responsibility for lesser forms of the offenses discussed
in this report are possible upon proof of a lesser mens rea. E.g., criminal liability based
upon command responsibility may be established by proving that the commander "knew
or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof" ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.3.
61. Tadic I, supra note 7; Tadic II, supra note 7; see also Cassese Memorandum,
supra note 7.
62. Cassese Memorandum, supra note 7, at 5.
63. Id. citing Tadic I, supra note 7, 100, 102, 104, 108, including its considera-
tion of State practice during the Spanish Civil War; the practice of States applying parts
of the Geneva Conventions, per common Article 3; the unilateral willingness of States to
abide by international humanitarian law in their internal conflicts; and actions of the
ICRC; UN General Assembly Resolutions; declarations made by Member States of the
European Union; Additional Protocol II of 1977; and some military manuals. Obviously
some of these are problematical on several counts, including their persuasiveness toward
the creation of international custom.
64. Id. citing Tadic II, supra note 7, 1 97.
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Some argue that this broad proposition of jurisdictional interpreta-
tion as applied to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute or any other statute for
a permanent international criminal court, raises some difficulty. Sover-
eignty concerns, among others, certainly will be raised. 65 President
Cassese puts several limitations to the expanse of the blurring of civil
and international strife:
(1) only a number of rules and principles governing international
armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal
conflicts and (2) this extension has not taken place in the form of
full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts;
rather the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed reg-
ulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal
conflicts.66
President Cassese notes that the 1994 ILC Draft Statute is
broader than the Statute for the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Whereas the Appellate Chamber in the Tadic case considered armed
conflict to be a trigger of jurisdiction, it was not necessary that the
armed conflict be occurring at the time or in the place of the crime.67
ILC Draft Statute Article 20(d) (crimes against humanity) and Rwanda
Statute Article 3 cover the same ground as Article 5 of the Yugoslav
Tribunal Statute, but do not require any nexus to armed conflict. The
statutes are broader, therefore, and any distinction between internal
versus international conflict becomes irrelevant.
4. Is there a gap in the coverage of conduct in internal armed
conflict in relation to Common Article 3 and Protocol II?
Is there conduct that constitutes a crime against humanity, but is
not covered by the 1994 ILC Draft Statute? It should be emphasized
that crimes against humanity are not limited necessarily to conduct
against civilian populations.6 Crimes against humanity in the 1994
ILC Draft Statute are not and should not be linked to War Crimes.
The commentary to ILC Draft Article 20, defines crimes against hu-
manity as: "inhumane acts of a very serious character involving wide-
spread or systematic violation aimed at the civilian population in
whole or in part." Professor Paust considers this language needlessly
65. James Podgers, Cover Story: The World Cries Out for Justice, 82 A.BAJ. 52, 62
(Apr. 1996).
66. Cassese Memorandum, supra note 7, at 6. President Cassese does not elaborate.
I am not at all sure what this means or whether it is meaningful at all. I worry about
prosecuting "general essences."
67. Id. at 7, citing Tadic H, supra note 7, $ 70.
68. See Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 13; PAUST ET AL, supra note 46, at
1028-31, 1035, 1062, 1075-78; Cf Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4; Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US.) 1984
I.C.J. 392; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 6, however does require the civilian pop-
ulation nexus.
VOL. 25:2
JURISDICTION, DEFINITIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY
limiting of responsibility recognized under the customary instruments
pertaining to crimes against humanity. 9 The commentary to the ICTY
Statute suggests and Rwanda Statute Article 6(e) explicitly provides,
that the above-noted language applies to crimes based on "national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."70 There is no reason that
such a limitation should apply and the commentary in that regard
should be ignored. International law today is not limited in application
to crimes against the peace or war crimes, as the judges at Nirnberg
worried. 71 Control Council Law No. 10, provided that "[a]trocities and
offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on po-
litical, racial or religious grounds . . . [are punishable]." 72
Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier subsequently were prosecuted for
crimes against humanity independent of any crimes against the peace
or war crimes. 73 The Commission of Experts on Rwanda concluded that
crimes against humanity need not be connected to crimes against the
peace or war crimes. 74 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute also refers to the
crime of torture as defined in the UN Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN.
Torture Convention). The Annex also includes reference to Apartheid
and offenses relating to hijacking, sabotage, and other terrorist of-
fenses. The U.S. Government has been opposed to Apartheid being
included.
5. Distinction between "War Crimes" and "Crimes against
Humanity"
President Cassese notes that the distinction has become concrete.
Professor Orentlicher notes that
69. Paust, Threats to Accountability, supra note 38.
70. Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 14. This is similar to Rwanda Statute,
supra note 27, art. 6(c), which explicitly requires this criteria.
71. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Meron, supra note 57, at 85; Amnesty Inter-
national, supra note 21, at 14.
72. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 14;
Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court
of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289
(1994).
73. Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier
for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAw & SOcIAL INQ. 191 (1995); Wexler, Inter-
pretation, supra note 72; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; see also Justice Case (Case
3), under Control Council Law No. 10.
74. Rwanda Statute, art. 3; Commission of Experts on Rwanda, Preliminary Report
of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security
Council Resolution 935 at 26-27 (Sept. 29, 1994), reported in Amnesty International,
supra note 21, at 15.
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[Un the International Law Commission's fourth report on the draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, its
Special Rapporteur asserted that the autonomy of crimes against
humanity from war crimes has now become absolute. Today, crimes
against humanity can be committed not only within the context of
armed conflict, but also independently of any such conflict.. .. 75
Of course, the same conduct during an armed conflict might, nonethe-
less, constitute both a war crime and a crime against humanity.
6. Vagueness & Inconsistency - A Serious Weakness in Both
Statutes
Vagueness in some aspects of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute is even
more serious than that of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The ILC Draft Stat-
ute prohibits systematic or mass violations of human rights, aggres-
sion, genocide, torture (listed in the text of article 20 in the commen-
tary or in the Annex), and "serious crimes of international concern."
This last phrase is vague. According to some, the articles incorporate
by reference the criminal law weaknesses in those treaty "offenses"
and fail to specify the mental state required for conviction and punish-
ment. The mental state may vary, depending on the particular offense.
It is also argued that they also fail to specify adequately the nature
and scope of the defenses. The applicability of national law to in-
stances in which the treaty does not define an offense with sufficient
precision may play an important role. The ICTY Statute commentary
recognizes the need for clarification. 76
National law, to the extent that it creates general principle or cus-
tom, may provide a valuable means to establish or to recognize the ele-
ments or definition of crimes in relation to procedural and evidentiary
rules, as well as to constitutional or human rights concerns. National
law is important for the omnipresent question of what is international
law? The elements of any specific offense charged perhaps may be es-
tablished not only by customary international law, but also by general
principles determined by a comparative analysis of the law of all
states. This proposed foundation has particular relevance for criminal
law, because the law of virtually all nations requires clear definition
and specific material elements. These criteria may be seen as general
principles of international law. The Tribunals must apply them. These
general principles, even as custom, may establish the elements of the
relatively small common core of crimes subject to prosecution before
the Tribunal. 77
75. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Vi-
olations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2589 (1991); Mariann Meier Wang, The
International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Im-
pact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 177, 226, n. 180 (1995).
76. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, at 15, 1 72
77. Some elucidation of this idea is found in BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at
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V. TRIGGER MECHANISMS & JURISDICTION
ILC Statute Article 21 provides the trigger mechanism or sets the
preconditions for jurisdiction to be exercised. This trigger or these pre-
conditions relate to Articles 20 (crimes), 25 (genocide), and 22-28 (ac-
ceptance of jurisdiction).
A. States' Acceptance of Jurisdiction, Based on Principles of Prescrip-
tive Jurisdiction. ILC Statute Articles 21-28
1. States, the Security Council, and the General Assembly
For a court to be independent and viable, it must be the judge of
its own jurisdiction. Article 24 so provides. Article 21 outlines the ways
states accept the Court's jurisdiction. A state party may express its
consent to be bound by declaration lodged with the depositary [Art.
22(1)(a)]. Alternatively, a state may accept the Court's jurisdiction by
declaration lodged with the Registrar with respect to Article 20 crimes
[Art.22(1)(b)]. A state's declaration of acceptance of the Court's juris-
diction may be general or may be limited to particular conduct or to
conduct that occurred during a particular period of time [Art.22(2)].
When a declaration is made accepting the court's jurisdiction for a
specified period, it may not be withdrawn before that period ends. If
the declaration is for an unspecified period, six-months notice is re-
quired for withdrawal. Withdrawal will not affect proceedings com-
menced prior to the withdrawal's effective date [Art.22(3)]. Under Arti-
cle 21, if acceptance of a state which is not party to the statute is
required, that state may consent to the Court's jurisdiction by lodging
its acceptance with the Registrar [Art. 22(4)].
Article 23 provides for the Security Council to refer Article 20
crimes to the Court pursuant to U.N. Charter Chapter VII. Acts of ag-
gression may not be so referred, unless the Security Council has first
determined that such an act occurred. The Court may not commence
prosecution of any conduct related to an "act of aggression or breach of
the peace under Chapter VII," being "dealt with by the Security Coun-
cil," unless the Security Council "otherwise decides. T"7
2. Controversy over triggering mechanisms
In the ILC itself, concerns were raised over what institutions,
States, or individuals should be allowed to trigger the Court. With re-
gard to the Security Council, some delegations worried that the pro-
cess could undermine the role of the Security Council in dispute reso-
lution. Others were concerned that the statute might confer more
authority on the Security Council than it had already under the U.N.
ch. 1.
78. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 23.
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Charter. Others worried that the relationship between the Court and
the Security Council could undermine the judicial independence and
integrity of the Court or the sovereign equality of states. 79
Should submissions of cases to the court be limited to States-
Parties? This limitation would encourage membership, but may re-
strict prosecution. Who should have discretion to limit acceptance of
cases? How broad should that discretion be? The significant powers of
the Security Council have emerged as formidable in the context of the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Does the Statute of
the ILC Court provide the capacity to expand or to restrict Security
Council power? Some ILC members felt that situations in which Chap-
ter VII was at issue rather than other cases ought to be signaled to
the Court by the Council. If the Council can do more than refer to
such situations, it was argued, what would happen to the indepen-
dence of the Procuracy or the Court itself? Dangers of influence on the
Procuracy, inequality of treatment or justice, especially given the pos-
sibility of a Security Council veto, gave pause to several on the ILC. °
3. Should the General Assembly be able to refer cases to the Tri-
bunal?
The General Assembly is the primary organ of the U.N. and, ar-
guably, the most representative body. It has primary authority, moreo-
ver, in matters of human rights and residual competence in matters of
international peace and security. It has the facility of acting when the
Security Council cannot because of the veto. On the other hand, what
are the legal consequences of a General Assembly decision to refer a
criminal case? Does a General Assembly Resolution have even similar
authority? Should state consent be required before a case is submitted
to the Court? Should ad hoc consent of the state which has custody of
the accused be required? Consent would seem necessary. Consent
should be necessary before the Tribunal or its organs could conduct
any investigation inside a particular country. This requirement is true
for cases referred by the Security Council as well. States, however,
could consent in advance by treaty to such investigations and to
render any fugitive to the tribunal. Cooperation in the traditional
sense should be required. Anything less would raise the specter of di-
minished sovereignty to the point that opposition would overwhelm
adoption. Some offenses, such as genocide, ought to trigger inherent
79. U.N.G.A., Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the
Period 25 March - 12 April 1996 at 39, A/AC.249/1, 7 May 1996 (Rapporteur, Mr. Jun
Yoshida).
80. See ILC, Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Sixth Session, Ch. 1, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace & Security of Man-
kind, at 11 (2 May - 24 July 1994), U.N. Doc. A/CN4/L.496, 13, 17 (1994) [hereinafter
Draft Report].
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jurisdiction in the Tribunal. Inherent jurisdiction over the conduct,
however, would not obviate the necessity of cooperation both from the
theoretical and the practical point of view. There is also some question
as to which offenses will trigger inherent jurisdiction. Is "aggression"
part of the prerequisite base? Multiplicity of concurrent jurisdiction
and the risk of harassment prosecution will cause some states to be
hesitant.
B. Competence Ratione Personae and Individual Criminal
Responsibility l
1. The Ad Hoc Statute and hierarchy of jurisdiction
Yugoslav Ad Hoc Statute, Article 6 reads: "[Tihe International Tri-
bunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the pro-
visions of the present statute." Are juridical, non-natural, persons sub-
ject to jurisdiction? 2 The Secretary General recommended against
jurisdiction over juridical persons, such as associations or organiza-
tions and against jurisdiction based solely on membership in such or-
ganizations.83 The Secretary General's Report, moreover, provides that
jurisdiction and responsibility are to attach on the basis of individual,
not vicarious or imputed liability.8 The ILC Statute provides simi-
larly.8s Command responsibility, however, does not contradict this pro-
vision. 8 Command responsibility does obtain liability, and ought to, for
lesser versions or degrees of the offenses discussed herein, based on a
lesser mens rea. For example, criminal liability for an manslaughter
type homicide based upon command responsibility may be established
by proving that the commander "knew or had reason to know that his
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the su-
perior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."87
2. More Specifics on Triggers
ILC Draft Statute Article 21, "Preconditions to the exercise of ju-
risdiction," reads:
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction over a person with respect
to a crime referred to in article 20 (supra), if-
81. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 50-52.
82. Id. 9 50.
83. Id. 951.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 20-30.
86. But see, PAUST r AL, supra note 46, at 22-23, 32-43, passim.
87. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.3; cf, Irwin Cotler & Judith Hippler Bello, Re-
gina v. Finta, Comment on Canadian Supreme Court War Crimes Decision, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 460 (1996).
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(b) in any . . . case [other than genocide, where there is inherent
jurisdiction per Arts. 21(a) and 25] . . . a complaint is brought
under Article 25 (2) and the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to the crime is accepted under Article 22:
(i) by the State which has custody of the suspect... ('the custodial
State'); and
(ii) by the State on the territory of which the act or omission in
question occurred.
2. If, with respect to a crime to which T 1(b) applies, the custodial
state has received, under an international agreement, a request
from another State to surrender a suspect for the purposes of pros-
ecution, then, unless the request is rejected, the acceptance by the
requesting State of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the
crime is also required.
In other words, the consent of both the State on whose territory the of-
fense occurred, the state on whose territory the defendant is now
found and even the state whose nationals were injured or killed by the
accused must consent.
3. Ceded Jurisdiction
The ILC Draft Statute operates on the basis of what might be
called "ceded jurisdiction," except in relation to genocide.s Except for
genocide, for which the Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction, jurisdiction
applies to the set of offenses indicated by Article 20, if the suspect is
present within the territory of the state of his nationality, of the state
in which the offense was committed or if his extradition has been ap-
proved to a state having a proper basis of jurisdiction, the consent of
each of those states is required.89 Consent, thus, is the apparent basis
of the Tribunal's binding authority. On the other hand, ILC Statute,
Article 23 provides that notwithstanding Article 21 (preconditions to
exercise of jurisdiction, infra), the Court has jurisdiction in accordance
with this Statute with respect to crimes referred to in Article 20
(crimes within the court's jurisdiction), as a consequence of referral by
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The Security Council, therefore, may refer cases to the ILC Tribunal,
thus triggering priority jurisdiction. Of course, the very statutes of the
Ad Hoc Tribunals are based on Security Council authority pursuant to
Chapter VII. Ultimately, as is the case with any independent judicial
body, the Tribunal is the judge of its own jurisdiction, although one
could argue that ceded jurisdiction in some forms negates this
principle.90
88. See Crawford, supra note 1, at 143.
89. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, arts. 20-22 especially art. 21; see Craw-
ford, supra note 1, at 143-44.
90. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 24; See The Norwegian Loaus
Case, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (especially Judge Lauterpacht's separate opinion), discussed in OLI-
VER ET AL., supra note 1, at 48-53.
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Ceded jurisdiction under ILC Statute Article 22 operates in a
manner similar to that of the International Court of Justice. A state
party may consent to jurisdiction in a wholesale manner at the mo-
ment it becomes a party to the Convention.9 It may agree to the Tri-
bunal's jurisdiction only for certain offenses. 92 The state may agree at
some time later than when it became a party to the treaty, by so indi-
cating in a declaration lodged with the Registrar.9 3 Here, it may accept
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court for all covered offenses or
the offenses indicated in its declaration.9 A declaration may even be
made for a specified period of time; however, the state may not with-
draw during the indicated period unless it gives six-months notice of
intent to withdraw.95 Withdrawal does not affect proceedings already
commenced at the time of the notice.96 Article 22(4) allows a non-state-
party to consent to jurisdiction in a given case only for a particular
crime, by declaration lodged with the registrar or a complaint tendered
to the Tribunal. 97 The United States is opposed to this latter
provision.9"
4. Jurisdiction and the U.N. Security Council
The ICTY operates pursuant to the authority of U.N. Charter
Chapter VII. It may be maintained that nations which are members of
the UN have agreed ab initio to abide by the will of the Security
Council when it acts consistently with its authority under the Charter.
Some questions arise. Are non-member nations also subject to authori-
tative decisions of the Security Council? Are they bound by decisions of
a Tribunal created pursuant to the authority of the Security Council?
What is the authority under international law to require non-member
states to abide by such rulings? Does customary international law so
provide?99 The Tribunal and its proponents, of course, argue
affirmatively. 100
91. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(a). See the general discussion
in OLVER r ETAL, supra note 1, at 40-66.
92. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(1) & (3).
93. Id. art. 22(lXb).
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 22(3).
96. Id.
97. See id. arts. 26 & 22.
98. US. Report, supra note 24, at 14.
99. See contra, eg., TuNKiN, supra note 10;. VAN HOOF, supra note 10; Blakesley,
Obstacles, supra note 1.
100. Opposing positions are put elsewhere. See, eg., authority in Blakesley, Obsta-
cles, supra note 1. See also BLAKESLEY, TERROIuSm, supra note 1, at chs. 1 & 2; Anthony
D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS & PROSPECT
1 (1987); Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Law?, ch. 3 in INTERNATONAL LAW AN-
THOLOGY (1994).
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C. Obtaining Jurisdiction over the Accused, Correlation of Prescriptive
and Enforcement Jurisdiction
There is obligation under both the Ad Hoc and the ILC Statutes to
"bring to justice, to extradite, or to transfer the alleged fugitive," e.g.,
1994 ILC Draft Statute Article 53(2)(c). Article 22 of the 1994 Draft
Statute deals with submitting to the Tribunal's Jurisdiction, and opt-
ing in and out.
All States Parties apparently must cooperate with the Tribunal
upon a request to prosecute for the crime of genocide. 10 1 All States who
have accepted the Court's jurisdiction for international crime in gen-
eral apparently must cooperate with a request to arrest and to trans-
fer an accused to the Court albeit with exceptions.'02 If a State has not
accepted the Court's jurisdiction for offenses listed in the Annex (e.g.,
torture, or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of the Addi-
tional Protocol I), it must either transfer the accused to the Court or
extradite him to a nation that will prosecute him or prosecute him it-
self. 0 3 For other circumstances, the state party must determine
whether its own law and constitution will allow it to transfer, extra-
dite or prosecute the requested individual. 1 4
The premise of the ILC Report was to promote the widest possible
acceptance of jurisdiction and to require certain elements of coopera-
tion, even when jurisdiction was rejected in a given instance.'l 5 Never-
theless, acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction created disagreement
within the ILC Working Group. The appropriateness of ad hoc accept-
ance and the form that it might take is at the bottom of this disagree-
ment.1'6 An early draft provided for an 'opting in" approach modeled
after Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
This approach would have allowed a state to "opt in" at any time, on
the basis of a specific offense having been committed. 0 7 For example,
Libya could have accepted jurisdiction of the Court for the suspects in
the Lockerbie incident. Here, U.S. or U.K. consent apparently would
not have been required, although Libya's consent would be required
before its nationals could be prosecuted before the Tribunal.'08 This ap-
proach would have avoided the problem that most continental nations
and those whose law and constitutions follow the continental tradition
101. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(2)(aXI).
102. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(ii).
103. See id. 53(2Xb).
104. See generally Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 18-19.
105. Crawford, supra note 1, at 144; See eg., Articles 58(1), 62, 63(3Xc), and 65. See
Working Group Report on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Annex
to Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session,
UN. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255, UN. Doc. A/48110 (1993).
106. See generally Crawford, supra note 1, at 144.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 24(1)(a) & (2).
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which requires a state to refuse to extradite its own nationals.' °9 On
the other hand, a second alternative, "opting out," would require a
state to declare, with at least six months notice, that it will no longer
be subject to jurisdiction of the Tribunal."10 Finally, the ILC Draft
adopted a position in which a State has the right and the obligation to
send the fugitive to the court, to extradite or to prosecute [Art. 53
(2),(3)-(6)]. If a State has a basis of jurisdiction to prosecute and has
requested extradition and had the request approved, that State's con-
sent is also needed. [Art. 21 (2)(6)]. Article 53 of the ILC Statute re-
quires all states parties to cooperate in matters related to the Statute.
In fact, jurisdiction of the ILC Court is designed to be integrated into
the extant framework of international cooperation in criminal matters.
There is some debate over whether an International Tribunal ought to
be the mechanism of last resort; to become activated when the perti-
nent state that otherwise has jurisdiction either refuses or otherwise
cannot either prosecute or extradite the fugitive."' Consent to jurisdic-
tion in some form appears to be required for offenses other than
genocide." 2
Some members of the ILC felt that the rule on submission to juris-
diction being required for genocide and voluntary as to other offenses
set the appropriate balance between an aggressive or ambitious versus
a more cautious approach. Others argued that this approach was too
timid. They felt that the Tribunal ought to have a limited inherent ju-
risdiction for a common core of the most serious offenses, at least
when the jurisdictional state was either unwilling or unable to prose-
cute or extradite. This more vigorous option raised the fear of abuse
for political reasons and the potential for human rights violations. Still
others felt that the Statute ought to provide simply a facility for states
to supplement rather than to supplant their domestic jurisdiction.
Some felt that the Tribunal ought to have the authority to decline a
case if it felt that it was of insufficient gravity and could be handled
by the domestic court."3 The States-parties, at any rate, have obliga-
tions under the Statute (pursuant to Articles 22-24 and Article 53).
The Court's capacity to exercise jurisdiction, however, may be under-
mined by the mechanisms for opting out, in Article 53.
D. Enforcement Jurisdiction
The ILC Draft provides in Article 4, that the "Court shall be per-
manent and shall enjoy in the territory of each State party such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
109. Crawford, supra note 1, at 144; BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, sUPRA note 1, at 203, et
seq.
110. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22; Crawford, supra note 1, at 144.
111. See Draft Report, supra note 80.
112. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(2Xc).
113. Draft Report, supra note 80.
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fulfillment of its purposes." This provision raises several questions:
does the Court have authority to run an investigation in other States?
Does it have authority to subpoena witnesses or to participate in
searches and seizures pursuant to their investigation of pertinent
crimes? The phrase, "such legal capacity as may be necessary" to per-
form its functions is broad. Is it "necessary" that some sort of mutual
assistance treaty be established between the Court and the relevant
State-situs of such investigation? Does it have the power to secure the
person of an accused for trial in the Court? If so, how exactly will that
occur? The ICTY Statute is even broader and the above-mentioned
questions obtain even greater importance.
1. Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Article 29 of the ICTY Statute provides:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for as-
sistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not
limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Tribunal.
The ICTY was established on the basis of a Chapter VII deci-
sion.1 4 This origin creates a binding obligation on all States-Parties to
the United Nations to take whatever steps are required to implement
the decision." 5 All States are obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal
and to assist it in all stages of the proceedings; to ensure compliance
with requests for judicial or other legal assistance in the gathering of
evidence; hearing of witnesses, suspects, or experts; identification and
location of persons; the arrest and detention of persons; the surrender
or transfer of the accused to the tribunal; and service of documents."16
States are obligated to effectuate all orders issued by the Trial Cham-
ber [or prosecutor's office?], such as warrants of arrest, search war-
rants, warrants for the surrender or transfer of persons, and any other
114. See Draft Report, supra note 80, 23.
115. Draft Report, supra note 80, 125; 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art.
29.
116. Draft Report, supra note 80, 125; 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art.
29; see also Jordan J. Paust, When We Meet an Alleged War Criminal in Bosnia, ASIL
Intl Crim. Law Interest Group Newsl. no. 1, at 6 (1996); PAUST ET AL., supra note 46, at
79-80.
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orders necessary for the conduct of the trial(s).1 7 The order to transfer
an accused or other persons to the ad hoc Tribunal is considered to be
a Chapter VII enforcement measure."l 8 Several of these obligations
raise serious issues, including many of those noted in the first para-
graph of this section. Others include whether it is appropriate or legal
under various domestic legal systems to require a state to transfer a
case to the ad hoc Tribunal, if the state is already vigorously prosecut-
ing or planning to prosecute the defendant? Will the Tribunal be as ef-
fective as the state? What if the state prosecutors believe in good faith
that they can do a better job? Is it proper to require them to transfer
the fugitive to the Tribunal? These issues were actually pertinent to
the Tadic case currently being prosecuted before the ad hoc Tribunal
in the Hague, after transfer from Germany. Nevertheless, transfer is
clearly required by the statute. If transfer were not required, of course,
the danger of sham prosecution would arise. On the other hand, what
sanctions will the Security Council really be able to impose for disobe-
dience, given the veto?
2. Is Sending a Fugitive to the Court Extradition?
Another related question, not to be addressed at length herein, but
one that is significant, is whether the rendering of the fugitive is an
extradition. The issue is important, because in States like the U.S., ex-
tradition triggers certain constitutional and statutory protections,
which may not be ignored but which are ignored by both the ICTY and
the 1994 ILC Draft Statutes. 119 Failure to conform to the rules protect-
ing accused fugitives, provided to accused fugitives in the realm of ex-
tradition, will thwart their being "rendered" to the tribunal, whatever
the statute drafters choose to call the transfer.
3. The Importance of a Treaty or Implementing Legislation
If transfer of a defendant to an international tribunal is extradi-
tion, the question of whether the statute functions as a treaty is cru-
cial for the United States, unless other legislation covers it. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that extradition from the United States is not
possible without an applicable extradition treaty.120 One could argue
117. Draft Report, supra note 80, $ 125.
118. Id. 9 126.
119. See, e.g., Coumou v. United States, 1995 WL 2292 (E.D.La. 1995) ("[Tlhe Court
relies on the testimony of [Professor] Christopher Blakesley, [who establishes the notion
of "de facto" or "functional" extradition.] The Court agrees with Blakesley's use of the
phrase . . . [although it] agrees with defendant's argument that these words have no
[prior] legal recognition, and so, apparently, does Blakesley (Transcript 518). They do,
however, pretty well articulate the events which occurred.. . .") 1995 WL 2292 at 11;
Coumou v. U.S., 1997 WL80441 (5th Cir. 1997) (approving the decision).
120. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US. 276, 287 (1933); Valentine v. US. ex rel. Nei-
decker, 199 U.S. 5, 18 (1936). See discussion in Blakesley, Extradition Between France &
the US.: An Exercise in Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L.
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that it is extradition, whatever it is called: a rose by any other name is
still a rose. If so, it is necessary that some form of an extradition type
treaty or clause be entered into and that it receive the advice and con-
sent of the Senate or that legislation be promulgated to do so.1 21 It
may be necessary that the treaty or clause call for the extradition, ren-
dition or other relevant action to deliver the fugitive to the tribunal for
trial. Is it an extradition, as called for by U.S. jurisprudence when a
fugitive is being sent to an international tribunal rather than a State?
While these are questions that will likely be answered in the affirma-
tive, they will have to be addressed by the courts in the United States.
It could be argued that the U.N. Charter, via the above-mentioned pro-
visions and Article 25 could function like an extradition treaty. It could
be considered, at least, as a treaty-based mechanism for the rendition
of individuals. One must ask whether this approach will be upheld
under Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a fugitive were to be requested
from the U.S. A new treaty creating a permanent court could satisfy
U.S. law with an extradition clause, such as Article 10(2) of the Hos-
tages Convention. 22 This problem has been obviated, perhaps, by the
promulgation of a law that provides for extradition or rendition to the
tribunal.m This law authorizes the rendition of fugitives to the ad hoc
Tribunal and could apply to any Permanent Court and cover the inci-
dents and issues relating to that rendition. Its constitutionality re-
mains to be tested, but it is likely to prevail.
The U.S. Supreme Court insisted on a treaty for the U.S. to extra-
dite, because the U.S. extradition statute so requires. 124 A statute,
therefore, may be sufficient, assuming that a prima facie case and all
other requirements are established for surrender. A statute is neces-
sary because of the principle that individuals cannot be apprehended
without general legislative authorization. This point is very important!
It is certainly necessary in the U.S. that there be enabling or imple-
menting legislation for the process to work. The Council of Europe is
653, 656-62 (1980); BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 185-92; O1vER ET AL, supra
note 1, at 217-24.
121. E.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, art. 10(2), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
122. Id.
123. The A.B.A. Task Force calls for this arrangement. See Report of the American
Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Task Force on War Crimes in
Former Yugoslavia, at xii (Proposed Final Draft, June 22, 1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task
Force Report] (and what has been done for the Ad Hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia). See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-106,
1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996); see Robert Kushen & Kenneth Harris, Surrender of Fugi-
tives by the United States to the War Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
G.O.A.J.I.L. 510 (1996).
124. Factor v. Laubenheimer, supra note 120; Valentine v. United States, supra note
120. The Valentine Statute covers international tribunals. The U.S. has amended its ex-
tradition statute to cover international criminal tribunals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184, as
amended 1996, supra note 123.
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working on model implementing legislation. This drafting has been
done for the ICTY and Rwanda Tribunal.
E. Non-bis-in-idem - Nexus between Jurisdiction and the Rights of
the Accused
Article 10 of the Yugoslav ad hoc Statute reads:
1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts consti-
tuting serious violations of international humanitarian law under
the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by
the International Tribunal.
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for acts consti-
tuting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be
subsequently tried by the International Tribunal only if:
(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an
ordinary crime; or
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or indepen-
dent, were designed to shield the accused from international crimi-
nal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted
of a crime under the present Statute, the International Tribunal
shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by
a national court on the same person for the same act has already
been served.
The principle of non bis in idem, whereby no person shall be tried
twice for the same offense, thus, is incorporated.12 5 Given the primacy
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, subsequent trial before a national court
should be forbidden, although the Secretary-General's Report notes
that subsequent trial by the International Tribunal would be appropri-
ate when: (a) "the characterization of the act by the national court did
not correspond to its characterization under the statute, or (b) consid-
erations of impartiality, independence or effective means of adjudica-
tion were not guaranteed in the proceedings before the national
courts."126 Should the Tribunal decide to assume jurisdiction over a
person who has already been convicted by a national court, the former
should take into consideration the extent to which any penalty im-
posed by the national court has already been served. 7 The use of the
phrase, "the characterization of the act by the national courts did not
correspond to its characterization under the statute" may be problem-
atic. It might have been more appropriate to indicate that if the con-
duct alleged to have been committed did not constitute an offense of
the same gravity, the Tribunal will not be precluded from re-trying the
case. The characterization of the offense is not the key. Rather, the key
is the nature of the criminal conduct and its punishability under inter-
125. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 66.
126. Id.
127. Id. 68.
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national law and the Tribunal's statute. The language of the ICTY Ad
Hoc Statute Article 10 still poses somewhat of a problem in this re-
gard, but it is better than the language of the Report. Article 10(2)(b)
indicates that retrial may take place if the "national court proceedings
were not impartial. . . ." This language probably refers to a situation
of the kind suggested by the next phrase, which speaks of the accused
being "shielded from international criminal responsibility." It may well
be important also to include, in any statute for a permanent court, sit-
uations where the International Tribunal will be more protective of the
human rights of the accused than would be a national court which
may not be "impartial" or "well-disposed."
F. Trial in Absentia
While the ad hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia rejected trial in
absentia, the ILC Draft Statute, Article 37 provides for trial in absen-
tia under some circumstances in what appears to be a compromise:
1. As a general rule, the accused should be present during trial.
2. The Trial Chamber may order that the trial proceed in the ab-
sence of the accused if:
(a) the accused is in custody, or has been released pending trial,
and for reasons of security or the ill-health of the accused it is un-
desirable for the accused to be present;
(b) the accused is continuing to disrupt the trial; or
(c) the accused has escaped from lawful custody under this Statute
or has broken bail.
3. The Chamber shall, if it makes an order under paragraph 2, en-
sure that the rights of the accused under this Statute are
respected, and in particular:
(a) that all reasonable steps have been taken to inform the accused
of the charge; and
(b) that the accused is legally represented, if necessary by a lawyer
appointed by the Court.
4. In cases where a trial cannot be held because of the deliberate
absence of an accused, the Court may establish, in accordance with
the Rules, an Indictment Chamber for the purpose of:
(a) recording the evidence;
(b) considering whether the evidence establishes a prima facie case
of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
(c) issuing and publishing a warrant of arrest in respect of an ac-
cused against whom a prima facie case has been established.
5. If the accused is subsequently tried under this Statute:
(a) the record of evidence before the Indictment Chamber shall be
admissible;
(b) any judge who was a member of the Indictment Chamber may
not be a member of the Trial Chamber.
The Statute for the ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal wisely did not adopt
trial in absentia. Some have argued vigorously in favor of trial in ab-
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sentia.128 Others argue less vigorously, but would allow such trials. 129
Those favoring it have succeeded in the ILC Draft Statute. Often sys-
tems which allow trials in absentia provide that the party who was
tried in absentia has a right to a trial de novo. The protections af-
forded the accused in a trial in absentia and its trial de novo are chi-
merical. Adoption of trial in absentia is dangerous and unacceptable; it
is a serious defect in the ILC Draft. Trial in absentia certainly accom-
modates the likely difficulty such a tribunal often will face in not be-
ing able to obtain the person of the accused. Trials in absentia, how-
ever, are anathema to the Common Law systems. Some of the
arguments against trials in absentia, presented immediately below, ap-
ply to continental criminal justice systems in general. The point is that
there may be a tendency in the world community to adopt a European
model for the war crimes tribunal. Trial in absentia, however, raises
serious problems for those from the "common law" or "adversarial"
model of criminal justice.130 Trials in absentia, moreover, necessarily
violate Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, which recognizes the right of any accused "[t]o be tried
in his presence."
Continental criminal justice systems have built-in protections for
individuals accused of crime. These protections have not been incorpo-
rated into the statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunal or the ILC Draft. One
can argue that sending a person to the Tribunal after a conviction in
absentia cannot lead to a new trial that will be compatible with U.S.,
Canadian and other adversarial system constitutional standards or
even continental standards.ul3 The same is likely true of New Zealand,
128. Of the vigorously approving side, see Letter Dated 10 Feb. 1993 from the Per-
manent Resident of France to the U.N. addressed to the Security Council, 108,
U.N.Doc. S/25266 [hereinafter Report of the Committee of French Jurists]; see also
Schiktte, Comments at Conference on the Ad Hoc Tribunal at the Max Planck Institute,
Freiburg, Germany; Julian Schutte, Comments at the XV Congresso Internacional de Dir-
ito Penal, Rio De Janeiro, September 5-10, 1994; Julian Schfitte, Comments at the World
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal to Enforce Inter-
national Criminal Law and Human Rights, In Cooperation with the UN. and the AIDP,
Dec. 2-5, 1992.
129. Of the less vigorous, yet still approving side, see Wedgwood, supra note 15, at
267-70 (1994).
130. For more analysis on this, see Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Blakesley,
Atrocity and its Prosecution, supra note 1.
131. It seems to me that one should be hard pressed to accept trial in absentia, un-
less one is willing to accept it under one's own domestic law. But see Hirota v. MacAr-
thur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (no habeas corpus when sending a person to an interna-
tional tribunal); PAuST ET AL., supra note 46, at 275. Moreover, disruptive defendants
have been removed from the courtroom in the United States, although this may be dis-
tinguishable, if still not acceptable. It seems to me that just because a given system in
times of stress or hysteria tends to take action that is violative of fundamental fairness,
it should not be made or accepted as a rule of law. Why should it be acceptable? One can
understand by the hysteria surrounding war and atrocity and serious improper (one
might say "illegal,* in a fundamental sense) conduct by a state, which is even approved
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Australia, and now South Africa. In terms of minimum standards of
protection for an accused person in International Human Rights Law,
increasingly, U.S. requests for extradition and hand-overs under Status
of Forces agreements have been overridden by international and for-
eign courts that have ruled international human rights provisions take
precedence. In two of the cases, concerns over capital punishment in
the U.S. have resulted in litigation in which courts outside the U.S.
have held that turning persons over to states in the U.S. with the
death penalty would in certain circumstances violate provisions of in-
ternational human rights conventions. 132 International human rights
conventions contain rights that sometimes are equivalent to protec-
tions guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In particular, the provisions
guaranteeing the right to fair trial, equality of arms and access to
court, 133 the presumption of innocence, 3 4 the right to confrontation,
and the right to counsel of choice. 35 The problem is in the scope of
these rights, which are written into human rights treaties in abstract
terms. For example, in many European systems, although one has the
right to counsel, the right does not obtain until the dossier has been fi-
nalized and handed-over to the indictment court. There is no right to
counsel even during "custodial interrogations." In most jurisdictions,
the dossier is evidence and the case against the accused is virtually
complete by that time. 36
by the judiciary. See, e.g., Koramatsu v. United States, 323 US. 214 (1944). This situa-
tion, however, is not acceptable unless one trusts that due process protections may prop-
erly be dismissed by authorities who, perhaps, have some sense about who is a "terror-
ist," a "war criminal," or other evil type. More on this tendency is discussed in John
Dugard, The Judiciary in a State of National Crisis - With Special Reference to the
South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477 (1987). My position is that one
should not trust one's domestic governmental officials with such power, why should one
give it to an international institution? If a trial in absentia were followed, necessarily, by
a trial de novo in which none of the prior dossier or prior evidence could be used, it
would be more acceptable. Again, however, one might be skeptical about the impact that
this evidence might have.
132. For background on the cases, see, e.g., S6ering v. United Kingdom, 11 HuM.
RTS. L J. 3-35 (1990); Steinhardt, Recent Developments in the Soering Litigation, 11
HuM. RTs. L.J. 1073 (1990).
133. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), U.N.T.S. 222.
134. Id. art. 6(2).
135. On human rights and due process, see PAUST ET AL., supra note 46, at 734-41;
BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, chs. 1, 2, 4 & Conclusion.
136. See, eg., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITY (Christine Van den
Wyngaeert ed.) ch. 1, Belgium; ch. 5, Germany; ch. 6, Greece; ch. 10, The Netherlands;
and most of the others (1993); HENNING FENNELL, JORG, & SwART, CRIMINAL JuS7ICE IN
EUROPE, ch. 1, the Netherlands (1995). The Italian attempt at improvement has not
fared very well in application.
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IV. MORE ON TRIGGERING MECHANISMS - OTHER SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AD Hoc TRIBUNAL AND ANY FUTURE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
Although the Ad Hoc Tribunals are being created solely for the
purpose of prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law in
the former Yugoslavia since 1991 or in Rwanda, they will have an im-
pact on the development of a permanent international criminal tribu-
nal. This impact will be positive or negative, depending on whether
the ad hoc Tribunals are fashioned and proceed in a manner that
brings credit to the international legal system. The ICTY seems to be
proceeding in this way, with the assistance of excellent judges, prose-
cutors, and defense teams, but they must also be perceived as being ef-
fective in obtaining the person and prosecuting major perpetrators of
the indicated crimes in a manner that comports with the international
human rights protections afforded accused individuals. They must be
perceived as producing results, i.e., convicting perpetrators. Failure on
any of these fronts could damage the development or acceptance of a
permanent tribunal.
Dangers abound: difficulty in obtaining evidence in a manner that
comports with protections guaranteed accused persons; difficulty in ob-
taining custody of accused individuals; difficulty in protecting victims
of the atrocities while obtaining meaningful and usable evidence
against accused persons; and many, many other crucial problems face
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 137 Proper resolution of these problems is indis-
pensable if this enterprise is not to damage the effort to establish a
permanent tribunal.
Some of the problems actually facing the Ad Hoc Tribunal, how-
ever, are different from those that would face a permanent tribunal.
Armed forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia appear not to
have kept good records; some of the alleged atrocities may have been
perpetrated by loosely controlled members of local militia type groups,
for which it may be difficult to establish a clear command responsibil-
ity leading to major order givers and other higher-ups. It appears that
the groups which are alleged to have perpetrated many of the atroci-
ties are now in control of areas where evidence or perpetrators may
exist. This situation makes it difficult to expect and to receive their co-
operation. These are some of the harsh realities of the situation cur-
rently facing the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The Rwanda Tribunal's prospects
diminish as chaos again descends on that terror-ridden land. To the
extent that these difficulties may not face a permanent tribunal the
137. For example, there is an inconsistency between the defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses pursuant to Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute and the victims' and wit-
nesses' right to be protected from appearing before the Tribunal under Article 22. See
also ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(1).
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differences must be emphasized by those interested in promoting the
Tribunals.
A. The Power and Authority of the Prosecutors Office - More Signifi-
cant Dangers
1. General
The relationship of the Prosecutors Office in the ILC Tribunal and
the Ad Hoc Tribunals to the Tribunal itself is a fascinating and impor-
tant one, especially given the nature of the Tribunals which straddle
the Common Law and European models. Questions were raised in the
ILC whether the permanent tribunal's prosecutor should be a collegial
body rather than an individual. The prosecutor must be independent
and must have the financial and political wherewithal to meet the
high burden of investigation and prosecution of such significant of-
fenses. In addition, the issue of the Procuracy's role, training, and ap-
proach must be addressed more carefully than it has been up to now.
The system created for the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, for example, straddles precariously between the Anglo-American
or Common Law Systems and those of the "Civil Law" world. This bal-
ance is not bad in itself; indeed, it is good. However, making systemic
decisions and providing organization, resources and training, without a
thorough study of how the system is to work, could be disastrous. The
Continental System trains its procureurs as judges, inculcating the in-
stincts to protect civil liberty and human rights. They do not depend
on the adversarial system to counter-act the "win at any cost" mental-
ity that can take over the common law approach. 138 During the Niirn-
berg Trials, aspects of the adversarial system were adopted. The
judges understood that model and stood by as umpires for the battle.
The problem was that many of the defense attorneys for the Germans
had absolutely no training in the techniques or mindset of the advo-
cate in the adversarial world. Lack of care or attention to detail could
establish a system that incorporates the worst of each system, rather
than the best. Here follows a discussion of some of the pitfalls of which
one must be wary. While the points made below are harsh and are
generalizations, they are accurate. The protections vary from nation to
nation, but they are essentially of the same sort. They are based on a
model in which the protection of society, including the accused, is de-
pendent on the quality and good-faith of the prosecutor and judge.
ILC Draft, Article 12, provides that the Procuracy is an "indepen-
dent organ of the Court" (continental model). The essence of its nature
is the same as that indicated above and discussed below.
138. One may wonder, however, whether European prosecutors, despite a good faith
desire to be neutral, do not develop a particular theory of this case and become "adver-
sarial" to the persons they suspect committed the crime.
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2. The Prosecution in the ILC Approach
ILC Article 13, Composition, Functions, and Powers of the
Procuracy, states:
1. The Procuracy shall be composed of a Prosecutor, who shall be
Head of the Procuracy, a Deputy Prosecutor and such other quali-
fied staff as may be required.
2. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor shall be of high moral
character and possess the highest level of competence and experi-
ence in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal
cases. They shall be elected by a majority vote of the States parties
to this Statute from among candidates nominated by the States
parties thereto for a term of five years and be eligible for re-
election.
3. The States parties shall, unless otherwise decided, elect the
Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor on a standby basis.
4. The Procuracy, as a separate organ of the Tribunal, shall act in-
dependently, and shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or any source.
5. The Prosecutor shall appoint such staff as are necessary to carry
out the responsibilities of the office.
6. The Prosecutor, upon receipt of a complaint pursuant to article
28, shall be responsible for the investigation of the crime alleged to
have been committed and the prosecution of the accused for crimes
referred to in articles 22 and 26.
7. The Prosecutor shall not act in relation to a complaint involving
a person of the same nationality. In any case where the Prosecutor
is unavailable or disqualified, the Deputy Prosecutor shall act as
Prosecutor.
Prosecution may commence on the basis of a criminal complaint
brought by a State Party.139 Also, a Party that does not have prescrip-
tive or in personam jurisdiction or that does not wish to bring a crimi-
nal complaint within its own jurisdiction, may petition the Procurator-
General of the Tribunal to inquire the potential direct prosecution by
the Court. In such cases, the request by a State Party will be confiden-
tial and only after the Procurator-General of the Tribunal has deemed
the evidence sufficient will the case for prosecution be presented to the
Court in camera for the Court's action. In such a situation, the Tribu-
nal's Procuracy acts as a Judicial Board of Inquiry.'40 Once the
Procuracy (sitting as the Judicial Board of Inquiry) has decided
139. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 21.
140. See id. art. 12. BLAKEsLEY, DRAFT MODEL FOR PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION [OR BOARD] OF CRIMINAL INQUIRY, part of DRAFT MODEL INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL, adapted, with analysis from earlier DRAFT MODELS BY M.C. BAssiouNI and
that cited for the Instituto Superiore Internazionale de Scienze Criminali, Committee of
Experts on International Criminal Policy for the Prevention and Control of Transna-
tional and International Criminality for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Siracusa, Italy, 24-28 June 1990; analysis, and alternative draft, in 1995.
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whether to prosecute, the Procurator-General will issue an indictment
and request the surrender of the accused by the State Party where the
accused may be found. The Convention includes provisions on surren-
dering the accused to the Tribunal and providing the Tribunal with le-
gal assistance (including administrative and judicial assistance) for the
procurement of evidence (both tangible and testimonial). 14 1
3. The Prosecutor in the Ad Hoc Tribunals
The role, authority, and power of the prosecutor are important.
The prosecutor has significant triggering power. ICTY Article 16, The
Prosecutor, (and comparatively, Rwanda Statute Article 15) provide:
1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.
2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of
the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or to receive
instructions for any Government or from any other source.
3. The Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed of a Prosecutor
and such other qualified staff as may be required.
4. The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Security Council on
nomination by the Secretary-General. He or she shall be of high
moral character and possess the highest level of competence and
experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of
criminal cases. The Prosecutor shall serve for a four-year term and
be eligible for reappointment. The terms and conditions of service
of the Prosecutor shall be those of an Under-Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
5. The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Prosecutor.
The Prosecutor for the Ad Hoc Tribunals was appointed by the Se-
curity Council, upon the nomination of the Secretary-General. The ob-
ligation was to appoint someone of the highest level of competence and
experience in the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions
and be of high moral character. He was appointed for a four-year term
(eligible for re-appointment). His, or potentially her, terms and condi-
tions of service shall be the same as those of an Under-Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 142 The Prosecutor's role seems to be
based on a somewhat mixed (common law/continental) model. He or
she shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of per-
sons responsible for the offenses within the competence and jurisdic-
141. See, e.g., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, Apr. 20,
1959 (E.T.S. No. 30), and the various bilateral Conventions between various states. See,
e.g., Allan Ellis and Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, in 2 M.C. BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 151 (1986).
142. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, T 86; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art 15(3).
VOL. 25:2
JURISDICTION, DEFINITIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY
tion of the Tribunal.' The Prosecutor is to be an independent organ of
the Tribunal and is not to seek or to receive instructions from any gov-
ernment or other source. 144 The Prosecutor's Office will be composed of
the Prosecutor and other qualified staff, "as may be required" to per-
form the functions entrusted in an effective and efficient manner.145
The staff will consist of an investigation and a prosecution unit,146 to
be appointed by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the
Prosecutor.147 The staff must meet rigorous criteria of professional ex-
perience and competence; they must have relevant experience in their
own countries as investigators, prosecutors, criminal lawyers, law en-
forcement personnel or medical experts [and] [g]iven the nature of the
crimes committed and the sensitivities of victims of rape and sexual
assault, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff
to the employment of qualified women.4 Most of the qualification cri-
teria for staff are spelled out only in the Report, not the Statute.
VII. TRIGGERING INVESTIGATION & PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 149
ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute, Article 18 and Rwanda Article 17,
Investigation and Preparation of Indictment set out investigation and
preparation of an indictment as follows:
1. The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the
basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from
Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the infor-
mation received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed.
2. The Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects, vic-
tims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site inves-
tigations. In carrying out these tasks the Prosecutor may, as appro-
priate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned.
3. If questioned, the suspect shall be entitled to be assisted by
counsel of his own choice, including the right to have legal assis-
tance assigned to him without payment by his in any such case if
he does not have sufficient means to pay for it, as well as to neces-
143. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 85; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art 15(1) (different temporal and geographic
competence).
144. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, T 85; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 15(2) (different temporal and geographic
competence).
145. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 16(3); Secretary-General's Report, supra note
7,%87.
146. This division of labor is indicated in the Report, but not in the Statute.
147. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 87; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(5).
148. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 88.
149. Id. 99 98-98; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, arts. 18 & 19.
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sary translation into and from a language he speaks and
understands.
4. Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prose-
cutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of
the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is
charged under the Status. The indictment shall be transmitted to a
judge of the Trial Chamber.
ICTY Article 19 and Rwanda Article 18, Review of the Indictment,
state:
1. The judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has
been transmitted shall review it. If satisfied that a prima facie case
has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indict-
ment. If not so satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the re-
quest of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the ar-
rest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other or-
ders as may be required for the conduct of the trial.
In the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Prosecutor will initiate investiga-
tions ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source,
particularly from governments, United Nations organs, intergovern-
mental, and non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall as-
sess the information received or obtained and decide whether there is
sufficient basis to proceed. 50 The standard of proof to allow prosecu-
tion is that of a prima facie case.' 5' The Prosecutor seems to have dis-
cretion somewhat like that of a Common Law prosecutor. On the other
hand, the Prosecutor is an organ of the Tribunal, a characteristic obvi-
ously of civilian origin. The Prosecutor, in conducting investigations,
will have the authority and power to question suspects, victims and
witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In
carrying out these tasks the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the
assistance of the State authorities concerned. 152 Once the Prosecutor
believes that a prima facie case is established, he or she will prepare
an indictment concisely stating the facts and the crimes with which
the accused is charged pursuant to the Statute. 5 3 The indictment will
be transmitted to the Trial Chamber for review and decision as to its
confirmation or dismissal.' 5 ' It is not clear whether the review and de-
cision of confirmation or dismissal of the indictment is to be made by
150. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 93; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(1).
151. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(4).
152. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, % 94; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(2).
153. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(4).
154. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6,
arts. 18(4) & 19(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, arts. 17(4) & 18(1).
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the whole Trial Chamber or by a single judge. If the indictment is con-
firmed, the Tribunal shall issue, at the request of the Prosecutor, such
orders, and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender and transfer
of persons, or any other orders as may be necessary for the conduct of
the trial. 15
If the Prosecutor questions suspects as part of the investigation,
the suspect has the right to be assisted by counsel of his or her own
choice, including the right to have this representation without pay-
ment, if the accused cannot afford the cost. The same is true for the
cost of translation.'" One problem with this arrangement is similar to
that faced by many Continental and Common Law nations. At what
point does a person become a suspect, as opposed to a witness. Obvi-
ously, the line between witness and suspect may be blurred and since
the right to the presence of counsel obtains only for suspects, there is
room for abuse. The A.B.A. Task Force noted that the Statutes have no
provisions for pre-trial release or habeas corpus type protection for the
accused pending trial.1 57 There is danger of abuse in a Tribunal such
as this one, where there is no strict political accountability. Some sort
of pretrial protection and oversight is necessary.
VIII. TRILu & POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Trial Fairness. ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute, Article 20. Com-
mencement and Conduct of Trial Proceedings
ICTY Article 20 dictates:
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expedi-
tious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the
rules of procedures and evidence, with full respect for the rights of
the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses.
2. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall,
pursuant to an order or an arrest warrant of the International Tri-
bunal, be taken into custody, immediately informed of the charges
against him and transferred to the International Tribunal.
3. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that
the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused
understands the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a
plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for trial.
4. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to
close the proceedings in accordance with its rules of procedure and
evidence.
155. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 97; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
19(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 18(2).
156. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 96; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(3); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(3).
157. A-BA. Task Force Report, supra note 123, at x.
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The trial is to be conducted expeditiously and fairly, in accordance
with the rules of procedure and evidence, with the Trial Chamber en-
suring that the rights and interests of the accused, the witnesses and
victims are given full respect and protection.15 8 A person against whom
an indictment is confirmed is to be informed of the charges against
him and shall be taken into custody and transferred to the tribunal for
prosecution; trials in absentia will not be allowed, being considered
contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.159
The trial shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to have it
closed, pursuant to its rules and procedures. 60
IX DAMAGES IN TORT AND LA PARTIE CiMLE
It would be interesting and was suggested in the Meeting of Ex-
perts on the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and the possibilities for a Permanent Tribunals Association Interna-
tional de Droit Pdnal, December 4-8, 1994, Siracusa, Italy, that the
ILC Draft include language that would allow the possibility of some
sort of tort action by the victims or even for a mechanism for a victim
to be a partie civile as in France and other continental nations.' 6' The
partie civile is essentially the victim of the crime who has the right to
have his civil action associated with the criminal prosecution. In civil
law jurisdictions, this victim's right has existed for ages. He or she has
the opportunity to feel a part of the action against the defendant. It
also provides the victim with cost-free means to have his or her tort
case established. Damages are not a problem in civil law jurisdictions,
because the range is statutorily set. In addition, the burden of proof
problem is not presented, because the standard is the same in Europe
for both criminal and civil actions; the judge (or jury) must come to a
conviction intime (literally intimate conviction).
Une conviction intime is the innermost conviction of conscience
that the individual committed the crime/wrong. Commentators explain:
[I]n the system of I'intime conviction, the judge appreciates and
weighs all of the evidence presented in total liberty.162 He decides
in accordance with his conscience to convict, to mitigate or to ac-
158. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 99; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
20(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 19(1).
159. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 101-102; ICTY Statute, supra note
6, art. 19(2) (the explicit statement prohibiting trial in absentia is not in the Statute);
Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 20(2) provides similarly. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N.T.S., vol. 999, No. 14668, p. 171, and vol. 1057, p. 407.
160. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 103; ICTY Statute, supra note 6,
art. 20(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 19(4).
161. See, e.g., Belgian Code de Procodure Pdnale arts. 82, 63, 108; French Code de
Procedure Pgnal, arts. 85-89; Gaston Stefani, Georges Levasseur, Bernard Bouloc, PRoci-
DURE PENALE §§ 494, et seq.; 537, et seq. (14th ed. 1990); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17, 18, 170-171 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993).
162. French Code de Procedure Pgnale, supra note 161, arts. 353, 485 & 543.
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quit, in accordance with whether he is convinced or not of the
defendant's culpability, without being obliged to give any justifica-
tion whatsoever, of the probative impact or force that he attached
to any of the evidence.. . .63
This system burden of proof, of course, may not work in the "adver-
sarial context." First, the burden of proof for a crime is beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; too high for a civil plaintiff. Second, in an adversarial
setting, the attorney representing the partie civile would likely pit
himself against another defendant or in some other way develop fric-
tion between him and the judge. One way to ameliorate this problem is
to have the recovery of damages from defendant be totally dependant
on the conviction. This solution, however, would not resolve the prob-
lem of the difference in standard of proof. These difficulties may cause
the partie civile approach not to work well, but it is worth considera-
tion and an attempt to resolve the difficulties.
Damages in tort ultimately may be the more efficient and fruitful
method of deterring violations of humanitarian law and promoting its
value. Justice and Professor Frank Newman noted this in a panel dis-
cussion in which I participated at the American Society of Interna-
tional Law Annual Meeting, April 1994.164 Al Rubin recommended this
some time ago as an alternative to prosecution in relation to the Ira-
nian Air Bus and the Lockerbie incidents, among other things.
165
Y, TRIGGERING APPELLATE AND REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
A. Generally
The Secretary-General's Report and the Statute for the ICTY and
the Rwanda Ad Hoc Tribunal recognize the fundamental nature of the
right to appeal, as incorporated in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 16 The Ad Hoc Tribunal's appellate process, thus,
allows a person convicted or the prosecution to appeal errors on ques-
tions of law that would invalidate the decision and on errors of fact
which would occasion a miscarriage of justice.1 6 7 The Appellate Cham-
163. Id. arts. 353, 427, & 536; STEFANi, LEVASSEUR, & BouLoc, supra note 161, § 37
& 44-45.
164. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Remarks on the Ad Hoc and Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal, 88th Annual Meeting, ASIL 243, 244, 254-55, 257 (1994); Frank New-
man, Comments on my presentation in same panel discussion; Id. at 253; see also Jordan
Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage Taking, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 351 (1991); Alfred P. Rubin, Remarks on the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, 87 ASIL Proceedings 32-35 (1993); Alfred P. Rubin, International Crime & Pun-
ishment, 33 THE NAT'L INTEREST 73 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Remarks on the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, 87 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 32-35 (1993); Rubin, International Crime & Punishment,
33 THE NAT'L INTEREST 73 (1993); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNrTED STATES 198-203, 212 (1996).
166. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 9 116.
167. Id. 1 117; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27,
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ber may reverse, affirm, or revise the decisions of the Trial Cham-
bersM by way of decision rendered publicly and accompanied by a rea-
soned opinion, to which other opinions, either concurring or dissenting,
may be appended. 169 The decision of the Appellate Chamber is fi-
nal. 70 The ILC Draft Statute is similar. ICTY Article 25 and Rwanda
Statute Article 24 - Appellate Proceedings
Ad Hoc Tribunal, ICTY Article 25 and Rwanda Article 24 Appel-
late Proceedings, provide that:
[tihe Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted
by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following
grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision;
or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions
taken by the Trial Chamber.
B. ILC Draft Statute Article 42
The ILC Draft Statute, Article 42, provides for the prosecution as
well as the defense to be able to appeal adverse decisions. The appeal
is a civilian-type appeal of errors of fact as well of errors of law. Article
42 provides:
[T]he Appeals Chamber, has all the powers of the Trial Chamber. If
the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from
were unfair or that the decision is vitiated by error of fact or law, it
may: (a) if the appeal is brought by the convicted person, reverse or
amend the decision, or, if necessary, order a new trial; (b) if the ap-
peal is brought by the Prosecutor against an acquittal, order a new
trial. If in an appeal against sentence, the Chamber finds that the
sentence is manifestly disproportionate to the crime, it may vary
the sentence in accordance with Article 47 [applicable penalties].
The decision of the Chamber shall be taken by a majority of the
judges and shall be delivered in open court. Six judges shall consti-
tute a quorum. Subject to Article 50 [on revision, infra], the deci-
sion of the Chamber shall be final.
C. Serious Problems Depending upon What System
Obviously, prosecutorial appeal of acquittal is problematic for
those from countries having adversarial systems. Double jeopardy,
non-bis-in-idem in civilian countries, the right to a jury trial, among
other basic constitutional protections of accused individuals, seem to
art. 24.
168. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 24.
169. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7,
91 118.
170. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25.
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be put aside. Nations like the United States might be hard put to
enter into a treaty that would allow such practice.
D. The Qualifications and Election of Appellate and Trial Level
Judges
ILC Article 6, Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute Article 13 (ICTY), and
Rwanda Article 12 also pose controversial and significant issues.
Should the appellate judges have different qualifications from those of
the trial judges? Should they be elected separately? From the common
law or adversarial perspective, it is important that there be separate
elections and separate qualifications for the two types of judges be-
cause they do significantly different type of work. On the other hand,
from a civilian or continental perspective and based on the continental
nature of the tribunals under the statutes, this differentiation of ex-
pertise, talent, and election is not necessary. A related issue is that of
judicial rotation from the trial chambers to the appellate chamber in
the Ad Hoc Tribunal. This problem has proved serious for the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, but has been avoided in the ILC Draft. As the number of
cases mount in the Ad Hoc Tribunal, it will become more and more
difficult to manage. A judge cannot sit on appeal if he or she has had
any prior relationship to the case. Potentially and eventually, no
judges will be available for appellate work.
E. Review Proceedings
Article 26 of the ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal, Article 25 (Rwanda), and
Article 50 of the ILC Draft Statute present a similar problem. Article
26 of the Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute provides that, when a new fact has
been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings
before the Trial Chambers or the Appeals Chamber and which could
have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted per-
son or the Prosecutor may submit to the International Tribunal an ap-
plication for review of the judgement. Article 50 of the ILC Draft Stat-
ute allows the prosecutor or the person convicted to do the same.
F. Potential US. Constitutional Problems
The related questions of meaningful appellate review and
prosecutorial authority to appeal or to have an acquittal revised, pres-
ent potentially devastating defects from the U.S. Constitutional point
of view. Having merely one level of review is problematic. In addition,
does allowing the prosecution more than a mere interlocutory appeal
of errors of law, which would trigger a new trial for the same offense,
violate the principle against double jeopardy? To comport with the pro-
tection against being subject to jeopardy twice for the same conduct
(double jeopardy) from the perspective of United States constitutional
law, the defendant only, not the prosecution, should be allowed this
prerogative. The same is true for the notion of revision.
1997
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XI. CONCLUSION
The attempts to protect and enforce human rights through prose-
cution of those who commit serious violations of humanitarian law are
important and laudable. The success of the tribunals, indeed, the via-
bility of both peace and justice, depends on promulgation, interpreta-
tion, supplementation, application, and enforcement. The Ad Hoc
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the proposed
ILC Draft Statute fall short, but they are all subject to being modified
in a manner that will make them functional. This modification must
be done.
Complementarity
JEFFREY L. BLEICH*
This report provides a preliminary analysis of the complementar-
ity provisions of the most recent International Law Committee (ILC)
Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This report is
intended to stimulate discussion of the treatment of complementarity
by the ILC, and is not intended to reflect any formal conclusion of the
International Law Association (ILA) Working Group.
I. BACKGROUND
The principle of "complementarity" concerns the allocation of juris-
diction between domestic courts and the ICC. The scope of "comple-
mentarity" - i.e., the extent to which a domestic court may claim ex-
clusive jurisdiction over a case implicating the Court's powers and
vice-versa - is relevant to any prosecution of a person alleged to have
committed an international crime, who is simultaneously subject to the
domestic jurisdiction of a state respecting that same crime.
Because complementarity questions can arise only in cases where
both the Court and a State have not only the capacity, but the intent
to prosecute the same crime, complementarity presupposes that there
is a subset of "interested States" with an interest in prosecuting these
cases. States which may have an interest in applying their own domes-
tic laws and procedures in such cases include: (1) the State in which
the crime occurred; (2) the State(s) in which the victim(s) and/or the
accused reside; (3) the State(s) in which the victim(s) and/or the ac-
cused resided at the time of the crime, and/or; (4) the State(s) of na-
tionality for the victim(s) and/or the accused. To resolve whether any
of these States may claim precedence over the prosecution of an inter-
national crime, the ILC Draft Statute must address five issues.
1. What factors define an "interested State" for purposes of chal-
lenging ICC jurisdiction;
2. As between two competent forums, the ICC and the domestic
court of an interested State, which forum has priority;
3. What standard shall apply for determining the competency of a
domestic forum;
* Lecturer in Human Rights, University of California at Berkeley School of Law;
Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olsen, San Francisco; B.A., 1983, Amherst College; MPP,
1986, Harvard University; J.D., 1989, University of California at Berkeley; Law Clerk to
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 1990-91; Law Clerk to Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
1991-92.
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4. Who has the burden of proof in determining whether a domestic
forum is competent;
5. What institution will ultimately resolve whether a domestic fo-
rum is competent, and at what stage of the proceedings.
These issues are addressed with varying degrees of clarity in the ILC
Draft Statute.
II. THE ILC DRAF STATUTE
The principle of complementarity appears in the preamble of the
ILC draft statute, and is implicated by other provisions of the draft.'
The third paragraph of the preamble of the ILC draft statute provides,
essentially, that the ICC may assert jurisdiction only where domestic
court jurisdiction is not "available," or domestic court proceedings
would be "ineffective." "[The] court is intended to be complementary to
national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures
may not be available or may be ineffective."2 The Statute as drafted
thus reflects a general consensus that the ICC should not supplant na-
tional judicial authorities, but may only complement these authorities.
As discussed in more detail below, although there is agreement
that the ICC Statute should give preference to "effective" domestic fo-
rums over the ICC, there is significant disagreement about how this
principle will be accomplished.
The Draft Statute provides that the ICC may be seized with a
matter or investigation based upon either a State complaint or a refer-
ral by Article 25 of the Security Council. Following such an investiga-
tion, the ICC prosecutor would have authority to issue an arrest war-
rant. Under Article 53, a State party served with a warrant for the
arrest and transfer of an accused international criminal "shall ...
take immediate steps to arrest and transfer the accused to the Court."3
Depending upon the circumstances, "a State may have discretion to ex-
tradite the accused to a requesting State or refer the case to its compe-
tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."4 A State party may,
within 45 days of receiving such a request, file a written application to
set aside the request.5
Outside of States challenging requests for arrest and transfer, the
Draft Statute does not directly address the issue of which States are
"interested" for purposes of challenging the Court's jurisdiction. As a
1. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 ILC Draft]. Complementarity principles are, as noted infra, also implicated by Arti-
cles 25, 34, 35, 36, 42, 53, 54, and 56.
2. Id. pmble., 3.
3. Id. art. 53(2Xa).
4. Id. art. 53(2)(b)-(c).
5. Id. art. 53(6).
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general matter, Article 53 confers jurisdiction to a State in which the
accused resides at the time an investigation begins. Article 21 suggests
that domestic jurisdiction is based upon traditional international law
concepts, and thus a State may assert jurisdiction based either on ter-
ritoriality (i.e., if the accused is within its borders, or if the act oc-
curred within its borders) or based on nationality (if the accused is a
national).
To the extent that a party with jurisdiction wishes to challenge
the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that an "effective" and "availa-
ble" trial procedure exists within its domestic system, that party must
proceed under Article 34. Article 34 provides that a State may chal-
lenge the ICC's jurisdiction only prior to or at the commencement of
the trial.6
Article 35 provides that the Court shall decide the ultimate ques-
tion of whether a domestic forum affords an "effective" and "available"
procedure for prosecuting the crime; the Court should refrain from pro-
ceeding with the matter if a State has investigated a matter and made
an "apparently well-founded" decision not to proceed, or if the matter
"is under investigation by a State which has or may have jurisdiction
over it, and there is no reason for the Court to take further action."7
The Court must give the State complainant or the accused a hearing
on these issues.8
Finally, the Act provides that a decision by the Court to exercise
jurisdiction will have preclusive effect against domestic proceedings for
the same offense.9 Article 42(1) contains a "non bis in idem" provision,
which protects a person tried by the Court from "double jeopardy" by
barring subsequent prosecution in domestic fora for the same interna-
tional crimes.
III. GENERAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE CuRRENT DRAFT
The phrasing of the ILC's complementarity provisions has been
criticized for failing to clarify: (1) the extent to which the ICC may
claim jurisdiction over an action arguably within the competence of a
domestic court; (2) the burden of proof, timing, and standard for decid-
ing that a domestic judicial authority is unavailable or ineffective; and
(3) the effect of such a determination upon domestic court proceedings.
These general concerns are addressed in turn.
6. Id. art. 34(b). An accused or the Court itself, however, may question its jurisdic-
tion at any time up until the conclusion of the trial. Id. arts. 34(b), 35(b).
7. Id. art. 35.
8. Id. art. 36.
9. Id. art. 42.
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A. The Authority of the ICC to Determine the Adequacy of State
Forums
Some States, including the United States, China, and Japan, have
expressed concern that - as presently written - the ICC could uni-
laterally determine that it has a superior capacity to prosecute crimes
already being prosecuted by domestic courts.'0 However, the nature of
these concerns varies. China, for example, is reluctant to give the ICC
authority to decide the issue of its own jurisdiction, and would prefer
that this decision be left to domestic courts or possibly the Security
Council." The United States does not object to the ICC having the
ability to decide its own jurisdiction in principle, but would endorse
this power only if the challenges to jurisdiction are available at all
stages (including the investigative stage), and the ICC has limited dis-
cretion to assert jurisdiction over a State's objection. 2
The United States proposes that Articles 25-27 be amended to give
States standing to object to any investigation by the ICC prosecutor
that might interfere with a legitimate national investigation or prose-
cution. The United States also believes that the universe of interested
States with standing to object to ICC jurisdiction may vary depending
upon the nature of the crime. The United States appears to favor a re-
gime under which the State of nationality of the victim or accused may
be deemed a "more interested State" than the State in which the act
occurred or the State in which the accused now resides) 3
Most other nations appear, however, to prefer that the determina-
tion of whether a case is properly subject to domestic jurisdiction be
left to the Court itself,14 and that designation as an "interested State"
10. See, e.g., Comments of United States to Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment
Of An International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/
l/add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee]. (". . . [draft statute]
frequently fails to uphold [national jurisdiction]"); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to
U.N.GA 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) (urging
principal reliance upon national courts pursuant to principle of aut dedere, aut judicare);
Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) ("Regrettably, [the complementarity principal] has not been fully
implemented in the operative part of the Statute and some provisions even appear to be
contrary to the principle.").
11. See Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 10, at 3.
12. See Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 10, at 8-10, 3.
13. See id. at 19, $ 54-56.
14. The European Union, for example, has endorsed the principle that the Court
alone should carry out the principle of "complementarity" and decide whether national
forums are available and effective. See Statement by J.A. Yanez-Barneuvo (European
Union) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR
(1995) ("Resort should be made to [the Court] where the Court has decided that national
systems were not available, or were ineffective."). See Statement of F. Wong (New Zea-
land) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27
(1995) ("The decision to pursue individual criminals . . . should reside with the Court
itself.").
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be based upon traditional notions of territoriality and nationality. This
view has been urged particularly by smaller nations, which apparently
fear that larger nations will be tempted to use procedural devices to
block investigations and prosecutions and thereby avoid exposing in-
ternational criminal violations to an international forum.1
5
B. The Standard for Determining the Effectiveness of a State's Domes-
tic Procedures, Timing, and the Burden of Proof
Although there is a fragile consensus that the ICC should have
the capacity to determine whether its jurisdiction survives a concur-
rent prosecution by a State, there is general dissatisfaction with the
Draft's failure to address the implementation of this authority. Specifi-
cally, the draft fails to clarify the standard that the ICC must apply in
resolving challenges, when such challenges may be heard, and who
should bear the burden of proof
1. Standard for Evaluating Whether a State Forum is Available
and Effective
Official United States Comments have requested that the Draft
Statute be altered to limit the capacity of the ICC to determine that
an interested State's forum is not available and effective. Specifically,
the United States believes that a domestic forum should be considered
"unavailable" or "ineffective" only if: (1) the crime at issue falls outside
of that nation's domestic jurisdiction; (2) the State affirmatively de-
clines to exercise its jurisdiction without a full and adequate investiga-
tion, or in an "unreasonable" manner; or (3) the domestic forum's judi-
cial process is not "bona fide."16 United States officials contend that the
preamble should clarify that States have the primary duty to prosecute
these crimes, and that if a nation has an operating judicial system and
makes a bona fide effort to investigate and/or prosecute an offense that
otherwise falls within the ICC's jurisdiction, the ICC may not inter-
fere.'7 Under the United States' position, States with a bona fide judi-
15. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court. A/50/22 49, at 10 (1995) [hereinafter ICC Committee Report).
16. See Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 Of General Assembly Resolu-
tion 49/53 On The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on The Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at
9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add. 2 (1995) [hereinafter United States Comments]. See also
Statement of I.E. Ayewah (Nigeria), U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR
(1995) (Although Nigeria endorses complementarity, "[W]e would have difficulties with
the statue if a hierarchy is established in which the ICC would be superior to national
courts. Rather, recourse to the court should only be in the absence of national
jurisdiction.").
17. United States Comments, supra note 16; See also Statement by Jamison S.
Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, to U.N.G.A. 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27 (1995) [hereinafter State
Department Comments] ("The decision to pursue individual criminals ... should reside
1997
DENy. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
cial process may thus, at any time, preempt an ICC investigation or
prosecution of crimes that fall within their domestic jurisdiction. s
The United States also appears anxious not to allow the standard
for determining whether a judicial process is "bona fide" to create a
significant loop-hole that would allow the Court to arrogate jurisdic-
tion from a competent State tribunal. In its comments to the Sixth
Committee, the State Department further expressed reluctance to al-
low the ICC to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction, unless
"bona fide procedure" is understood very narrowly. 9
The United States' position that "ineffectiveness" should be read
narrowly has some support in the ILC commentary to the Preamble.
The commentary States that the ICC "is intended to operate in cases
where there is no prospect of those persons being duly tried in na-
tional courts." The United States' stance thus would permit ICC juris-
diction only where a State court has no judicial procedure, refuses to
employ its procedure, or its procedure is not "bona fide" in that it of-
fers "no prospece of a person being "duly tried."
Other States as well have "stressed that the standards [for deter-
mining "availability" and "effectiveness"] were not intended . . .to al-
low the international criminal court to pass judgement on the opera-
tion of national courts in general."20 Accordingly, they favor a standard
that would limit the Court's discretion to deny the jurisdiction of State
tribunal to extraordinary cases where there is no likelihood of a "bona
fide" prosecution occurring.
2. The Timing of Challenges to Jurisdiction
As noted, the Statute provides that a State may challenge the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal at any time after the prosecutor has initiated
an investigation until the time of trial. The United States urges that
the question of superior domestic jurisdiction should be addressable at
an even earlier stage of the proceedings. 2' Consistent with the United
with the Court itself").
18. The United States Department of State reiterated its official position regarding
the principle of complementarity at the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly Sixth
Committee. See State Department Comments, supra note 17, at 4. "It is.. .important to
elaborate further the principle of complementarity. We believe that bona fide national in-
vestigations and prosecutions will always be preferable, where possible. . . . [Accord-
ingly,] national jurisdiction should enjoy a presumption of regularity." Id. at 4.
19. Id. (M[it is a... difficult, intrusive and subtle judgment to say that a function-
ing national system is not bona fide"). Some States would go further than the United
States and apparently permit a State's mere representation that it has a bona fide judi-
cial process to suffice to block ICC jurisdiction. See, eg., Statement of H. Golan (Israel)
to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27 (1995)
(where State has prior jurisdiction to try [accused] for some or all of the alleged criminal
acts . .. it may reasonably claim priority.).
20. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 9, 43.
21. Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 10, 52, at 19 ("It is essential
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States' view, States should be allowed to challenge jurisdiction "before
the prosecutor of the international criminal court initiated an investi-
gation because even the initiation of an investigation might interfere
with the exercise of national jurisdiction. 22 The United States also ad-
vocates an automatic stay of jurisdiction while a State conducts a bona
fide investigation.23
Under the United States' proposal (which to date has not been ad-
dressed in other State comments), a State could block any investiga-
tive action by the ICC prosecutor, by demonstrating that a "full," "ade-
quate," or "bona fide" investigation is proceeding in that State forum.
24
The United States, although it does not suggest how, maintains that
examination of these issues should be allowed to precede any investi-
gation at all, because decisions to investigate should not be "secondary
considerations which the court (or Prosecutor) has sole discretion to
decide."25 The United States Comments do not attempt to propose a
formal mechanism for accomplishing this right for pre-investigation ob-
jection. The Comments fairly suggest, however, adding either some
form of restriction on the prosecutor's ability to commence an investi-
gation at all, or some independent limitation by some entity other
than the ICC, or prosecutor, to prohibit further investigation.
3. Burden of Proof
The Draft Statute at present is silent on the issue of who should
bear the burden of proving whether the ICC properly has jurisdiction:
the party supporting State jurisdiction or the party contesting jurisdic-
tion. To the extent that States have addressed the issue, smaller na-
tions appear to support having the burden of proof reside with the na-
tion claiming jurisdiction to prove that its national system is available
and effective, and that the Court resolve the issue of its own jurisdic-
tion based upon this evidence.26
According to the Ad Hoc Committee Report, however, "some dele-
gations" expressed the view "that the burden of proof as to the appro-
priateness of an exception to the exercise of national jurisdiction
should be on the international criminal court."27 This view may be con-
sistent with the United States' suggestion that "national jurisdiction
to take account of the views of interested States at the earliest stage of investigation,
and not wait until there is a prosecution before the court.").
22. ICC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Statement of F. Wong (New Zealand) to U.N.GA 6th Comm., supra note 14,
at 2 ("the burden of rebutting the Court's superior claim to jurisdiction must lie with the
national authorities and not on the Court.").
27. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 10, 49.
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should enjoy a presumption of regularity."28
C. Effect on State Court Proceedings
Finally, general concerns have been expressed by the United
States and other delegations that the effect of an ICC investigation
upon State Court proceedings should be more clearly defined. As
noted, consistent with its presumption in favor of State court proceed-
ings, the United States favors amending Articles 26 and 27 to require
the prosecutor and Court to take greater consideration of on-going do-
mestic investigations.29 The Ad Hoc Committee Report notes a sugges-
tion (possibly from the United States) that the Prosecutor should sus-
pend investigation and that the ICC suspend jurisdiction immediately
once an interested State informs the Court that it is conducting its
own bona fide investigation."
Several other States have also expressed reservations about the
doctrine of non bis in idern, as it would not only foreclose a State from
initiating a prosecution where the Court has found that prosecution
was ineffective, but it would prevent any other State from proceeding
with a prosecution once trial commenced. 31 These States noted that, in
most cases, national judicial systems are more highly developed and
thus more effective than the ICC. The States thus questioned the wis-
dom of foreclosing prosecutions in these jurisdictions, simply because
the first nation to object to jurisdiction lacked a bona fide system.
IV. ILA SUB-COMMIT"rEE WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS
To date, the ILA working group on complementarity of the Sub-
Committee on the Permanent International Criminal Court has not at-
tempted to form a consensus on the various concerns expressed about
the ILC Draft Statute. The following issues, however, may warrant
discussion and further consideration.
A. Court's Power to Decide Its Own Jurisdiction
As noted, the ILC Draft Statute provides that the Court has the
capacity to decide whether a domestic forum has exclusive jurisdiction.
In general, it may be preferable to retain this portion of the ILC Draft
Statute, notwithstanding the United States government's and other
nations' concerns about giving the Court this authority.
Granting the Court authority to decide the question of jurisdiction
is consistent with the function of the ICC. One key purpose of creating
an International Criminal Court is to afford the international commu-
28. State Department Comments, supra note 17.
29. See United States Comments, supra note 16, at 10, l 9-10.
30. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 10, 51.
31. Id. at 9, 43.
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nity as a whole an opportunity to assure that individuals who commit
crimes of an international character are brought to justice. To permit
domestic courts to assume this responsibility, without an international
instrument's ability to examine the effectiveness of those domestic
courts, may undermine an important function of creating the ICC.
In addition, reservations about permitting the Court to decide its
own jurisdiction may derive less from structural notions about the ap-
propriateness of conferring this power to the ICC, than from a lack of
confidence in the Court generally, or in the adequacy of specific rules
to limit the ability of the Court to overreach. The better approach to
allaying these concerns may be not to assign competence elsewhere,
but to tighten up procedures by which the Court may examine its own
jurisdiction.
B. The Factors that Define an 'Interested State" for Purposes of Chal-
lenging ICC Jurisdiction
It also may be preferable not to disturb the ILC Draft Statute's
current formulation of whether a State qualifies as "interested" for
purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Under current international law,
there are several theories of jurisdiction that may support a nation's
assertion of competence to try an international matter.32 Although
valid concerns may exist about the appropriateness of certain theories
of jurisdiction relative to others, the Statute of the ICC appears to be
an awkward vehicle for attempting to select among these theories, or
to establish a ranking of claims of jurisdiction. Consensus is more
likely to develop through practice rather than through theory.
Accordingly, it appears proper to allow the ICC to decide, case-by-
case, whether a State's asserted theory of jurisdiction is appropriate,
and thus whether the State's judicial system is "available." This allows
for a more deliberate evolution of the law of State jurisdiction. At the
same time, it may have significant tactical benefits. It may give the
ICC flexibility to cede jurisdiction to the State with the "best" theory of
jurisdiction where several States wish to claim jurisdiction, i.e., the
State with the greatest stake in assuring effective prosecution.
C. Preference for Domestic Jurisdiction
In general, the consensus favoring domestic jurisdiction (where
available and effective) seems sensible. The function of the ICC is to
improve the effectiveness of prosecution of international crimes. To the
extent that an ICC prosecution would merely duplicate the efforts of a
State (or would only marginally improve the likelihood of successful
prosecution), the expense, effort, and possible offense to a sovereign's
32. See, e.g., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, reprinted in
29 AM. J. INT'L L 435 (Supp. 1935), (addressing theories of Territorial, Nationality, Pro-
tective, Universal, and Passive Personality Jurisdiction).
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judicial system, is probably not justified. In addition, given that State
systems are generally better developed at this point (and the risk of
ICC preemption may spur them to even more effective prosecution in
the future), the concept of the ICC as a supplemental court - at least
in theory - seems proper.
D. Standard, Timing, and Burden of Proof
1. Standard for "Unavailable" or "Ineffective"
As noted, several States have complained that the standard by
which the ICC may determine that a State's claim of jurisdiction will
not be accepted is presently ambiguous. This criticism appears well-
taken. The terms "unavailable" or "ineffective" require greater elabora-
tion to give States comfort that the Court will not overreach in refus-
ing to cede jurisdiction to a State that seeks to proceed with a bona
fide prosecution. The ILC may wish to address this matter through
commentary to the Statute.
The ILC commentary may define "unavailable" as referring to sit-
uations in which: (1) the forum does not provide for jurisdiction over
the crime; (2) the exercise of jurisdiction would exceed the limits of in-
ternationally recognized extra-territorial jurisdiction; or (3) the forum
is in a State of unrest such that its judicial system is not operating in
a reliable fashion.
The commentary may define "ineffective" as referring to situations
in which: (1) the forum provides a standard of guilt, or punishment,
which is incompatible with international norms; or (2) the State in
question has not demonstrated an actual intention to prosecute, or to
conduct, a full and prompt investigation.
Including these clarifications in the commentary to the ILC Draft
Statute may go a long way towards alleviating concerns expressed by
the United States and other nations about giving the Court too much
discretion.
2. Timing
The United States' proposal to permit challenges to jurisdiction
before an investigation has not, as yet, provoked much interest among
other nations, and may not be perceived as particularly compelling.
The marginal expense to the Court of a precipitous investigation, or
the marginal "interference" with domestic investigations caused by a
potentially duplicative ICC inquiry, may not seem sufficient to warrant
adding another whole layer of delay and administrative procedure.
To the extent that such a proposal is to be incorporated, the ILC
may consider proposing a "stay" procedure. A State, upon learning that
an ICC investigation is being considered, and that such an investiga-
tion would be unnecessary or inappropriate, may request an order of
the Court staying the prosecutor from conducting those portions of the
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investigation that the State finds objectionable. The standard for
granting such a stay would be that there is a reasonable probability
that the State investigation will be adequate, and that further investi-
gation by the prosecutor would cause an undue burden to the State or
the Court. This stay application could be addressed on an expedited
basis. By setting a relatively high standard of proof, the "stay" proce-
dure may limit State attempts to use challenges to jurisdiction as a
means of delaying or compromising investigations. Absent compelling
reasons, an investigation could go forward until the Court had an op-
portunity to consider its jurisdiction.
3. The Burden of Proof
At present the Draft Statute does not allocate the burden of proof
for establishing domestic jurisdiction over a case pending before the
ICC. The Draft Statute should address this omission, and formally al-
locate the burden of proof as between the ICC prosecutor and a State
asserting primary jurisdiction. Although arguments exist for allocating
the burden to either party, three considerations in particular may
favor having the burden assigned to the State.
First, the issue of State jurisdiction will generally arise only after
a State has determined to initiate or continue a prosecution that will
deprive the ICC of further authority to review the matter. Because the
State has made the choice to assert its superior jurisdiction, it should
be required to demonstrate that it has taken this action in good faith,
and not simply as a means of depriving the ICC of jurisdiction.
Second, as a practical matter, the State will possess the best evi-
dence concerning the effectiveness of its own system; thus, requiring it
- rather than the prosecutor - to produce this evidence will likely re-
sult in a more informed decision.
Third, politically, it may be offensive to require the ICC prosecutor
to present affirmative evidence impugning the availability or effective-
ness of a State's judicial system. As a matter of decorum and respect
to the State, it appears more appropriate to deny State jurisdiction on
the basis of a failure to satisfy the burden of proof, as opposed to an
affirmative conclusion that the system is inadequate.
To the extent that there are objections to this allocation of the
burden of proof, these concerns may be mitigated by the statute in ap-
plying a relatively low standard of proof, such as the preponderance of
the evidence standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is offered as a basis for further discussion among
the ILA Working Group and Committee on a Permanent International
Criminal Court about the doctrine of complementarity. As noted, de-
spite criticisms that have been directed at the Statute's failure to fully
define the principle of complementarity, the general principle appears
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sound. It should be encouraged with appropriate refinements, includ-
ing some or all of those discussed above.
Cooperation with National Systems
JEFFREY L. BLEICH*
This report concerns the provisions of the International Law Com-
mittee (ILC) Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
regarding cooperation between the ICC and national jurisdictions. The
comments of the Working Group are intended to stimulate discussion
of the relevant Draft provisions and are not intended to reflect any for-
mal conclusion of the International Law Association (ILA) Working
Group.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of evaluating the current ILC Draft, the term "coop-
eration between the court and national jurisdictions" has a limited
meaning. Cooperation between the court and national jurisdictions is,
of course, implicated by virtually every provision of the Draft ILC
Statute. With respect to this report, and the report of the Preparatory
Committee, consideration is limited only to affirmative acts of judicial
assistance by States in furtherance of the Court's jurisdiction. Specifi-
cally, these acts of cooperation involve assistance by States in con-
ducting ICC investigations, facilitating trial, and executing the Court's
sentence.
The principal issues raised by the "cooperation" provisions of the
ILC Draft are:
1. Whether the ICC should have authority to conduct independent
investigations and compel the cooperation of States to assist in those
investigations consistent with the principle of "complementarity?"
2. Whether the ICC should have authority to compel States to ar-
rest, detain, and transfer suspected criminals notwithstanding that
state's obligations under domestic law or with regard to extradition
treaties?
3. To the extent that the ICC may override some traditional limi-
tations on extradition, what bases, if any may, a State raise for not
transferring a person subject to an ICC arrest warrant?
4. What "supervisory jurisdiction," if any, will the ICC have to as-
sist States in matters where the ICC has concurrent jurisdiction, has
* Lecturer in Human Rights, University of California at Berkeley School of Law;
Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olsen, San Francisco; B.A., 1983, Amherst College; MPP,
1986, Harvard University; J.D., 1989, University of California at Berkeley; Law Clerk to
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1990-91; Law Clerk to Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
1991-92.
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deferred to the jurisdiction of the national courts, and has been called
upon by that nation to assist?
5. What mechanism, if any, should be employed for effectuating an
ICC request in cases in which the State from which assistance is
sought does not have a functioning judicial system?
These issues are addressed below.
II. THE ILC DRAFT STATUTE
As explained below, cooperation by individual States in assisting
the Court is implicated principally by Articles 26 (investigation of al-
leged crimes), 28 (arrest), 29 (pre-trial detention and release), 31 (per-
sons made available for prosecution), 51 (cooperation and judicial as-
sistance), 52 (provisional measures), 53 (transfer of an accused), 54
(obligation to extradite or prosecute), 55 (rule of specialty), 56 (cooper-
ation with States not parties), 57 (communications and documenta-
tion), 58 (recognition of judgments), and 59 (enforcement of
judgments).'
In general, the Draft was intended to promote flexibility - not to
require "complete reliance upon national law and practices."2 Neverthe-
less, consistent with the principle of "complementarity," the Draft Stat-
ute seeks to maximize reliance upon voluntary cooperation with the
Court by utilizing official government organs, and avoiding initiation
of an investigation within a State's territory against that State's
wishes.3 Likewise, although the Draft provides the ICC with extensive
powers to require States to assist in the arrest and transfer of sus-
pected criminals, it limits the scope of this authority based upon
whether the State party has accepted the Court's jurisdiction with re-
spect to a specific crime.
A. Investigation
Articles 26, 51, and 52 provide for cooperation between States and
the prosecutor with respect to the investigation of alleged crimes. Arti-
cle 26 provides that the prosecutor has the authority to detain and
question suspects, victims, and witnesses (subsection (2)(a)), collect
physical evidence (subsection 2(b)), conduct on-site investigations (sub-
section 2(c)), protect individuals from intimidation (subsection 2(d)),
1. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 ILC Draft].
2. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 38, 199, U.N. Doc. A/50/22
(1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm. Report].
3. Id. at 37, 197 ("[O]nly in limited circumstances, where national jurisdiction
failed to provide such assistance, would the question of the court's direct exercise of its
investigative powers in the territory of the State, either on its own or through agents of
the State acting on its behalf, arise.").
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and "as appropriate, seek the cooperation of any State or of the United
Nations" (subsection 2(e)). 4
Article 51 provides that "States parties shall cooperate with the
Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings
under this Statute."5 The Article enumerates a non-exclusive list of du-
ties of States, including assistance in the identification and location of
persons (subsection 2(a)), collection of evidence (subsection 2(b)), and
service of process (subsection 2(c)). Once a request has been made, the
States parties "shall respond without undue delay to the request."6 Ar-
ticle 52 clarifies that this may entail requiring the State to take provi-
sional measures, such as seizing evidence or otherwise preserving evi-
dence or witness testimony.7 The prosecutor's requests for assistance
may be made informally, provided that the prosecutor follows up with
a formal, written request "as soon as possible."" Evidence provided by
the State may not be used in prosecution or punishment of any other
crime without the State's consent.9
B. Arrest and Pre-Trial Detention
Article 28 provides that the Presidency may, at the request of the
prosecutor, issue a warrant for the provisional arrest of a suspect. 10
Because the ICC Statute does not contemplate a separate police force,
execution of the warrant is accomplished through the cooperation of
the State in which the suspect then resides.'1 Accordingly, pursuant to
a warrant, the Court may request a State to provisionally arrest 12 and
detain that suspect pending transfer to the Court.
3
The circumstances of an arrest under Article 28 are subject to re-
view by a judicial officer of the State where the arrest occurred.' 4 At
the hearing, the judicial officer has authority to determine only
whether the warrant has been duly served, and the rights of the ac-
cused have been respected.' 5 If the arrest is deemed valid, then the
State in which the arrest took place, or where the trial will occur, is
expected to hold the person in an appropriate place of detention.'
6
4. Article 26 also provides that if the prosecutor decides not to pursue a prosecu-
tion, a complainant state may seek review of that decision by the Presidency of the ICC.
1994 ILC Draft, supra note 1, art. 26(5).
5. Id. art. 51(1) (emphasis added).
6. Id. art. 51(3).
7. Id. art. 52(1).
8. Id. art. 52(2).
9. Id. art. 55.
10. Id. art. 28(1).
11. Id. art. 51(1), 51(2)(d).
12. Id. art. 52(lXa).
13. Id. art. 53.
14. Id. art. 29(1).
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 29(4).
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Under Article 53, all States must cooperate in arresting and trans-
ferring individuals pursuant to a warrant relating to the crime of ge-
nocide.' 7 A State which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the crime in question must also comply with the Court's re-
quest for arrest and transfer, as well as give priority to a request by
the Court over requests from other States. 8 A State party which is a
party to a treaty establishing an international crime, but which has
not accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to that crime, is re-
quired either to transfer the accused voluntarily, or to take all neces-
sary steps to extradite the accused.' 9 In all other cases, although the
State party must consider taking these steps, its obligation to extra-
dite or transfer the accused is limited by domestic laws. 20
C. Prosecution
Pursuant to Article 31, "[t]he prosecutor may request a State
party to make persons available to assist in a prosecution."21 Persons
ordered to assist in an ICC prosecution are required to follow the di-
rection of the prosecutor, notwithstanding contrary requests by their
respective Governments. 22
D. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
Article 58 provides that States parties recognize the judgments of
the Court. Article 59 clarifies that not only must States give full faith
and credit to Court judgments, but also they must assist in the en-
forcement of these judgments. Thus, the Court may sentence convicted
criminals to confinement in the prisons of States that have volun-
teered to accept prisoners for incarceration.23 The effectuation of the
sentence, however, remains subject to the supervision of the Court and
in accordance with Court rules.24
III. GENERAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE CURRENT DRAFT
The ILC's provisions regarding State cooperation have been criti-
cized for: (1) abridging the notion of complementarity by giving pri-
macy to the ICC over decisions to investigate; (2) altering the tradi-
tional system of apprehension and surrender under international law;
(3) failing to specify the bases for a State's refusal to extradite or
transfer a person subject to an ICC arrest warrant; (4) and failing to
17. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(i).
18. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(ii).
19. Id. art. 53(b), art. 54.
20. Id. art. 53(c). States not parties to the ICC Statute may assist the ICC based
upon unilateral or ad hoc consent. Id. art. 56.
21. Id. art. 31(1).
22. 1994 ILC Draft, supra note 1, art. 31(2).
23. Id. art. 59(1).
24. Id. art. 59(3).
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address additional issues regarding re-extradition, residual supervisory
authority, and judicial assistance where the national judicial system
was no longer functioning. While other concerns may be presented by
the cooperation provisions of the Draft, absent a complaint by States
parties, those concerns have not been raised in this report.
A. State Assistance in the Investigation Of Crimes And
Complementarity
Some nations have complained that the ILC Draft makes it too
easy for the prosecutor to initiate an investigation, thereby potentially
imposing the Statute's cooperative obligations upon States parties.
Israel, for example, has proposed that in order to initiate an investiga-
tion "charges . . . must be filed not by one country alone but by a
large and diverse group of countries, showing that the issue is one
which has, indeed, aroused the wrath of a significant portion of the
world."2S
Although the United States has not gone quite as far as Israel, it
proposes that Articles 25-27 be amended to give States standing to ob-
ject to any investigation by the ICC prosecutor that might interfere
with a legitimate national investigation or prosecution. 26 The United
States thus proposes that a State be permitted to prevent an investi-
gation by the ICC prosecutor, by showing that a "full," "adequate," or
"bona fide" investigation is proceeding, or will proceed, in that State
forum.27 As noted in the Working Group's report on complementarity,
the United States seems to prefer either limiting the prosecutor's abil-
ity to commence an investigation without the consent of interested
States, or adding some sort of independent review by an entity other
than the ICC or prosecutor, regarding the need for an ICC investiga-
tion. The United States thus advocates an automatic stay of jurisdic-
tion while a State conducts a bona fide investigation.28
At the same time that the United States and other nations pro-
pose increasing restrictions on the ICC's capacity to initiate an action,
some other nations advocate easing any restriction upon the prosecu-
tor's ability to go forward with an investigation.2 As the New Zealand
25. Statement of H. Golan (Israel) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/C.6/50/SR (1995).
26. See United States Comments to Ad Hoc Committee Report, U.N. GAOR, 50th
Sess., at 19, 20, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1IAdd.2 (1995) [hereinafter United States
Comments].
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 18. The Ad Hoc Committee reports note a suggestion, possibly by the
United States, that the prosecutor should suspend investigation, and that the ICC sus-
pend jurisdiction, immediately once an interested state informs the Court that it is con-
ducting its own bona fide investigation. Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 10, 1 51.
29. See Statement of F. Wong (New Zealand) to U.N.GA 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., at 9, $ 43, U.N. Doc A/C.6150/SR (1995) ("the prosecutor should be able to in-
vestigate and prosecute cases on his or her own initiative.").
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delegation explained: "It would [sic] completely inadmissible if the Se-
curity Council was able to prevent the Court from exercising its juris-
diction by simply claiming it had already been 'seized' of the matter."3 0
Accordingly, a tension exists between the notion of complementar-
ity, which establishes the primacy of national jurisdictions in investi-
gating and prosecuting international crimes, and the possibility that
the ICC may require States to conduct an ICC investigation and to
provide other judicial assistance before that State has had an opportu-
nity to challenge the Court's authority.
B. Easing of Traditional Principles Concerning State Assistance in the
Apprehension, Detention, and Transfer of Suspected Criminals
As several States have noted, Article 53 - the Article which di-
rectly concerns State obligations to apprehend, detain, and transfer
suspected criminals - represents a significant departure from the
traditional system of State extradition. Rather than incorporating limi-
tations of general treaty provisions among States parties, Article 53
imposes a new strict transfer scheme. This scheme limits the role of
national courts in evaluating the grounds for arrest and extradition by
restricting review only to the adequacy of service, and the validity of
the procedures surrounding the arrest under domestic law. Moreover,
Article 53 establishes a presumption in favor of transfer to the Court
over simultaneous requests for extradition by other States pursuant to
treaty.3 1
The comments of States regarding the system for apprehending,
arresting, and transferring suspects reflect a wide divergence of opin-
ion about the wisdom of the ILC Draft approach. Some States suggest
that the balance struck by the Draft is appropriate given that the com-
petence of the Court is limited to only the most serious international
crimes - those which warrant mandatory international cooperation.32
These States argue that because the crimes over which the ICC would
have jurisdiction warrant a coordinated international response, it is
appropriate to have a homogenous system that transcends technical
differences in treaty law.
Other States, however, argue that, notwithstanding the value of
having a homogeneous system, the ICC statute may not properly tran-
scend national constitutional requirements and established practices of
existing extradition treaties without violating principles of complemen-
tarity.33 These States appear to favor an "opt-in" provision by which
30. Id.
31. See generally Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 39, $ 205.
32. Id. at 39, $ 206.
33. Id. at 39, 1 205. See Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 Of General
Assembly Resolution 49/53 On The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court,
Ad Hoc Committee On The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, UN.
GAOR, 50th Sess., at 10, UN. Doc. A/AC.244/l/Add.2 (1995) (expressing concern of the
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States that accept the jurisdiction of the Court are given the option of
either adopting Article 53 or applying traditional extradition
procedures.3
Finally, other nations propose various compromises to permit
greater "consideration" of national law. The Netherlands, for example,
proposes that the ICC should be empowered to invoke national law of
the territorial State to deal with questions relating to the types of re-
sponsibility, defenses, and other general principles of criminal law to
be applied.35
In general, a fragile consensus appears to exist that a balance
must be struck between the need for the ICC to transcend traditional
extradition-treaty limitations while, at the same time, providing States
with some assurance that they may rely upon treaty protections in ap-
propriate cases. As set forth below, the critical area of disagreement
appears to be with respect to how that balance will be struck and
what grounds may be asserted for refusing to carry out an ICC trans-
fer request.
C. Bases For Challenging Arrest, Extradition, or Transfer
The United States has expressed concern that the ILC Draft does
not adequately specify which bases are permissible for setting aside a
request for judicial assistance.36 As noted, the ILC Draft provides that
requests by the Court have priority over requests by nations pursuant
to existing extradition agreements, and that the Court ultimately de-
cides whether to invalidate its prosecutor's request for transfer.37 Sev-
United States that extradition provisions of the draft statute "frequently fail to uphold
national jurisdiction"); see also Statement by I.E. Ayewah (Nigeria) to U.N.G.A. 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 5, $ 19, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR 29 (1995) ("the strict
transfer scheme envisaged in [Article 52], which bypassed national courts, continues to
be of concern."); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR (1995) (urging principle reliance upon national
courts and systems pursuant to principle of aut dedere, out judicare); Statement of C.
Shiqiu (China) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/
SR (1995) ('[extradition] provisions appear to be contrary to the principle" of complemen-
tarity.) [hereinafter Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm.].
34. Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 33, at 39, 9
207; see also Statement by Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States De-
partment of State, to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
50/SR.27 (1995) [hereinafter State Department Comments].
35. Statement of T. Halff to the U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 5,6,
U.N. Doc A/C.6/50/SR (1995). Japan has specifically criticized this approach as poten-
tially producing inconsistent results. Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A_ 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR (1995) ("further discussion is
necessary in order to assess whether [application of national law] is appropriate for dif-
ferent national laws and definitions of crimes to result in different criminal procedures
or penalties").
36. United States Comments, supra note 26, at 28, $ 101.
37. Id.
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eral States complained that, as presently drafted, the Statute "stacks
the deck" against objections to Court requests, and gives no guidance
regarding what are even valid bases for challenging a Court or prose-
cutor's request for judicial assistance.38 The United States Comments,
for example, ask rhetorically, "Are there any circumstances where a
State with a legal bar to extradition of its nationals would be required
to surrender the person to the court? 39 Based on these concerns, the
United States has proposed that the Statute contain more specific in-
formation regarding the scope of a state's obligation to arrest and/or
transfer a person to the ICC, and that the ILC Draft commentary con-
sider encouraging a program by which States parties enter into a set
of "surrender agreements."4°
The United States expressed specific concern regarding whether a
State under the Draft Statute would be required to cooperate regard-
less of contrary requirements of domestic law, and regardless of
whether cooperation may require the State to reveal sensitive informa-
tion or matters of national security.4 1 The United States warned that:
it is not possible for States to cooperate with the court smoothly
(and in some respects at all) unless these types of matters are clar-
ified. If they are not, States will take it upon themselves to deter-
mine the extent of their obligations to cooperate, leading to what
will likely be inconsistent results.42
Other States have agreed that States parties should be permitted
to refuse to comply with Court orders, but that the grounds for doing
so should be extremely narrow. These States, for example, would ex-
clude objections that "national authorities should not have the right to
examine the warrant in relation to substantive law."3 Rather, they
maintain, "exceptions to the obligation to surrender . . . should be
kept to the absolute minimum and they should be specifically articu-
lated in the statute."" These States thus would consider inappropriate
such traditional limitations or exceptions as the nationality of the ac-
cused, the level of social integration, excuses and justifications under
national law, the political exception, lapse of time, or health of the
accused.45
Finally, other States have argued that the degree of national coop-
eration mandated by the ICC may vary depending on the nature of the
assistance sought." Thus, States may be required to permit the prose-
38. Id.
39. Id. at 28, 103.
40. Id.
41. United States Comments, supra note 26, at 26, 9 94.
42. Id. at 26-27, % 95.
43. Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 40, 9 212.
44. Id. $ 214.
45. Id.
46. Ad Hoa Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 42, 9 225.
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cutor to conduct an investigation within the State's territory provided
the prosecutor complied with domestic law and informed appropriate
State authorities, because of the limited intrusion of State sover-
eignty.47 By contrast, activities requiring more coercive measures, such
as searches, property seizures, or arrest and surrender should, accord-
ing to these States, be left to the prerogative of national police
authorities. 8
Accordingly, while differences exist as to what specific exceptions
should be permitted to a State's duty to comply with an ICC request
for judicial assistance, there appears to be general agreement that
those exceptions need to be set forth explicitly in the statute and that
the list be exhaustive.
D. Re-Extradition, Inter-State Agreements, and Non-Functioning Na-
tional Judicial Systems
Finally, States have expressed concern about the absence of provi-
sions in the Draft Statute for granting the ICC supervisory powers
where it possesses concurrent jurisdiction with a State engaged in a
bona fide prosecution, or where States are unable to provide judicial
assistance because their domestic law enforcement system is not
functioning.
Some States noted that there may be cases in which the ICC could
assist a State engaged in a bona fide investigation in obtaining the ju-
dicial assistance of other States. These States argue that because one
purpose of the statute is to encourage national prosecution of alleged
offenders, the statute should either include mutual judicial assistance
agreements or grant the Court supervisory power to facilitate coopera-
tion in cases in which a domestic prosecution is going forward.49
Similarly, some States expressed concern that the Statute fails to
address the issue of re-extradition, i.e., the transfer of the accused by
the court to a third state. In particular, some States questioned
whether it would be appropriate for the Court to act as a conduit for
extradition from one State to another, where the original host State
would not have permitted extradition directly to the recipient state.50
Finally, some States expressed concern that the Statute does not
account for a default procedure in cases in which the assistance of na-
tional authorities is impractical because the State does not have a
functioning national judicial system.5 1
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 44, 236.
50. Id. at 42, T 220.
51. Id. at 44, T 236.
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IV. ILA SUB-COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS
To date, the ILA working group on national cooperation of the
Sub-Committee on the Permanent International Criminal Court has
not attempted to form a consensus on the foregoing concerns about the
ILC Draft provisions on cooperation by national courts. The following
thoughts, however, are offered for further consideration and
discussion.
A. Investigation
The United States suggestion to afford States greater say in
whether they will be required to assist in an investigation before the
investigation begins does not appear to have generated substantial in-
terest among other commentators. Although the suggestion has some
merit, most commentators apparently are concerned that adding an-
other layer of administrative procedure to initiating an investigation
may cause unacceptable expense, delay, and interference with valid
investigations.
As noted in the Working Group Report on Complementarity, an
expedited "stay" proceeding may provide a viable compromise. For ex-
ample, the Statute could provide that a State - upon a proper show-
ing that an ICC request is unnecessary, inappropriate, or imposes an
impermissible burden - may request an order of the Court staying
the prosecutor from conducting certain objectionable parts of its inves-
tigation. The standard for granting such a stay would be high. The
State would be required to show a significant likelihood that it will
prevail in challenging the Court's jurisdiction or the prosecutor's re-
quest, and must show a potential for irreparable injury if the State is
required to comply with the prosecutor's request. The relatively high
standard of proof would likely limit attempts by States to use these
challenges as a means of delaying or compromising investigations. Ab-
sent compelling reasons, an investigation could go forward until the
Court had an opportunity to consider its jurisdiction.
B. Principles Concerning State Assistance in the Apprehension, Deten-
tion, and Transfer of Suspected Criminals
As noted, there is a wide spectrum of opinion regarding whether
the Court should have separate and superior authority to compel the
transfer of alleged criminals, or whether the Court should be required
to rely principally upon traditional extradition arrangements. Although
reasonable minds could differ on this point, States advocating principal
reliance on a new "transfer" authority may have the better view. One
principal function of the Statute is to assure that prosecutions of
crimes against the international community will go forward notwith-
standing the parochial interests of a specific state. In order for the ICC
to accomplish this goal, and to assure a coordinated international re-
sponse to serious international crime, the Court must have some
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method of by-passing the potential obstacles created by the extradition
treaties of a specific state. The ILC Draft reflects this goal, and per-
mite the ICC to transcend the limitations of specific extradition trea-
ties where a State has acceded to the Court's jurisdiction with respect
to the crime at issue.
At present, the draft attempts to accommodate the interests of
States in retaining their extradition policies by making transfer volun-
tary as to crimes for which a State has not acknowledged the Court's
jurisdiction. To the extent that this compromise is considered inade-
quate, future drafts may further accommodate the concerns of States
about the need to fulfill extradition treaty commitments by broadening
the ICC's ability to consider treaty obligations. The ILC may, for exam-
ple, wish to consider amending Article 52 to indicate that the Court, in
exercising its transfer powers, may give due consideration to the na-
tional laws of the host state. The ICC would thus be expected, to the
fullest extent possible, to act consistently with national law of the ter-
ritorial State relating to responsibility to transfer, defenses, and other
general principles of criminal law.
C. Bases for Challenging Arrest, Extradition, or Transfer
As noted, there appears to be a general consensus that the ILC
Draft needs to enumerate the specific bases for a State to refuse to
comply with a request for judicial assistance.52 As presently drafted,
the Statute gives no guidance in identifying valid bases for challenging
the Court or prosecutor's request or for otherwise resisting a Court or-
der.53 This may create enforcement problems by placing national au-
thorities in the awkward position of either violating their domestic law
or violating their treaty obligation to provide judicial assistance. Ac-
cordingly, the ILA Committee may wish to consider drafting a model
set of defenses for submission to the ILC. As a starting point, the
Committee may wish to consider the suggestion that the Statute ex-
clude non-constitutional, non-fundamental, and/or discretionary bases
for refusing an ICC request, such as the nationality of the accused, the
level of social integration, excuses and justifications under national
law, the political question doctrine, laches, or health of the accused.
D. Supervisory and/or Default Provisions
As noted, the Statute is silent on issues of potential concern re-
garding assistance by the Court where it has ceded jurisdiction to a
State, or where a State is unable to provide judicial assistance because
its court processes are not functioning.
A significant issue arises in cases in which the Court has been de-
prived of jurisdiction because of the existence of an effective and avail-
52. United States Comments, supra note 26, at 28, T 101.
53. Id.
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able domestic forum, whose efforts are frustrated by the failure of
other nations to cooperate with that state. In such cases, it may be ap-
propriate to grant the Court limited "supervisory" powers. Under such
a supervisory powers clause, a State may request the assistance of the
Court to command judicial assistance where that State's ability to
compel the assistance of other States is inferior to that of the Court.
Such a power would also resolve the question of re-extradition, as it
would clarify that States have a right to expand their powers of mu-
tual assistance to parallel that of the Court where the Court possesses
concurrent jurisdiction.
Another issue concerns what measures are available to the Court
in the event that the State to whom a request for judicial assistance is
made does not have a functioning national judicial system. Although
this is a significant concern, it may not be necessary, or more to the
point, wise to attempt to address this in the Draft Statute. Presuma-
bly, in a case in which a State has deteriorated to the point where its
judicial system is no longer functioning, the U.N. may consider other
efforts to maintain peace and order in the region, including dispatch-
ing security forces to the State. Under these circumstances, it is not
difficult to imagine that peace keeping forces could provide judicial as-
sistance to the Court. Introducing the notion of U.N. troops to assist
the Court, however, would not likely be politically wise. Accordingly,
given that this is a potentially touchy subject, and the issue is likely to
be resolved through extra-judicial events, it may be best not to propose
any new sections or language addressing this topic.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is offered as a basis for further discussion among
the ILA Working Group and Committee about cooperation with na-
tional systems. As noted, despite criticisms that have been directed at
the Statute's failure to fully define the principle of cooperation with
national systems, the general principle appears sound, and should be
encouraged with appropriate refinements.
VOL. 25:2
A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal
MICHAEL P. SCHARF*
In his historic opening statement, Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief
Prosecutor at Nuremberg said, "we must never forget that the record
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which his-
tory will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chal-
ice is to put it to our lips as well."' It is ironic that history has not
been altogether kind to the Nuremberg Tribunal, labeling it "victor's
justice," denouncing its application of ex post facto law, and rebuking
its procedural shortcomings. Fifty years later, the world community
has created another war crimes tribunal - the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In its first annual report, this new
Tribunal stated that "one can discern in the statute and the rules a
conscious effort to avoid some of the often-mentioned flaws of Nurem-
berg and Tokyo."2 Because it will serve as the model for future ad hoc
tribunals and a permanent international criminal court, the Yugoslav
Tribunal has recognized that to achieve success it must not only be
fair, but be seen as fair - a goal it has only partially achieved thus
far.
In many respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement
over its predecessor. Its detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for
example, represent a tremendous advancement over the scant set of
rules that were fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. Further, in
contrast to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Yugoslavia Tribunal prohibits
trials in absentia, which are inherently unfair and are likely to be seen
as an empty gesture. And where the defense attorneys at Nuremberg
were prevented from full access to the Nuremberg Tribunal's eviden-
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and
Policy, New England School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser for U.N. Affairs at the
US. Department of State. Professor Scharf has served as Rapporteur to the Committee
of Experts on an International Criminal Court convened under the auspices of the
United Nations and International Association of Penal Law, and as an ex-officio member
of the American Bar Association's Blue Ribbon Task Force on an International Criminal
Court, chaired by former Attorney-General Benjamin Civiletti, and the American Bar
Association's Task Force on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, chaired by former
State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh. He is co-author of the first book pub-
lished about the Yugoslavia Tribunal, VIRG UA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGOsLAvIA (1995).
1. Opening Speech of Robert H. Jackson, THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG (1946).
2. Annual Report of the International Tribunal, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007,
A/49/342 (1994).
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tiary archives, 3 defendants before the Yugoslavia Tribunal are entitled
to any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecutor, and
both the prosecution and the defense are reciprocally bound to disclose
all documents and witnesses prior to trial. Finally, where the Nurem-
berg Tribunal has been criticized for compelling defendants to make
incriminating statements, the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal guar-
antees every accused the right "not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt,"4 in addition to a panoply of other rights
not recognized under the Nuremberg Charter.
The most often heard criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived ap-
plication of ex post facto laws, by holding persons responsible for the
first time in history for the "crime of aggression" and by applying the
concept of conspiracy which had never been recognized in continental
Europe. The creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths
to avoid a similar perception with regard to the International Tribu-
nal. First, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions that put
the people of the former Yugoslavia on notice that they were bound by
existing international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva
Conventions. The resolutions enumerated the various types of reported
acts that would amount to breaches of this law, and warned that per-
sons who commit or order the commission of such breaches would be
held individually responsible. Second, the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Tribunal is defined on the basis of the highest standard of appli-
cable law, namely rules of law which are beyond any doubt part of cus-
tomary law to avoid any question of full respect for the principle
nullem crimen sine lege. It is particularly noteworthy that the crime of
waging a war of aggression, which engendered so much criticism after
Nuremberg, is not within the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Jurisdiction.
To some extent, the Yugoslavia Tribunal undermined this accom-
plishment in one of its first pre-trial rulings interpreting its subject
matter jurisdiction. In a pre-trial motion, the Defendant, Dusko Tadic,
challenged the lawfulness of his indictment under Article 2 (grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and Article 3 (violations of the
customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute on the ground that there was
no international armed conflict in the region of Prijedor, where the
crimes he was charged with are said to have been committed. To sup-
port his argument, Tadic pointed out that in its proposal for the Tribu-
nal's Statute, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
world's leading authority on international humanitarian law, "under-
lined the fact that according to International Humanitarian Law as it
stands today, the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of inter-
3. Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to
the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DicK. J. INT'L L. 57, 89 (1995).
4. Statute for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
UN. SCOR., 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 2 1(4)(g), UN. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Statute for the Yugoslav Tribunal].
VOL. 25:2
TRIBUNAL CRITIQUE
national armed conflict."5 In what can only be described as a novel in-
terpretation, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Appeals Chamber decided on a
four to one vote that, although Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute ap-
plied only in international armed conflicts, Article 3 applied to war
crimes "regardless of whether they are committed in internal or inter-
national armed conflicts." 6 The Tribunal based its decision on its per-
ception of the trend in international law in which "the distinction be-
tween interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as
human beings are concerned."7
While distinguished commentators such as Professors Meron and
Paust have argued convincingly for acceptance of individual responsi-
bility for violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols addi-
tional thereto in the context of internal armed conflict," such recogni-
tion would constitute progressive development of international law,
rather than acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt found in
existing law. In addition to raising the ex post facto criticism, there is a
second important reason for the Tribunal to exercise greater caution in
construing its jurisdiction: States will not have faith in the integrity of
the Tribunal as a precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a per-
manent international criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as
prone to expansive interpretations of its jurisdiction.
Another criticism of Nuremberg was that those acquitted by the
Tribunal were retried and convicted in subsequent proceedings before
national courts. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in contrast,
expressly protects defendants against double jeopardy by prohibiting
national courts from retrying persons who have been tried by the In-
ternational Tribunal.9 However, by permitting the Tribunal's Prosecu-
tor to appeal an acquittal,10 the Tribunal itself may infringe the ac-
cused's interest in finality which underlies the double jeopardy
principle. The U.S. Constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy pro-
hibits prosecution appeals of acquittals. The prohibition is not against
being twice punished, but against being twice forced to stand trial for
the same offense. There are two important rationales for the rule. One
rationale is that the trial itself is a great ordeal, and once the defend-
ant is acquitted, the ordeal must end." The other is based on the in-
5. Preliminary Remarks of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 22 Feb.
1993, reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 391 (1995).
6. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct.
1995, IT Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, at 68. Judge Li dissented from this conclusion.
7. Id. at 54.
8. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 554 (1995); Jordan Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to
Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 499, 521-22 (1994).
9. Statute for the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 10(1).
10. Id. art 25.
11. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
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creased risk of an erroneous conviction that may occur if the state,
with its superior resources, were allowed to retry an individual until it
finally obtained a conviction.u These rationales are just as applicable
to prosecution before an international criminal court as to domestic
prosecutions. The International Tribunal's Prosecutor, together with
State authorities assisting the Prosecutor, will have the full resources
of the court and several interested States behind it, while defendants
and their counsel will be acting alone to refute guilt.
Nuremberg has also been criticized for its failure to provide for
the right of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been
recognized as constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by
guaranteeing the right of appeal and providing for a separate court of
appeal. However, the procedure for the selection of judges by the Gen-
eral Assembly did not differentiate between trial and appellate judges,
leaving the decision to be worked out by the judges themselves. At the
Hague, this became the subject of an acrimonious debate, since nearly
all the judges wished to be appointed to the appeals chamber, which
was viewed to be the more prestigious assignment. As a compromise,
the judges agreed that assignments would be for an initial period of
one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular basis" thereafter.13 The
rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the provisions
of the Tribunal's Statute intended to maintain a clear distinction be-
tween the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that there shall
be three judges in each Trial Chamber and five judges in the Appeals
Chamber, and Article 14(3) expressly states that a judge shall serve
only in the chamber to which he or she is assigned. These provisions
were intended to ensure the right of an accused to have an adverse
judgment and sentence in a criminal case reviewed by "a higher tribu-
nal according to law," as required by Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The purpose of the principle of
the double degree of jurisdiction under which judges of the same rank
do not review each other's decision is to avoid undermining the integ-
rity of the appeals process as a result of the judges' hesitancy to re-
verse decisions and avoid the future reversal of their own decisions. 14
The rotation principle, therefore, undermines the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
appellate process.
Critics of Nuremberg have pointed out that the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal failed to provide sufficient due process guarantees to the defend-
12. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
13. Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Adopted on 11 Feb. 1994,
amended on 5 May 1994 and 4 Oct. 1993, and further revised on 30 Jan. 1995), U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.3, 30 Jan. 1995, reprinted in Momius & ScHmw, supra note 5, at 41.
14. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Ses-
sion, 3 May - 23 July 1993, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 323, U.N. Doc.
A/48/10 (1993).
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ants, and those it did provide were circumscribed by several pro-
prosecution judicial rulings. The most notable of such rulings was the
Nuremberg Tribunal's decision to allow the prosecutors to introduce ex
parte affidavits (depositions taken out of the presence of the accused or
his lawyer) of persons who were, in fact, available to testify at trial.
During the proceedings, the Nuremberg Tribunal took statements from
240 witnesses, and received 300,000 ex parte affidavits into evidence. 15
As Telford Taylor, one of the Prosecutors at Nuremberg, wrote: "Total
reliance on . . . untested depositions by unseen witnesses is certainly
not the most reliable road to factual accuracy. . . . Considering the
number of deponents and the play of emotional factors, not only faulty
observation but deliberate exaggeration must have warped many of the
reports." 6 Such ex parte affidavits seriously undermined the right of
the defendants to confront the witnesses against them. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has expressed the importance of this right as follows:
"Face-to-face confrontation generally serves to enhance the accuracy of
fact finding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully impli-
cate an innocent person."1 7
The jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been stained by
this same criticism that tarnished the legacy of Nuremberg. At the
Prosecutor's request, the Yugoslavia Trial Chamber recently ruled that
the identity of several witnesses could be withheld indefinitely from
the defendant (Dusko Tadic) and his counsel, even throughout the
trial, in order to protect the witnesses and their families from retribu-
tion.'8 There are two problems with this decision. First, the Tribunal
decided to elevate the protection of victims above the accused's right of
confrontation, notwithstanding the fact that Article 20 of the Tribu-
nal's Statute requires that proceedings be conducted "with full respect
for the rights of the accused," and with merely "due regard for the pro-
tection of victims and witnesses." Simply put, the right to examine or
cross-examine witnesses cannot be effective without the right to know
the identity of adverse witnesses. As one noted commentator has
stated, "[Ilt is an almost impossible task to effectively cross-examine
an adverse witness without knowing that witness' name, background,
habitual residence, or whereabouts at the time of the events to which
he or she testifies."19 Second, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its
decision on the ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military
Tribunal" which has more "limited rights of due process and more leni-
15. JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNEs LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 94 (R.A. Downie
trans., 1962).
16. TELFORD TAYLOR. ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 174 (1992).
17. Maryland v. Craig, 497 US. 836, 846 (1990).
18. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and Wit-
nesses, 10 Aug. 1995, IT. Doc. IT-94-I-T
19. Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: The Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996).
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ent rules of evidence."20 It then cited favorably the practice of the Nu-
remberg Tribunal to admit hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits
with greater frequency than would be appropriate in domestic trials. 21
What the Tribunal (apparently) failed to realize is that this practice
has in fact been a lightening rod for criticism of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. 22
Perhaps the most often-heard criticism of Nuremberg was that it
constituted "victor's justice." In contrast to Nuremberg, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal was created neither by the victors nor by the parties involved
in the conflict, but rather by the United Nations, representing the in-
ternational community of States. 23 The judges of the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal come from all parts of the world, and are elected by the General
Assembly.24
On the other hand, the decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal was made by the U.N. Security Council, which has not remained
merely a neutral third party; rather, it has itself become deeply in-
volved in the conflict. The Security Council has imposed sanctions on
the side perceived to be most responsible for the conflict, the Serbs,25
and authorized the use of force and air strikes, 26 and sent in tens of
thousands of peacekeeping personnel.27 Its numerous resolutions have
been ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been injured or
killed; some have even been held hostage. Moreover, throughout the
conflict, the Security Council has (justifiably) favored the Bosnian
20. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and Wit-
nesses, Doc. IT-94-I-IT, at 15.
21. Id.
22. The Nuremberg Tribunal had also been severely criticized for allowing the pros-
ecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused over the objections of their
attorneys. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 241; AME.mcAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE
WAR CRIMES COMMITrED IN THE FORMER YuGosLAiA 27 (1993).
23. MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 5, at 332.
24. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 12 and 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
25. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3082d mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
26. S.C. Res. 770, UN. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3106th mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992)
(authorizing force to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia); S.C.
Res. 816, UN. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing
force to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) (authorizing measures to prevent violations of
economic sanctions imposed on Serbia).
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3087th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
761 (1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to ensure the security of Sarajevo airport); S.C.
Res. 762, UN. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3088th mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/762 (1992) (dispatching
peacekeepers to "pink zones" in Croatia); S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3114th
mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/776 (1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to other parts of Bosnia to
facilitate delivery of aid); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/819 (1993) (dispatching peacekeepers to "safe areas" in Bosnia).
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Muslims and Croats over the Serbs. Although it imposed sweeping eco-
nomic sanctions on Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs; such action was
never even proposed when Croatian forces committed similar acts of
ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia in October 1993. Throughout the
conflict, the Council had been quite vocal in its condemnation of Serb
atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by Muslims and Croats
were muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to be independent
from the Security Council, one cannot ignore that the Tribunal's Prose-
cutor was selected by the Security Council and its Judges were se-
lected by the General Assembly from a short list proposed by the Se-
curity Council. Indeed, given that the battle for control of Bosnia was
in large measure a religious war between Bosnian Muslims and Bos-
nian Serbs, it is astonishing that four of the eleven judges elected by
the General Assembly upon the nomination of the Council come from
States with predominantly Muslim populations.2s In contrast, the nom-
inee for the Tribunal's bench from Russia (the one state with the clos-
est historic ties to Serbia) was defeated ostensibly to avoid a pro-Serb
bias.29 While the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute anyone respon-
sible for violations of international humanitarian law in the Former
Yugoslavia, the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against
Serbs: as of the date of this writing, 46 Serbs have been indicted, 9
Croats, and 3 Muslims.
Finally, noting China's dismal human rights record, one commen-
tator has likened China's participation as a Permanent Member of the
Security Council in the establishment of the Tribunal, the selection of
its Prosecutor, and the nomination of its judges, as equivalent to Rus-
sia's presence on the Nuremberg Tribunal. 30 As long as the jurisdiction
of international criminal tribunals is triggered by a decision of the Se-
curity Council, and the prosecutors and judges are selected by the
Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism that they
are not completely neutral. This is one of the reasons the eventual es-
tablishment of a permanent international criminal court independent
from the Security Council is so important.
In his report to the President on the Nuremberg trials, Robert
Jackson said, "Many mistakes have been made and many inadequacies
28. Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt), Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria),
Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), and Lal Chand Bohrah (Malaysia). None of the Judges,
however, are, themselves, Muslim.
29. See Boris Krivoshei & Serbei Staroselsky, Russia Will Obey Tribunal on War
Crimes in Yugoslavia, TAss, Sept. 24, 1993, available on LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
30. Chaney supra note 3, at 82. Nuremberg has been criticized on the basis of "un-
clean hands" since Soviet judges convicted defendants for waging aggressive war and
mistreatment of prisoners despite the forcible Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and
appalling record of the Soviets regarding the treatment of their POWs.
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must be confessed. But I am consoled by the fact that in proceedings of
this novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive to the fu-
ture."3 1 Just as the Yugoslavia Tribunal reflects a general improvement
over Nuremberg, the Statute and Rules of a Permanent International
Criminal Court must be crafted in a way that avoids the errors and
missteps of the Yugoslavia Tribunal which have been identified in this
Report.
31. Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President, Oct. 7, 1946.
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General Rules of Criminal Law*
EDWARD M. WISE**
In discussions of the problems connected with the establishment of
an international criminal court, attention has naturally turned to the
question of the nature of the law to be applied by the proposed court.
In Europe, down through the eighteenth century, criminal as well
as civil law was largely based on a common law (ius commune) that
transcended national boundaries.' The situation is described in scath-
ing terms in the opening line of the preface to Beccaria's essay On
Crimes and Punishments:
A few remnants of the legislation of a former conquering people
compiled by a prince who reigned at Constantinople twelve centu-
ries ago, afterwards mixed up with the customs of the Lombards,
and buried in a voluminous muddle of obscure commentaries -
these comprise the hotch-potch of opinions to which a large part of
Europe has given the name of law; and thus, even today, it is as
deplorable as it is common that an opinion of Carpzov, an ancient
practice noted by Clarus, a torture proposed with barbaric compla-
cency by Farinacci, provide the rules so confidently administered by
men who ought to tremble when they decide on the lives and for-
tunes of their fellow citizens.2
The eighteenth-century movement for penal reform swept all this
away. Article 8 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citi-
zen of 1789 declared: "no one may be punished except by virtue of a
law (loi) drawn up and promulgated before the offense is committed";
the first (and only) code adopted during the French Revolution was the
penal code of 1791. Almost everywhere (and nowadays, to a large ex-
tent, even in countries following English common law), the principle of
legality has been taken to require that crimes be specifically pro-
scribed by law in advance of the conduct sought to be punished. The
most well-known formulation of the principle is Anselm Feuerbach's
maxim: nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. In its classical formula-
* Parts of this section are taken from a paper on The Codification of International
Criminal Law, which will appear in the revised second edition of M. Cherif Bassiouni's
three-volume compilation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. Edward M. Wise, The
Codification of International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(forthcoming).
** Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative Criminal Law Project, Wayne
State University, Detroit, Michigan.
1. See Marc Ancel, The Collection of European Penal Codes and the Study of Com-
parative Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 329, 341-42 (1958).
2. Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene 3 (Franco Venturi ed., 1965).
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tions, the principle requires that crimes and punishments be defined
in a statute (loi, lex) promulgated prior to the offense.
A slightly diluted version of the principle appears in Article 11(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under na-
tional or international law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall
a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at
the time the penal offence was committed.3
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 4 contains virtually the same language:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense,
under national or international law, at the time when it was com-
mitted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was
committed...
Article 15 of the Covenant then adds the qualification: "Nothing in this
article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was crimi-
nal according to the general principles of law recognized by the com-
munity of nations."
In these statements, it is not necessarily required that the offense
be proscribed by a pre-existing statute, only by pre-existing law. The
weaker formulation of the principle in international instruments pre-
serves the possibility of prosecution for at least pre-existing common
law crimes and of prosecution for violations of customary international
law.
Article 39 of the International Law Commission's Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court 5 is titled "Principle of legality (nullum
crimen sine lege)." This article provides:
An accused shall not be held guilty:
(a) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to
in article 20(a) to (d), unless the act or omission in question consti-
tuted a crime under international law;
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 UN. GAOR, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
5. International Law Commission's Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Ses-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
ILC Draft Statute].
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(b) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to
in article 20(e), unless the treaty in question was applicable to the
conduct of the accused; at the time the act or omission occurred.
Article 39 does not require that the definition of the relevant of-
fense be articulated in a statute, much less a statute promulgated
prior to the offense. In this respect, the title of the article includes a
misnomer: the principle set out in Article 39 is not precisely the ver-
sion of the legality principle encapsulated in the maxim nullum crimen
sine lege.
In any event, there appears to be considerable dissatisfaction with
the idea of leaving undefined (as the Commission's Draft does) the of-
fenses over which the proposed court will have jurisdiction. In discus-
sions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Establishment of an International
Criminal Court in 1995,
the view was expressed that a procedural instrument enumerating
rather than defining the crimes would not meet the requirements
of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena
sine lege) and that the constituent elements of each crime should
be specified to avoid any ambiguity and to ensure full respect for
the rights of the accused.6
In further discussions during the April 1996 meetings of the Prepara-
tory Committee on Establishment of an International Criminal Court,7
it again seemed to be widely accepted that a statute itself should con-
tain offense definitions.
But would even that be sufficient? In a working system of criminal
law, it is not adequate simply to lay down (or point to) the definitional
elements of particular offenses. Criminal law does more than define of-
fenses: it lays down detailed rules about what constitutes culpable con-
duct, about what mental states are requisite for criminal liability,
about when particular results will be attributed to a particular actor,
about responsibility for the conduct of others and for inchoate crimes,
about general justifications for otherwise wrongful conduct that
reshape and complicate the boundaries of particular prohibitions,
about excuses that entirely or partially exclude culpability, and about
the grading of offenses and sanctions according to different levels and
degrees of culpability and harm. The rules pertaining to all of these
matters vary as between different national systems.
There is no equivalent body of existing international rules applica-
6. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, 57, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995)
[hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
7. See 1 Report of the Preparatory Committee on Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc A/51/22 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Preparatory Committee Report].
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ble with respect to international crimes. 8 "Indirect enforcement" by na-
tional authorities has meant that the rules governing these matters
have been, for the most part, those of the national system of the en-
forcing state. Trials conducted before "international tribunals" set up
in the aftermath of World War II generated some rules about defenses
like "superior orders" and "military necessity"; on the whole, however,
discussions in these cases of general principles of criminal liability is
sparse, superficial, and inconclusive. Partly because of their common
roots, some elementary generalizations about the common features of
national systems of criminal law may well be possible.9 But differences
in detail make it "very difficult, if not impossible," to devise a workable
and universally acceptable system of international criminal law simply
by abstracting the common provisions of major domestic systems and
treating them as "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions"'0 in the sense in which that expression is used in Article 38(1)(c)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1
Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia 12 sets out the principle of individual responsibility
for participation in crimes falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, de-
clares that official position does not confer immunity from prosecution,
establishes the liability of superiors for negligent supervision of subor-
dinates, and excludes defenses based on obedience to the orders of a
superior. This is the only provision in the Statute dealing with sub-
stantive principles of criminal liability. The Report of the Secretary-
General submitting the draft Statute to the Security Council indicated
that "[t]he International Tribunal itself will have to decide on various
personal defences which may relieve a person of individual criminal re-
sponsibility, such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon
general principles of law recognized by all nations." 13 Article
8. For painstaking proof of this proposition, see M. CHERIF BASsIoUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 339-469 (1992). See also 1 VmcGnA
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBU-
NAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 91-111 (1995).
9. For an effort to construct a system of principles of international criminal liabil-
ity on the basis of comparative study, see STEFAN GLASER, INFRACTION INTERNATIONALE:
SES ELEMENTS CONSrruTIFs ET SES ASPECTS JURIDIQUES (1957); Stefan Glaser, Culpabilitd
en Droit International Pdnal, 99 RECUEIL DES CoURS 467-592 (1960-II); cf. STANISLAW
PLAWSKI, 9TUDE DES PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PENAL 142-64
(1972).
10. BASSIOuNI, supra note 8, at 350. See also Albin Eser, The Need for a General
Part, in COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF
CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, at 43, 51 (Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
Nouvelles 9tudes P6nales vol. 11, 1993).
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1031.
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M.
1203 (1993).
13. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
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67(A)(ii)(b) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 deal-
ing with pretrial disclosure, requires the defendant to give advance no-
tice of "any special defense, including that of diminished or lack of
mental responsibility.. . ." This suggests that the tribunal will recog-
nize defenses based on insanity and diminished mental capacity.
Article 33 of the International Law Commission's Draft Statute for
a permanent court directs the proposed court to base its decisions on
(a) the statute itself; (b) "applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of general international law"; and, (c) "to the extent applicable,
any rule of national law." Like the Secretary-General's Report that led
to establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Commission's com-
mentary recognizes that the proposed court will have to develop its
own rules of substantive criminal law. It is somewhat vague, however,
as to whether the court's power to do so should more properly be re-
ferred to (b) or to (c), and also as to how a particular body of national
law, e.g., that of the place of commission of the offense, might be rele-
vant in an international prosecution.' 5
It has been urged that Article 33 of the International Law Com-
mission's Draft Statute
should not be interpreted to permit the Court to substitute the
laws of any nation or general international law for a proper "gen-
eral part" of an applicable substantive criminal law. Accordingly,
such a General Part must be elaborated, and to be suitable for in-
ternational use, it should reflect principles from the major criminal
law systems of the world in language that is as neutral or univer-
sal as possible.' 6
Indeed, broad agreement seems to be emerging that not only of-
fense definitions and penalties, but also the general rules of liability
and exoneration to be applied by the court, cannot be left to national
law, or otherwise permitted to vary from case to case, but must be set-
tled in advance. 17 The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee contains in An-
nex II a checklist of substantive matters that might or might not be
covered in the court's statute and rules. This list has served as a guide
to focus subsequent discussion. There does not yet seem to be, how-
ever, much agreement on exactly what general rules should be in-
cluded in the statute, much less on how they should be formulated.
It is sometimes suggested that fixing substantive rules in advance
may be required by the principle of legality. However, if not required
14. Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 33 I.L.M. 484 (1994).
15. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 5, at 103-04.
16. Committee of Experts on International Criminal Law, Draft Statute for an Inter-
national Criminal Court - Alternative to the ILC Draft (Siracusa Draft) 38 (July 1995);
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: Suggested Modifications to the 1994
ILC Draft (Updated Siracusa Draft) 44 (Jan. 1996).
17. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, 86-89, at 18-19; Prepara-
tory Committee Report, supra note 7, 187-88, at 43.
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by the principle of legality itself, the requirements of precision and
certainty expected in criminal proceedings may so necessitate. In fact,
precisely what the principle of legality requires to be determined in
advance depends on the relative importance ascribed to the various de-
siderata underlying the principle. 8 How much weight attaches to these
various factors has to be sorted out in order to determine whether
there is a principled basis for insisting that particular kinds of sub-
stantive rules need be laid down in the court's statute.
A central reason for insisting that punishment be imposed only by
virtue of a law enacted prior to the offense is the sense that fairness
requires giving due notice of what constitutes prohibited conduct and
of what will happen if the line between permissible and prohibited
conduct is crossed. Insofar as the object is to indicate where this line
lies, and therefore to provide a practicable guide to permissible con-
duct, it would follow that the law should not only define offenses but
also specify in advance the kind of justifications that will render other-
wise prohibited conduct permissible. Equally, the law should define the
kind of justifications that modify and complicate specific offense defini-
tions by creating privileged exceptions, and by stipulating conditions
under which what would otherwise constitute wrongdoing is licensed.
If the only object of the principle of legality is to give fair warning
of where the line between permissible and prohibited conduct lies, it
should not require setting out in advance the conditions under which
criminal conduct will be excused, the circumstances under which
wrongdoing will not be punished because the wrongdoer is not re-
garded as culpable or blameworthy.
At the same time, there are reasons for insisting on the principle
of legality other than the desire to give potential offenders fair warn-
ing of what the law prohibits. The principle rests in part on the judg-
ment that it is for legislators (or their international equivalent) rather
than judges to settle questions about what kinds of conduct will be
proscribed. In this aspect, the legality principle is a congener of the po-
litical doctrine of separation of powers. The principle rests in part on a
sense that fixed rules are required if we are to realize the ideal of
treating like cases alike, and that this ideal is particularly important
when it comes to imposing criminal penalties. It rests in part on the
sense that, especially in criminal cases, it is important to apply imper-
sonal rules articulated beforehand without regard to the particular
persons to whom they will be applied.
18. On this question, see GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 569-74
(1978); Eric Colvin, Criminal Law and the Rule of Law, in CRn, JUSTICE & CODIFICA-
TION 124 (P. Fitzgerald ed., 1986); Peter Alldridge, Rules for Courts and Rules for Citi-
zens, 10 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUDIES 487, 490-92 (1990); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Con-
duct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (1990).
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If full weight were given to all of these converging considerations,
the principle of legality would require that not only offense definitions,
but all significant principles of the applicable system of criminal law,
be laid down as definitely as possible in advance. It would practically
require a complete criminal code. 19
Absent a developed body of law on liability for international
crimes, the alternative to a proper code is likely to be reliance on a
hotch-potch of rules and principles plucked from hither and yon - the
very kind of situation against which eighteenth-century reformers like
Beccaria reacted. At the same time, there is no guarantee that a code
drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, in an age that
seems to lack the vocation for coherent criminal policy, will be any less
of a hotch-potch.
19. It might further preclude prosecutorial discretion as well as the kind of doctri-
nal and judicial development of new justifications and excuses that even codified sys-
tems of criminal law tolerate. This suggests that no legal system carries out in full all of
the implications of the principle of legality.
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Nullum Crimen and Related Claims*
JORDAN J. PAUST**
Unlike many domestic statutes, international instruments setting
forth international criminal proscriptions often lack detailed defini-
tional orientations or elements of crimes. Penalties are rarely set forth,
the word "crime" often does not appear, and mention of particular fora
for prosecution is scarce. It is widely recognized, however, that inter-
national criminal laws do not thereby run afoul of the principle nullum
crimen sine lege or otherwise lack legal validity.' Similarly, the fact
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1. See, e.g., 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 52, 111, 275, 333 (1995);
M. CHERiF BAssIouNi & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBU-
NAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 266 (1996) ("existing international criminal law ...
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cific elements and if they are "wanting . .. conviction violates human rights law," and
that "the law of virtually all nations requires clear definition and specific material ele-
ments." Id. at 9-10, 13, 15, 21. Professor Edward Wise also states: "Almost everywhere
. . . the principle of legality has been taken to require that crimes be specifically pro-
scribed by law in advance of the conduct sought to be punished." Edward M. Wise, Gen-
eral Rules of Criminal Law, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y315), adding: "the view was ex-
pressed" during a 1995 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
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that new domestic laws incorporate what had been international crimi-
nal law at the time of an alleged violation or that new fora (domestic
or international) allow prosecution of what had been an international
crime does not violate such a principle or a related prohibition of ex
post facto law.2
During the World War II era, in United States v. Altstoetter,3
before the United States' military commission established under Con-
trol Council Law No. 10, the Tribunal appropriately denied defense
claims that the principle nullum crimen sine lege applied:
Obviously the principle in question constitutes no limitation upon
the power or right of the Tribunal to punish acts which can prop-
erly be held to have been violations of international law when com-
mitted . . . C.C. Law 10, article II, paragraph 1 (b), "War Crimes,"
has by reference incorporated the rules by which war crimes are to
be identified. In all such cases it remains only for the Tribunal...
to determine the content of those rules under the impact of chang-
ing conditions.
4
The Tribunal added that "the ex post facto rule, as known to con-
stitutional states," does not apply "to a treaty, a custom, or a common
law decision of an international tribunal. . . ."5 With respect to the
principle nullum crimen, the Tribunal also stated: "[als applied in the
field of international law, the principle . . . received its true interpre-
tation in the opinion of the [International Military Tribunal] IMT . . .
[at Nuremberg] .. ."6 It then quoted the IMT:
International Criminal Court "that a procedural instrument enumerating rather than
defining the crimes would not meet the requirements of the principle of legality (nullum
crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege).... ." Id. citing Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee, 50 UN. GAOR, Supp. No. 22, at 12, T 57, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
2. On the prohibition of ex post facto laws, see, eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3, §10,
cl. 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11 (2) (... . which did not constitute
a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
• . ."), GA Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 99, 75 U.N.TS. 135;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1.
3. III TRAs OF WAR CRmmNALs BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBuNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1946-1949, addressed in PAUST, BASSIOUNI El AL., supra
note 1, at 253 [hereinafter The Justice Case].
4. Id. at 974; see also id. at 966, 975; In re Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen
Trial), 15 I.L.R. 656, 658 (US. Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1948), reprinted in PAUST,
BASSIOuNI ET Ai., supra note 1, at 722-23 (concerning "ex post factoism," '[t]he specific
enactments for the trial of war criminals which have governed the Nuremberg trials,
have only provided a machinery for the actual application of international law thereto-
fore existing... .. [Criminals] are amenable to punishment ... without any prior desig-
nation of tribunal or procedure.").
5. Id. at 975. See also The Prize Cases, 67 US. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1862) (criminal
cases addressing ex post facto principle "cannot be received as authoritative in a tribunal
administering ... international law.").
6. IIl TRIALS OF WAR CRImINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
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In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum cri-
men sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a
principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who
in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring
states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circum-
stances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far
from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished.7
When faced with an argument that an international agreement
outlawing war as an instrument of national policy "does not expressly
enact that such wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who
make such wars,"" and that therefore the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege is violated, the IMT had also declared:
To that extent the same is true with regard to the laws of war con-
tained in the [1907] Hague Convention ... Many of these prohibi-
tions had been enforced long before the date of the Convention; but
since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punishable as offenses
against the law of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere
designates such practices as criminal, nor is any sentence pre-
scribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and punish
offenders.9
The Tribunal also noted that the law of war "is not static, but by con-
tinual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world."10
It is doubtful, then, that either the IMT at Nuremberg or the sub-
sequent Tribunal under Control Law No. 10 considered nullum crimen
sine lege to be a principle of international law. In any event, both
clearly considered it just and otherwise appropriate, even in view of
such a principle, to prosecute persons for acts that were recognizably
criminal "when committed." It was also recognized that international
crimes can be incorporated "by reference" in international instruments,
that international instruments need not designate infractions as
crimes, that such crimes or their elements need not be defined with
great particularity, that a tribunal can "determine the content" of rele-
vant international law, that sentences need not be prescribed, and that
there need not exist any mention of a forum for prosecution. With re-
spect to penalties, the tribunals imposed various types of sentences
within the customary array of possible sentences for international
crimes. " The customary range of penalties for war crimes, for example,
CONTROL CouNciL LAW NO. 10, 1946-1949, supra note 3, at 975.
7. Id. at 975 (quoting Judgment and Opinion of the Int'l Military Tribunal, at 219
(Nuremberg 1946), reprinted in PAusT, BASsIOUNI ET AL, supra note 1, at 715).
8. IMT, at 218, reprinted in PAUST, BAssIouNI ET AL., supra note 1, at 905.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 219.
11. See, e.g., PAUST. BASsIOUNI ET AL, supra note 1, at 717-21.
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had ranged from letters of reprimand to death.1 2
The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) for the Former
Yugoslavia has taken a similar approach to such issues. For example,
in the 1995 decision in the Tadic case before the Trial Chamber, 13 the
ICT recognized that prosecution of war crimes committed in violation
of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not violate the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege'4 and that prosecution by the Tri-
bunal under its new Statute "does not violate the ex post facto prohibi-
tion."' 5 It also affirmed that "individual criminal responsibility of the
violator need not be explicitly stated in a convention for its provisions
to entail individual criminal liability," as evident from use of two trea-
ties "at Nuremberg, despite the fact that neither convention contain
any reference to penal prosecution or individual liability for
breaches."16 The Trial Chamber also ruled that "common Article 3 is
beyond doubt part of customary international law, [and] therefore, the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege is not violated by incorporating
the prohibitory norms of common Article 3 in" the Statute of the ICT. 7
On appeal, the Appellate Chamber of the Tribunal affirmed juris-
diction and declared that incorporation of crimes against humanity in
the Statute of the ICT did not violate the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege.'5 The Appellate Chamber also recognized with respect to war
crimes that there is no violation of such a principle even though "com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions contains no explicit reference
to criminal liability' The Chamber added: "individual criminal respon-
sibility is not barred by the absence of treaty provisions on punish-
ment of breaches." 9
In the United States, the only express reference by the Supreme
Court to the principle nullum crimen sine lege is found in a concurring
opinion by Justice Douglas. Douglas' opinion contained the quote of the
IMT at Nuremberg noted above and recognized that it had been uti-
lized to support a similar decision of the IMT for the Far East.2° Addi-
12. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Re-
sponsibility, 57 Mn.. L. REV. 99, 113-18, 122, 130-31, 169, 184-85 (1972).
13. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction
(Aug. 10, 1995), extract reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNi ET AL., supra note 1, at 813.
14. Id. at 827-30, paras. 65-74.
15. Id. at 830, para. 71.
16. Id. at 829, para. 70.
17. Id. at 830, para. 72.
18. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) (Cassese, J., opin-
ion) at paras. 139, 141, reprinted in PAUST, BASSIouNI ET AL, supra note 1, at 986. See
also id. at para. 143.
19. Id. at para. 128, also citing the IMT at Nuremberg. See also id. at paras. 139,
141 of the Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa.
20. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 212 n.12 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring in
1949) (quoting what appears here in the text supra note 10).
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tionally, the exact phrase is found in only one circuit court, and there
in a concurring opinion stating that it "reminds us that courts may not
punish conduct as criminal unless that conduct has transgressed the
clear, plain, or fair meaning of the defined offense."2' The concurring
opinion found that a federal statute incorporating state crimes in terse
"descriptive language" posed "no ambiguity," that it was sufficiently
"clear" and "defined with specificity" (although incorporation by refer-
ence was the mode chosen by the legislature), and that legislative his-
tory informed the meaning of certain terms. 22 The judge added:
Strict interpretation of a penal statute, of course, cannot be applied
in vacuo; it cannot be utilized to thwart dearly expressed statutory
text, or, in the event of ambiguity, the legislative purpose ex-
pressed in the statute or its legislative history.23
The Supreme Court also addressed a related phrase, "nullum crimen,
nulla poena, sine lege," in connection with its statement that "the law
in criminal cases is to be determined by the court,"24 the Court quoting
a textwriter: "[u]nless there be a violation of law preannounced, and
this by a constant and responsible tribunal, there is no crime, and can
be no punishment."25 In this sense, the Supreme Court has agreed
with international tribunals that the content of criminal law can be
determined by a court, although the quoted material stated that the
existence of such a law should be "preannounced."
In one of the rare uses of a similar phrase in a United States dis-
trict court opinion, the concept was referred to as a "principle" requir-
ing that a state within the United States should have "made the com-
mission of. . . [relevant] acts a crime and. . . authorized punishment
to be imposed. .. ,"26 adding that it is expressed in the "principle of le-
gality . . ."27 that "has historically found expression in the [United
States] criminal law rule of strict construction of criminal statutes,
and in the [United States] constitutional principles forbidding ex post
facto operation of the criminal law, vague criminal statutes,"28 and the
21. United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir. 1978) (Aldisert, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added). In practice, fair meaning is often less than clear or plain.
22. See id. at 1069-70.
23. Id. at 1069.
24. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 87-88 (1895) (Harlan, J., opinion).
25. Id. at 88 (quoting Wharton, note, 1 CRim. L. MAG. 51, 56). However, courts have
not required that the relevant tribunal be a "constant" tribunal. See infra notes 37-41
and accompanying text.
26. United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 316 (E.D. La. 1981).
27. Id. (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 28 (2d ed. 1960)).
Hall had stated that "the principle of legality had a vague and checheered ancient his-
tory" Id. at 30. See also BASSIOuNI & MANiKAs, supra note 1, at 270-71 (discussing philo-
sophic and other splits regarding the nature and meaning of the principle of legality).
28. Walker, 514 F. Supp. at 316-17. The ex post facto prohibition applies only where
there is an offense, punishment, or penalty of a criminal nature. See, e.g., J. PAUST, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 84 (1996).
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like. Another district court has stressed that "[olne of the essential re-
quirements of fairness in international law is that persons may not be
subjected to laws that make criminal, actions which were innocent at
the time."2
9
With respect to the prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws, it
has long been recognized here and abroad that the creation of a new
forum or a new jurisdictional competence for prosecution of what was
criminal at the time of the alleged offense does not violate the doc-
trine. In Cook v. United States,30 the United States Supreme Court
stated that as long as the crime was proscribed and no "change of pun-
ishment therefor" was involved, "[an] ex post facto law does not in-
volve, in any of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an al-
leged offense after its commission."31 In an earlier case, Calder v.
Bull, 32 the Supreme Court had recognized that the constitutionally-
based ex post facto prohibition applies if an action, "innocent when
done," becomes criminal with the creation of new law; if new law "ag-
gravates a crime;" if new law "inflicts a greater punishment;" or if new
law "alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required . . . in order to convict the of-
fender."33 "Laws, . ..[however], that change the number of appellate
judges or enlarge the potential class of competent witnesses do not af-
fect substantive rights and are constitutional."34
After the United States Civil War, it was affirmed that
[wihere an accused is charged with a violation of the laws of war,
as laid down in paragraph 86 of General Orders No. 100, of the
War Department, of April 24, 1863 [the Lieber Code], it is no de-
fence that the actual offence for which he was tried was committed
before the date of the order, the latter being merely a publication
and affirmance of the law as it had previously existed.35
29. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (C.D. Cal. 1985), citing the ex post
facto prohibition in article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
30. Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891).
31. Id. at 183 (citing Gut v. Minnesota, 76 US. (9 Wall.) 35, 38 (1869)). See also
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1925) (citing Duncan v. Missouri, 152 US. 377, 382
(1894) (change in appellate fora does not violate ex post facto prohibition)).
32. Calder v. Bull, 3 US. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798).
33. See id. at 390. For a recent discussion, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CoNsvrrrtrioNAL LAw 417-18 (4 ed. 1991). On increased punishment, see id. at
417 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 US. 397 (1937)); cf id. at 418 ("mere change in
the type of penalty, however, will not violate the provisions."). The British were less con-
cerned with new punishments. See, e.g., Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow 1478, 1480 (KB.
1764) (act only created new punishment).
34. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 33, at 418, (citing Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S.
377, 382 (1894); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884)).
35. DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF JAG, ARMY 244 (1866). See also 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297,
299-300 (1865) (laws of war exist, are binding, and may be prosecuted in military fora
"though not defined by any law of Congress" at that time). Those laws generally were
not defined with great particularity in the Lieber Code. See, e.g., PAUST, BAsSIOuNI ET AL.,
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Similarly, in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,36 the Sixth Circuit held that "the
fact that the State of Israel was not in existence when Demjanjuk al-
legedly committed the offenses [in violation of international law over
which there is universal jurisdiction, including war crimes and crimes
against humanity] is no bar to Israel's exercising jurisdiction under
the universality principle."3 7 Thus, the fact that both the Israeli law
and the Israeli fora designed to prosecute international crimes did not
exist at the time of the alleged offenses posed no legal problems. These
same points had been made in the widely known and well-received Is-
raeli opinions in Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,3 the Israeli
courts expressly addressing the "principle of legality," nullum crimen
sine lege, and ex post facto claims.3 9 Also addressed in Demjanjuk was
the recognition that creation of an extradition treaty (or a newly listed
extraditable offense) with respect to prior conduct that was already
criminal at the time of commission does not violate the prohibition of
ex post facto laws, a point recognized earlier by the Supreme Court.40
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
As noted above, the incorporation of international criminal law by
reference in an international criminal tribunal's statute or charter
does not violate the principle nullum crimen sine lege. Under the
United States Constitution, Congress has the power to "define and
punish" offenses against the law of nations.41 Is it a defense to prosecu-
tion in the United States that Congress has not declared a relevant
crime to be a crime under international law or that Congress has not
actually defined such an offense, but has merely incorporated interna-
tional crimes by reference?
The power of Congress to "define and punish" violations of inter-
national law allows Congress to create legislation implementing inter-
national criminal law.42 Yet, it has been recognized that when exercis-
ing such a power, Congress need not declare in the legislation that it
supra note 1, at 1011-13.
36. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
37. Id. at 582-83. See also J. PAUST, supra note 28, at 407. On universal jurisdiction,
see id. at 392-93, 402-08; PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 1, at 95-114.
38. Extracts reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL, supra note 1, at 204-09; Covey Ol-
iver, Judicial Decisions, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 821-24 (1962).
39. See supra note 38. Other national courts have reached similar decisions. See,
e.g., Irwin Cotler, Current Developments [the Finta case], 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 463
(1996) (Canadian Commission Report recognized and ruled similarly with Belgian,
French, and German courts that sustained legislation to prosecute prior war crimes or
crimes against humanity and that some of these were sustained by the European Com-
mission of Human Rights. Id. at 464.).
40. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 304 (1933); PAusT, BASSioUNI ET
AL., supra note 1, at 298.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
42. Id. Other bases for incorporation can include § 8, cls. 1, 3, and 18.
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is incorporating international law." Further, when United States fed-
eral statutes implement international criminal law, they might specify
the nature and elements of an offense with as much detail as is found
in a treaty or customary law," provide greater detail, or simply incor-
porate international law by reference.
Incorporation by reference has occurred in connection with the
crime of piracy4 5 and war crimes. 46 In both cases, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes in the face
of claims that federal statutes must identify the types of crimes pro-
scribed and/or set forth detailed elements of offenses as well as pun-
ishments.47 With respect to war crimes, the Supreme Court added:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized
and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of na-
tions which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights
and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.. . . It
is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such of-
fenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of interna-
tional law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or de-
fine by statute all the acts which that law condemns. . . . Congress
has incorporated by reference ... all offenses which are defined as
such by the law of war.. . . Congress had the choice of crystallizing
in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the
law of war, or adopting ... [such law]."
It is therefore clear that incorporation of international criminal law by
reference can be appropriate and does not run afoul of concepts such
43. See, e.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887); United States v.
White, 27 F. 200, 202-03 (C.C.E.D. Miss. 1886); see also Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107
U.S. 215, 217-19 (1882) (holding that previously existing statutory phrase "contrary to
law" incorporates subsequent treaty prohibition although statute does not mention inter-
national law). Thus, when Congress implements a non self-executing treaty by legisla-
tion, it need not refer to the treaty or to the fact of implementation.
44. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (concerning hostage-taking); International Con-
vention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, art. 1, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, re-
printed in PAusT, BAssIouNi ET AL., supra note 1, at 1123.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1651 ("piracy as defined by the law of nations").
46. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818 and 821 ("the law of war"); 18 U.S.C. §2401(a), (c) (1996)
(incorporating portions of Geneva law by reference); see also PAUSr, BASsIOUNi ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 202-03, 215-24; J. PAUST, supra note 28, at 409 (such incorporation of
the law of war as offenses against the laws of the United States also applies to civilians
and allows, with 18 U.S.C. § 3231, concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute law of war viola-
tions in the federal district courts).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-60 (1820) (re:
piracy); Ex parte Quirin, 317 US. 1, 27-30 (1942) (re: law of war); PAUsT, BASSIoUNI ET
AL., supra note 1, at 200-03, 216-17. With respect to civil sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 for violations of treaty-based or customary international law, see, e.g., Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that incorporation of international
law by reference is "sufficiently determinate" and "sufficiently and constitutionally
defined").
48. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US. at 27-28.
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as void for vagueness, nullum crimen, or otherwise involve an undue
process of law.
Some statutes, like that addressing genocide,49 have even provided
greater detail than that found in the Genocide Convention,50 but detail
of an erroneous and abnegative nature that generally precludes the
ability of the United States to effectuate its obligations under the Ge-
nocide Convention if prosecution can only be based on the federal stat-
ute (which may not be the case).51 In any event, a new federal statute
mirroring the definition of genocide in the treaty or incorporating the
treaty and/or the customary prohibition of genocide by reference is
preferable.52
The laws of many other states also incorporate international
crimes by reference, define offenses without great detail, or provide the
same sort of detail found generally in international treaties. Canada,
for example, incorporates piracy 53 and war crimes5 by reference much
like the United States. In Canada, the definition of crimes against hu-
manity is quite general 5 and the offense of aircraft hijacking reads
like the treaty forming a base for Canada's jurisdictional competence. 56
Like Canada and the United States, the 1991 British War Crimes Act
incorporates the law of war by reference.5 7 The Australian War Crimes
Act is nearly the same;58 however, the Australian War Crimes Amend-
ment Act 59 provides only minimal additional detail concerning "serious"
war crimes60 and in one section lists general factors similar to those
found in customary definitions of crimes against humanity and geno-
cide.61 The Netherlands Law of 1947 incorporated by reference war
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093, reprinted in PAUST, BASSIouNI ET AL., supra note 1, at
1107-09.
50. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. II.
51. See PAUST, BASsIoUNI ET AL., supra note 1, at 1109-12 (might also prosecute di-
rectly and alternatively under the treaty, without abnegative reservations, etc., or under
customary international law); J. PAusT, supra note 28, at 297-98, 310.
52. See J. PAUST, supra note 28, at 297, 309.
53. Criminal Code of Canada, Sec. 74, III Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, at 38,
reprinted in PAUST, BASSIoUNI ET AL., supra note 1, at 1230-31.
54. Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c.30, §7 (3.71 to 3.77)(Can.), reprinted in
PAUST, BAsSIOum ET AL., supra note 1, at 277-79.
55. See id. at 277-78.
56. Criminal Code of Canada, § 76; Hague Convention for the Supression of Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft, art. 1, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 1972 Can. T.S. No. 23, 22 U.S.T. 1641
(1971).
57. 1991 Ch. 13, 1. (1)(b) ("a violation of the laws and customs of war"), in the Pub-
lic General Acts and General Synod Measures 1991, pt. I, at 101.
58. War Crimes Act 1945, § 3 (a) ("violation of the laws and usages of war").
59. War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, 1989 Aust. Act 3.
60. Id. §§ 6 & 7. For example, section 6 (1) lists murder, manslaughter, causing
grievous bodily harm, wounding, rape, indecent assault, abduction, and so forth, without
defining these categories of crime.
61. See id. § 7(3)(a)(i),(ii). Concerning such customary definitions, see PAUST, BAS-
SIOUNi ET AL., supra note 1, at 1028-29, 1031, 1035, 1075-78, 1081-82, passim.
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crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in the Charter of the
IMT at Nuremberg, 62 and such incorporation by reference was upheld
in the face of defense claims that it violated the double plea of nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. 3
When Israel incorporated international laws proscribing genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law, some of the crimes mirrored international stan-
dards and some portions were incorporated more generally by refer-
ence.64 Israel also denied the nullum pleas made by defense counsel.65
Professor Bassiouni adds with respect to portions of the "Islamic crimi-
nal justice system" that they can be very "flexible," even allowing iden-
tification of criminal content by analogy.66 The 1973 Bangladesh Inter-
national Crimes (Tribunals) Act primarily mirrored international
definitions of crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide,
and certain war crimes, thereby providing in many instances merely a
list of sub-types of crime or factors.67 The Act also incorporated viola-
tions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions merely by reference.6 One also
reads in the Tadic appellate decision of the ICT for Former Yugoslavia
that a Yugoslavian Criminal Code of 1990 incorporated Geneva Con-
vention violations.69 The Code actually incorporated many war crimes,
including many violations of Geneva law (and most of the "grave
breach" provisions of the Conventions), by listing types of crimes in
general language found in international law.70 A few war crimes arti-
cles also contained phrases implementing international law by refer-
ence. 71 The prohibition of genocide was contained in an article that
generally mirrored the definition in the Genocide Convention.72
62. Netherlands Law of 1947, quoted in PAUST. BASSIouNI ET AL., supra note 1, at
206 (from the Eichmann case).
63. Id. at 206-07.
64. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950, sec. 1 (b), sec. 2;
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 38, reprinted in 56 AM. J. IN'L L. at
805, 812 (mirroring the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg).
65. See, e.g., PAUsT, BAssIouNi ST AL, supra note 1, at 206-09.
66. See BAssioUNi & MANiKAS, supra note 1, at 279.
67. Act No. XIX of 1973, § 3 (2) (a)-(d), reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI ST AL, supra
note 1, at 744.
68. See id. § 3 (e).
69. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 132 (addressing articles
142-143 of the Federal Criminal Code of Yugoslavia of 1990).
70. The Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ch. 16
("Crimes Against Humanity and International Law"), arts. 142-155c, Official Gazette No.
44/1976, reprinted in Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "Prosecuting War Crimes
in the Former Yugoslavia" 22-23, 25-33 (May 1995) [hereinafter Report].
71. See, e.g., id. art. 148 ("The Employment of Unlawful Means of Warfare") re-
printed in Report, supra note 70, at 32 (proscribing methods and means "prohibited by
the rules of international law").
72. Id. art. 141, reprinted in Report, supra note 70, at 24-25 (noting that the article
also added certain actions not expressed in the Convention).
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The Tadic decision also mentioned the Belgian law of 1993 that
simply "listed" grave breach violations of the Geneva Conventions as
crimes.7 3 The Penal Code of Mexico generally mirrors the international
definitions of piracy7 4 and genocide, 75 while incorporating certain viola-
tions of humanitarian law by reference. 76 The Penal Code of Finland
generally mirrors the definition of genocide, 77 lists certain war crimes
with general words or phrases found in the law of war,78 and also in-
corporates certain war crimes by reference.7 9 The Penal Code of Ethio-
pia also incorporates the crime of genocide by generally mirroring the
definition found in international law.80 It incorporates certain war
crimes with a provision referring to the need for conduct to be "in vio-
lation of the rules of public international law and of international hu-
manitarian conventions"81 and then by listing certain proscribed acts
such as "inhuman treatment"8 2 and "compulsion to acts of prostitution,
debauchery, or rape."83 The Penal Code of Sweden has broad coverage
of what is termed a "crime against international law" arising during
war in a section addressing certain war crimes and incorporating
others by reference, including the proscription of "acts in a manner
contrary to existing treaties . . . or to generally recognized principles
of international law. . ."84 The German Penal Code also incorporates
the crime of genocide by generally mirroring the definition under in-
ternational law. 5 France has failed to follow international law concern-
ing genocide and other crimes against humanity, but the definitions in
its Criminal Code are generally no more specific than those found in
73. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 132 (addressing article 1
of the Belgian Loi de 16 juin 1993 relative a la repression des infractions graves aux
Conventions internationales de Geneve du 12 aout 1949 et aux Protocoles I et I du juin
1977, additionnels a ces Conventions, Moniteur Belge (5 Aug. 1993)).
74. See C6digo Penal para el Distrito Federal en Materia de Fuero Comun (C.P.D.F.),
para Toda la Repiiblica en Materia de Fuero Federal (18 Aug. 1931), tftulo segundo,
capitulo I, art. 146.
75. Id., titulo tercero, capitulo II, art. 149 Bis.
76. Id., capitulo I, art. 149.
77. THE PENAL CODE OF FINLAND AND RELATED LAWS 49, ch. 13, On Offenses Against
Humanity, Sec. 4 (Matti Joutsen, trans., 1987).
78. Id. at 48-49, §§ 1-2.
79. Id.
80. Penal Code of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 158 of 1957, art. 281 (however, adding politi-
cal groups to the list unlike the international definitions), reprinted in Stuart H. Dem-
ing, War Crimes and International Crimnal Law, 28 AKRON L. REv. 421, 424, 428 n.17
(1995).
81. Id. art. 282.
82. Penal Code of Ethopia, supra note 80, art. 282(a), reprinted in Deming, supra
note 80, at 425-26 n.17.
83. Penal Code of Ethiopia, supra note 80, art. 282 (f).
84. The Penal Code of Sweden ch. 22, Articles of War, § 11, reprinted in 17 THE
AMERiCAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, SWEDEN 71-72 (Thorsten Sellin, trans., 1972).
85. German Penal Code of 1871, § 220a (of 1954), reprinted in 4 THE AMERICAN SE-
RIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, GERMANY 115 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Thomas Bu-
ergenthal, trans., 1961).
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customary international legal instruments.86 An older French Code of
Military Justice had covered some war crimes by fairly broad
language.8 7
From this brief survey of United States and foreign laws, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that most countries (or any) require more than incor-
poration by reference or a mirrored incorporation when implementing
international criminal law by domestic legislation. At times, some have
even incorporated international law directly for purposes of criminal
sanctions.8 It is also clear that there need not always be definitions or
elements of crimes set forth in implementing legislation, and when
they do exist they can be quite general. The crime of rape is but one
more example of a crime that is merely listed as such89 or one that is
set forth with very few elements. 90 It would be improper to argue, how-
ever, that conviction for rape would violate a functioning "principle of
legality," the principle nullum crimen sine lege, or international law.91
86. See PAUST, BASSIOUNI Er AL., supra note 1, at 1062-63; see also id. at 1047-61,
1075-80.
87. See James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs
of War, 14 AM. J. INVL L. 70, 73-74 (1920).
88. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNi ET AL., supra note 1, at 191-97, 199-200, 210-14, 1233-
37, 1379.
89. See, e.g., id. at 24, 744, 765, 1012, 1016, 1020-21; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 80. The Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, supra note 70,
had prohibited the war crime of "enforced prostitution and rape" in article 142. Rape as
a war crime has a long history of prohibition. See, eg., WOMEN & ICLIP, supra note 11;
Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INr'L L. & POLy' 499, 516-17 n.61 (1994).
90. See, e.g., 10 US.C. § 920. Sections 933 and 934 contain even broader language
incorporating several types of offenses with an imprimatur of constitutionality. See eg.,
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of sections 933 and
934). Concerning use of these sections for war crimes, see PAUST, BAsSIoUNI ET AL, supra
note 4, at 247 (including an example of a conviction for "cutting off an ear . . ., which
conduct was of a nature of being a discredit upon the Armed Forces"Xquotation marks
omitted).
91. There is no indication in Professor Cherif Bassiouni's work that this would be
the case. See Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual Violence-An Invisible
Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia (DePaul Occas. Paper No. 1, 1996); see also
PAusT, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 1, at 7; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 1; cf M.
CHERIF BASSIoUNI, CRiMEs AGAINST HuMANry 320 ft (1992).
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Organization of the International Criminal
Court: Administrative and Financial Issues
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. A permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) has
progressed from a dream to the threshold of reality in a span of time
few thought possible.' A substantial amount of work on the ICC's Stat-
ute has been done. Scholars have prepared texts and the United Na-
tions' Sixth Committee has convened sessions of a Preparatory Com-
mittee (PrepCom) to develop a Statute. A diplomatic conference is now
set for 1998. Today, the ICC is being discussed in practical and imme-
diate terms.
2. This paper focuses on administrative and financial issues that
relate to the International Criminal Court. Why is this important? The
experience of the two ad hoc tribunals has shown that practical and
administrative issues are important in determining how effective insti-
tutions of international justice can be. Table 1 highlights reasons why
these issues are important enough to command the attention of diplo-
mats, scholars, and practitioners today.
* Consultant, International Human Rights Law Institute; Partner, Pierson, Semmes
and Bemis, Washington, D.C.
** Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul
University; President, Association Internationale de Droit Pdnal; President, Interna-
tional Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
1. This paper uses the term "International Criminal Court" (ICC) because of its
common usage. As analyses such as this one make clear, it is sometimes necessary to
distinguish between the institution as a whole and the judicial organ, which is more
commonly referred to as the Court. This paper uses the term "Tribunal" to refer to the
institution as a whole. Using the name International Criminal Tribunal would also fol-
low the practice used by the United Nations in naming the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
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Table 1
Importance of Administrative and Financial Issues
1. Credibility will be the ICC's strongest asset.
2. Sound administration builds credibility.
3. Bureaucratic delays and financial difficulties can block
the course of justice.
4. Swift action is essential for effective investigations and
can deter crime.
5. Smooth administration allows the ICC to better achieve
its mission.
6. Only an effective ICC can deliver justice.
3. The final row in Table 1 deserves special mention. The world
has many ways to do justice-civil law, common law, and Islamic law
being only three such systems. Many of the decisions being made in
the drafting of the ICC's Statute draw on the elements of one legal
system or another. However vigorous those debates may be, everyone
involved shares the viewpoint that only an EFFECTIVE court can deliver
justice. Diplomats involved in shaping the ICC's Statute will want to
take into full account the practical, administrative, and financial is-
sues that will determine the effectiveness of the ICC.
A. Eight Opportunities with the International Criminal Court
4. Consider the following eight opportunities to improve upon the
ad hoc tribunals that can be created by careful shaping of the Statute
of the ICC:
1. Avoid slow startup
5. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) were criticized for being slow to start their work. The Statute
of the ICTY was adopted by the United Nations Security Council on
May 25, 1993.2 A Prosecutor was not chosen until late October 1993,
although he resigned before relocating to The Hague. A new Prosecu-
tor was not agreed upon until July 1994. And even though a Deputy
Prosecutor took office in February 1994, bureaucratic obstacles in hir-
ing key personnel prevented the first field investigation from starting
until late July 1994.3
2. U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., 48th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993).
3. I. Guest, On Trial: The United Nations, War Crimes, and the Former Yugoslavia,
Sept. 1995. This important monograph highlights the problems of the United Nations
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6. The Statute of the ICTR was adopted by the Security Council
on November 8, 1994.4 Although Prosecutor Richard Goldstone of the
ICTY was named Prosecutor of the ICTR, as well, and although the
Appeal Chamber of the ICTY also serves as the Appeal Chamber of
the ICTR, similar startup problems plagued the work of the ICTR. It
was not until mid-1995 that several key administrators were fully in
place at the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. The start-up
problems of the ICTR can be highlighted with a single statistic: OF
THE $12.9 MILLION BUDGETED FOR THE ICTR IN 1995, ONLY $1.6 MILLION
OF IT WAS SPENT.
5
7. In contrast to the ICTY and the ICTR, the opportunity exists
for the ICC to create a small, permanent "core" staff that can quickly
be "ramped-up" to larger size whenever needed.
2. Avoid funding problems
8. The work of the ICTY was particularly delayed by three specific
funding problems:
- PAYMENT OF BILLS. A two-year dispute over whether the ICTY
would be funded out of the general U.N. budget or the peacekeep-
ing budget made it difficult for United Nations financial officials to
raise and manage cash to pay the ICTY's expenses. Also, the need
to shift cash from one account to another in order to fund the ICTY
was a drain on bureaucratic resources until mid-1995.
* MIS-ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. Initial budgets for the ICTY, pre-
pared at United Nations headquarters, allocated most of the budget
- roughly two-thirds - to judges, administration and overhead
and only $562,300 to the expenses of investigations over a two-year
period. In part, this was due to inexperience in managing an enter-
prise like a tribunal. Later budgets, prepared in The Hague, had
more balanced allocations between the expenses of investigations,
salaries, and the other costs of operating a court.
- CHRONIC CASH SHORTAGES. Arrearages of certain States, particu-
larly the United States, make fiscal life a challenge for the ICTY.
Cash shortages at the United Nations that occur regularly in the
Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia and of the ICTY. See also C. Bassiouni,
Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,
Occasional Paper No. 2, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University
College of Law (1996), for a discussion of the bureaucratic problems faced by the Com-
mission of Experts.
4. U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg., 49th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
5. Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Respondible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Geno-
cide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Be-
tween 1 January and 31 December, 1994, Report of the Advisory Committee on Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Questions, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/50/9 (1996) [hereinafter Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions]. All references to dollars in this paper are to United States dollars.
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fourth quarter of each year have disrupted important travel by in-
vestigators working for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
9. With the ICC, mechanisms need to be set up to avoid those
funding problems.
3. Avoid apprehension problems
10. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have had difficulty in persuading
authorities to apprehend indicted war criminals within their jurisdic-
tions. Recent reports by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's)
have highlighted the fact that the whereabouts of many indicted, and
often notorious, war criminals are known, yet authorities do nothing to
apprehend those who have been indicted.
6
11. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to mitigate this problem,
even if it may not be solved altogether. The ICC can hire staff mem-
bers capable of facilitating national apprehension efforts. To some ex-
tent, however, the issue may be moot if the ICC Statute requires the
consent of the State in which an individual is located before a case can
be brought against that individual.
4. Avoid security problems with the Aegon building as presently
configured
12. The ICTY is headquartered in The Hague in the former office
building of an insurance company, Aegon. When the United Nations
chose The Netherlands as the seat of the ICTY in 1993, it became im-
portant to find a building to house the ICTY that met as many of the
necessary criteria as possible, and that could be occupied as quickly as
possible. The Aegon building was the best available on short notice for
a tribunal whose long-term future was, at the time, unknown. How-
ever, the Aegon building was not chosen explicitly as the site of a per-
manent international criminal court. Experience has shown that, for
long-term use, the Aegon building will require a number of improve-
ments to increase security. These problems need to be considered, at
least, before a decision can be taken to headquarter the ICC in the
Aegon building permanently. It may be less costly in the long run, and
more secure, to locate the ICC elsewhere in The Hague.
6. See Steven Lee Myers, Rights Group Says Bosnian Suspects Flaunt Freedom, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 26, 1996, at All (reporting on the Coalition for International Justice's report
on the whereabouts of 36 of 67 at-large indicted war criminals from the ICTY). Human
Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues released a
similar report on 13 December 1996 on the whereabouts of war criminals indicted by the
ICTR.
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5. Avoid allegations (such as those made against one individual
in the ICTR) of mismanagement in personnel decisions and
procurement
13. Administrative support for the ICTR became a public issue
when the New York Times reported on October 30, 1996, that someone
on the staff of the U.N.'s Office of Investigative Oversight Services
(OIOS) was investigating the Chief of Administration of the ICTR. 7 It
was not clear which body within the United Nations structure, if any,
should have been responsible for supervising the activities of the ICTR
Registry.
14. For the ICC, it will be possible to set up a supervisory struc-
ture that will help minimize the risk of mismanagement, without, at
the same time, engaging in micromanagement or binding the ICC in
bureaucratic red tape. One way this can be achieved is to establish a
Committee of States Parties with overall responsibility for the budget
of the ICC and to have the Committee select a smaller council to han-
dle oversights.
6. Improve the administrative chain of command
15. Another issue with the ICTY and the ICTR is the administra-
tive chain of command. Under the Tribunals' statutes, much of the ad-
ministrative support for the activities of the OTP is handled through
the Registry." Thus, those performing certain important tasks for the
Prosecutor's office do not report to the Prosecutor, but instead report
to the Registrar. While this organizational structure may produce cer-
tain administrative efficiencies, this "dotted-line" relationship has not
proven efficient overall.
16. For the ICC, the administrative staff for the Prosecutor should
be accountable directly to the Prosecutor.
7. Provide better protection for witnesses
17. Witness protection is handled in a separate unit in the Regis-
tries of both the ICTY and the ICTR. Both units are small and rely on
cooperation from States to protect witnesses whose lives or families
are at risk from reprisals and intimidation. These units do not have
enough resources to protect those at risk. Witnesses who would have
testified for the ICTR have already been killed, and ICTY witnesses
have already been intimidated.
7. Barbara Crossette, UN Investigates Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Officials, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1996, at A3.
8. ICTY Statute, Article 17(1), "The Registry shall be responsible for the administra-
tion and servicing of the International Tribunal." ICTR Statute, Article 16(1), adds "for
Rwanda" to the same sentence.
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18. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to fund witness protection
more fully.
8. Improve staff management
19. With the ICTY and the ICTR both wanting to start investiga-
tions as quickly as possible, delays in making personnel decisions
translate into lost investigative opportunities.
20. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to develop personnel rules
tailored to the unique needs of a prosecutorial and judicial body, while
still taking into account the need for equitable geographic distribution
and the need to recruit internationally from the five regions of the
world.
21. A similar problem faced by the ICTY and the ICTR has been a
problem with second staff. The ICC should be able to develop an ex-
perienced core (senior) staff, with second staff supporting them.
B. Five Successes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals To Continue in the Interna-
tional Criminal Court
22. At the same time, as the establishment of the ICC creates op-
portunities to solve some of the problems that have affected the work
of the ad hoc tribunals, there are a number of administrative aspects
of the ICTY and ICTR that have worked and should be kept in the
ICC:
1. Independence of the Chief Prosecutor from outside political
influences
23. The Chief Prosecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR have always
considered the position to be independent of outside political influ-
ences. This independence needs to be continued in the ICC.
2. Ability to attract the highest-quality professionals from around
the world
24. Because of the historic importance of the ICTY and ICTR, both
tribunals have been able to attract excellent candidates from many
States, either as direct hires or secondaries. Keeping up this level of
quality is important for the work of the ICC, as well. The ICC must
impose demanding recruiting standards that take into account the
need for equitable geographic distribution and the need to recruit in-
ternationally from the five regions of the world.
3. Having The Netherlands as host country
25. Having The Netherlands as host country for the ICTY has
worked well. The Netherlands is regarded by many outside observers
as an excellent potential host for the ICC.
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4. Ability to accept help from outside sources
26. Under the Security Council resolutions that established the
ICTY and ICTR, both tribunals are able to accept help from States, In-
ter-Governmental Organizations (IGO's) and Non-Governmental Orga-
nizations (NGO's). 9 The ICC should be able to do the same.
5. Free flow of discussion among Prosecutorial staff
27. One important management practice that has worked well in
the ICTY is the free flow of discussion among Prosecutorial staff. This
is mediated by intra-office email, but it is also part of the culture of
the office. This practice should continue in the OTP of the ICC.
28. In one respect, the ICC will be different: its staff are likely to
be dispersed in field offices around the world. In addition, not all staff
will be on active duty, and a way must, and can, be found for a wide-
spread staff to communicate securely.
II. OVERVIEW OF ICC PROCEDURE
A. When a 'Matter" Arises
29. Part II presents an overview of the procedures to be used in
the ICC. It is not intended as a formal analysis of the substantive or
procedural provisions of the proposed ICC Statute. Instead, it is in-
tended to provide context for the discussion of administrative and fi-
nancial issues in the remaining six parts of this paper.
30. The starting point is how a "matter" would come before the
ICC. In this paper, "matter" is used to refer to the scope of the Prose-
cutor's investigation. For example, "the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-pres-
ent," if it had occurred after an ICC came into being, would have been
counted as one matter. "Rwanda 1994" would have been counted as an-
other matter.
31. For this paper, a matter consists of one or more "cases." A case
would include a relatively discrete number of witnesses and potential
defendants. For example, "Mass Killings at Omarska Camp" would be
one case and "Siege of Sarajevo" would be another case.
32. Chart 1 shows how a matter proceeds through the ICC. First,
a matter is initiated by a complaint. Who can bring a complaint is dis-
cussed in subpart II C below. Second, the Prosecutor then investigates
the complaint. This is discussed in more detail in subpart II F below.
9. Under S.C. Res. 827 (1993), paragraph 5, the Security Council "[u]rges States and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment
and services to the International Tribunal [for the former Yugoslavia], including the of-
fer of expert personnel." S.C. Res. 955 (1994) uses the same language in paragraph 4
with respect to the ICTR.
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33. If the Prosecutor decides a case is meritorious enough, the in-
dictment is presented to the Indictment and Preliminary Matters
Chamber (IPMC). The purpose of the IPMC is to review the evidence
presented by the Prosecutor and decide whether to issue the indict-
ment. The IPMC thus serves as the "filter mechanism" to ensure that
only meritorious cases go forward. The IPMC consists of three judges
and one alternate judge. It is in permanent session in The Hague and
is able to hear urgent matters without delay. The IPMC also holds pre-
trial hearings and can have one or more of its members serve as su-
pervising judges where appropriate to protect the interests of poten-
tially interested but unidentified parties during the early stage of an
investigation.
34. An indicted suspect is brought to trial in the first instance
before a Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber consists of three judges
with one alternate.' 0 The judges on a trial chamber would have to be
ready to convene within 30 days' notice.
35. After the Trial Chamber delivers its verdict, the case can be
appealed to an Appeal Chamber. The decision of the Appeal Chamber
is final. The Appeal Chamber consists of five or seven judges, who are
assigned permanently to the Appeal Chamber. It would need to be
ready to convene on 90 days' notice.
10. Some experts say the Trial Chamber should consist of five judges.
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Chart 1
How a Matter Proceeds Through the ICC
Complaint Initiated
" On Prosecutor's own initiative
• By State Party
* By U.N. Security Council
- Otherwise as provided by Statute
Investigatory Stage
" Prosecutor assembles investigation team
" Prosecutor investigates
" Prosecutor decides whether to indict
Indictment and Preliminary
Matters Chamber
* Chamber in permanent session
- 3 judges, 1 alternate
- Holds hearing to confirm indictment
- Also holds pre-trial hearings
Trial Chamber
- Chamber of frst instance
* 3-5 judges, 1 alternate
- Different judges as I&PM Chamber
- Convenes on 30 days' notice
Appeal Chamber
* Judgment is final
• 5-7 judges
- Appeal judges permanently assigned
- Convenes on 90 days' notice
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B. Crimes in the ICC's Mandate
36. Which crimes are to be included in the ICC's mandate is a
matter of much debate." For planning purposes, the following crimes
are assumed to be within the mandate of the ICC:
1. Genocide.
2. Aggression.
3. Violations of the Laws and Customs of War.
4. Crimes Against Humanity.
5. Treaty Crimes.
37. Treaty crimes - cases brought to the ICC by the agreement of
States that do not fall in any of the first four categories - require sep-
arate discussion in this paper. The scope of a treaty crime prosecuted
by the ICC would be set out in the reference by the treaty States to
the ICC. Treaty crimes might not be of a magnitude of Genocide or
Crimes Against Humanity. It could trivialize the prosecution of more
horrible crimes if, at the same time, a chamber were hearing a case in-
volving one or two victims that was before the court only because two
States did not trust each other's judicial system to prosecute the
defendant.12 For that reason, it may be desirable to try treaty crime
cases before a separate chamber of judges.
38. Treaty crime cases might also have a separate status in the
way resources are allocated to them. For example, interested States
may offer to contribute prosecutors (including a special Deputy Prose-
cutor), investigators, and other resources to treaty crime cases. Be-
cause of the potential impact treaty crime cases could have on other
needs of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor should be able to decide whether
to accept a treaty crime matter, whether to accept contributed staff of-
fered by an interested State, and what other terms and conditions
must be met before the ICC takes on a treaty crime case.
C. Potential Sources of Complaints
39. Who can bring complaints to be investigated by the Prosecutor
of an ICC is also a controversial issue. 3 There are four possibilities:
1. ICC States Parties.
2. The United Nations Security Council.
11. See generally Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, Vol. I, 58-115,
U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) (hereinafter PrepCom Report).
12. That is not to say that such small cases should not be before the ICC. Much of
the ICC's work, at least at first, may involve treaty crime cases where States believe
that only an international criminal body can fairly prosecute and judge a certain
defendant.
13. See generally PrepCom Report, supra note 11, at 1 129-52.
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3. The Prosecutor.
4. States Parties to the Genocide Convention may be able to bring
complaints raising allegations of Geno cide even if they are not parties
to the ICC treaty.
D. Elements of a Complaint by a State
40. The necessary elements of a complaint are not fully settled,
but their outline seems clear.14 A complaint must provide the following
information:
a. Jurisdictional basis in the ICC's Statute.
b. Allegations of specific criminal conduct at a specified time and
place.
c. Identity and whereabouts of suspects, if known.
d. Identity and whereabouts of witnesses, if known.
e. Location of evidence.
f. Details of investigations undertaken by the corn plaining State
or other States.
E. The 'Filter Mechanism"
41. At some point before there is a full trial, there will be a judi-
cial "filter mechanism" to prevent non-meritorious cases from going
forward. Clearly, the Prosecutor acts as a filter, as it is assumed that
the Prosecutor will not bring non-meritorious cases. A second, judicial
filter will occur during the review of the indictment by the Indictment
and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC), before a case goes to a
Trial Chamber.
42. Some States, however, have suggested a judicial "filter mecha-
nism" that would occur even before the Prosecutor can begin an inves-
tigation. They may view even the initiation of an investigation by the
Prosecutor as having an important political effect. This kind of "filter
mechanism" would arguably prevent a "runaway Prosecutor" from
launching an investigation.
43. It is hard to see how such a mechanism would be effective in
practice. Such a "filter mechanism" can almost certainly be outflanked
by an adroit Prosecutor. For example, assume that there must be a ju-
dicial review before a Prosecutor can launch an investigation sua
sponte. Assume further that there is no such judicial review of com-
plaints brought by States. Under such a system, an adroit Prosecutor
should have no difficulty finding a State Party to bring the complaint,
obviating the need for the Prosecutor to initiate the complaint directly.
14. See id. at 1 217; see also id. at '9 120, 216-19.
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44. In addition, if a single judge serves as the pre-investigative
"filtering mechanism," there will probably be a rotation process to en-
sure that one judge does not carry the "filtration" burden alone. Judi-
cial rotation in confirmation of indictments is the practice at the ICTY,
where this responsibility is periodically assigned to a different judge.
The Prosecutor of the ICC could wait until the rotation process turns
up a favorable judge before going through the "filter mechanism."
45. In any case, judicial review prior to the Prosecutor's investiga-
tion presents numerous practical and legal challenges. The most obvi-
ous of the practical challenges is how the judges would make an in-
formed decision. In the absence of an investigation, judges would have
to rely on information available to the Prosecutor and to them, namely
government sources and media reports. The obvious questions are
"which government?" and "whose media?," as allegations of bias in cov-
ering atrocities is one of the most challenging problems that analysts
have faced. The same questions can be asked about IGO and NGO re-
ports of atrocities. In many cases, only field investigations are likely to
yield conclusive evidence.
46. An obvious legal problem with a judicial "filter mechanism" is
the legal standard to be used. The ICTY rules of procedure require the
Prosecutor to have "reasonable grounds" before submitting an indict-
ment for confirmation.1 5 In common-law States, police are required to
have "probable cause" before taking action, such as a search, against a
citizen. Should the standard for review, even before an investigation
has been made be "reasonable grounds," "probable cause," or some
lesser standard? It is hard to see what level of judicial scrutiny is
appropriate.
47. Finally, the delay caused by any pre-investigative "filter mech-
anism" would create the opportunity for political pressure to be
brought against the Court or the Prosecutor by any State wishing to
bring such pressure. This is particularly so if, as many supporters of a
filter mechanism have called for, the potential defendant or an inter-
ested State is allowed to appear before the judges to contest the Prose-
cutor's application to begin an investigation. Such political pressure
should be prohibited, but that prohibition is likely to shape the way in
which the pressure is brought - not to prevent the pressure from be-
ing brought in the first place.
48. The most likely solution, many observers believe, is that the
appropriate place for a judicial "filter" is in the review of the indict-
ment by the Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber. This pro-
vides the proper check on Prosecutorial discretion.
15. ICTY Rules of Procedure, Rule 47(A).
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F. Investigation to Indictment
49. An investigation would formally be initiated by a written order
of the Prosecutor.16 The internal details of an investigation are sup-
posed to be confidential. Cooperation of concerned states is expected.
The Prosecutor can proceed without cooperation in exceptional circum-
stances where there are concerns regarding the objectivity of national
authorities.
50. If, after an investigation, the Prosecutor decides not to seek an
indictment, it is likely that the complainant will be notified. It is possi-
ble that there may be judicial review of a decision not to bring an in-
dictment, although this might well jeopardize the confidentiality of the
Prosecutor's investigation.
51. If the Prosecutor seeks confirmation of the indictment, the evi-
dence will be submitted to the Indictment and Preliminary Matters
Chamber (IPMC). The indictment review thus serves as the "filter
mechanism." There will probably be a preliminary hearing, at which
the Prosecutor will present evidence from the investigation to date. It
is possible that the target of the investigation, or a concerned State,
may have the right to present evidence, although this will likely com-
promise the confidentiality of the proceedings. The judges will have
the opportunity to question the Prosecutor and any witnesses who ap-
pear in support of or opposition to the indictment. Allowing a target or
a State to present evidence may turn the indictment hearing into a
mini-trial of the Prosecutions case - which is something the drafters
of the ICC Statute should explicitly decide is permissible or not.
52. If the IPMC confirms the indictment, States would be notified
to arrest the accused and to assist any further investigation the Prose-
cutor may require. There may be hearings before the IPMC on prelimi-
nary legal issues. If the accused has accumulated assets, the IPMC
may be able to consider freezing those assets. In the event that the ac-
cused is not arrested, the IPMC may choose to hold a hearing in the
absence of the accused that is modeled on the ICTY's Rule 61
procedure.
53. In some field investigations, the IPMC may find it necessary to
use a supervising judge to oversee certain aspects of an investigation
to protect evidence for future use at trial while also protecting the
rights of as-yet unidentified defendants. For example, prior to the con-
firmation of an indictment, the supervising judge could help to protect
the interests of as-yet unidentified defendants in preserving evidence
from a mass grave exhumation. If a partially damaged building must
be demolished, a supervising judge could be used to supervise an in-
vestigation into the source of the shelling that damaged the building.
The supervising judge does not gather the evidence, but rather has the
16. See generally PrepCom Report, supra note 11, at 232-31, 246-52.
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power to direct the Office of the Prosecutor as to the procedures and
protocols to be used. Obviously, the supervising judge could not be
called as a witness at trial, although the supervising judge's rulings
would be part of the record available to the Trial Chamber and the
parties.
54. The alternative procedure, which is accepted practice in most
common-law countries, is for the Prosecutor's office or the police to fol-
low established procedures for investigations. If the procedures are not
followed, however, the use of the evidence in court may be jeopardized.
55. A comparable approach is to specifically empower the Prosecu-
tor's office to consider the rights of possible suspects in gathering evi-
dence and to require the Prosecutor to gather potentially exculpatory
evidence during any investigation. This leaves open the possibility of
challenge if the Prosecutor is deemed after-the-fact not to have been
diligent enough in protecting the rights of possible accused.
56. The use of a supervising judge allows the correction of investi-
gative errors with less risk of jeopardizing the use of evidence at trial.
On the other hand, the Prosecutor may not want a judge involved in
the investigative process. An aggressive supervising judge could come
into conflict with the Prosecutor's office, diminishing the effectiveness
of both.
57. The essential objective is that someone have the ability to pro-
tect the rights of those not present at a field investigation or that
there be some way that the Court, sitting after-the-fact, can be as-
sured that it hears all the relevant evidence it wants to hear about
field investigations.
58. Regardless of the procedure chosen by the drafters of the Stat-
ute and the rules, there is the possibility that the IPMC will play an
active role in a case before the case goes to trial. This is one of the
reasons why the IPMC must be available full-time at the seat of the
Tribunal.
G. Trial at First Instance
59. The trial at first instance before the ICC generally follows
common-law procedure (see Chart 2). First, the Prosecution presents
its case in chief. Then, the defense presents its case in chief. Each side
has the opportunity for rebuttal, after which the Chamber renders a
verdict of conviction or acquittal.
H. Appeal
60. As presently contemplated, the ICC Statute will allow both
the prosecution and defense to appeal. Grounds for appeal will include
erroneous rulings of law, erroneous findings of fact, errors in proce-
dure, and errors in the disproportionality of sentences.
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61. It is possible that only the defense may be able to assert erro-
neous findings of fact as a ground for appeal. Many common-law sys-
tems do not allow the prosecution to appeal from an allegedly errone-
ous finding of fact. The countervailing argument is that the offenses
under consideration by the ICC are the most heinous known and the
need for justice to be done requires that the Prosecutor be able to ap-
peal from an erroneous ruling of fact.
62. In addition, the defense would be able to assert as a ground
for appeal that newly discovered evidence warrants setting aside the
verdict or reducing the sentence. 17 If such an appeal were upheld, the
case would probably be referred back to a Trial Chamber for further
proceedings.
63. The Appeal Chamber would review any alleged errors of the
Trial Chamber and issue an opinion. The ultimate decision of the Ap-
peal Chamber would be final.
III. Locus AND PHYSICAL PREMISES OF THE TRIBUNAL
A. Objectives in Selecting the Location
64. In a sense, one of the first practical decisions that must be
made is to select the location of the seat of the Tribunal. While the
ICTY is based in The Hague, The Netherlands, and the ICTR is based
in Arusha, Tanzania, those locations and others should be considered
as the possible seat of a permanent international criminal tribunal.
Among the criteria should be:
" Full diplomatic support from the host State.
" A host State internationally respected for observing the rule of
law.
" Access to international transportation networks.
" Excellent telecommunications infrastructure.
• Reasonable cost of living for support staff.
" Availability of multilingual local-hire personnel, particularly in
the ICC's official languages.
- Reasonably attractive living conditions for international staff and
their families.
17. One expert has pointed out that if the prosecutor is allowed to appeal on the ba-
sis of an error of fact, this will allow the prosecution to bring to the Court's attention
during the appellate process any newly discovered evidence that becomes known prior to
the issuance of the Appeal Chamber's decision. In this limited situation, the ground of
newly discovered evidence would be available to the Prosecutor also.
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Chart 2
Trial at First Instance Follows Common-Law Procedure
65. For many reasons, the site of the Tribunal should be in The
Netherlands in general, and in The Hague in particular. The Hague
meets the practical criteria outlined above.
66. From a symbolic perspective, The Hague is also the best choice
for the site of the ICC. The Hague has long been regarded as the focal
point for institutions of international justice. The Hague is the site of
the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the ICTY,
Europol (European Police), and other institutions. The Hague has also
served as the host for important international conferences and agree-
ments. The Hague is the best location available for the site of the ICC.
B. Physical Premises of the Tribunal
67. The building in which the ICC is headquartered should have
certain characteristics. The headquarters of the ICC must be secure,
but must also provide dignified office and courtroom facilities appropri-
ate for the seat of international criminal justice. The building should
have at least two courtrooms so that a single case does not prevent
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other cases from being heard. The building should also have holding
cells and secure areas for moving those in custody without exposing
them to public areas. This is done for the security of those in custody
as well as the security of the public and Tribunal personnel. (Longer-
term detention facilities would presumably be off-site.)
68. There must be adequate space for press and communications
equipment. The ICC will need its own satellite dish for communica-
tions to field offices and staff.
69. In many cases, trials in the first instance will be held in, or
close to, where the crimes occurred. In deciding whether to hold trials
in the first instance at the seat of the Tribunal or elsewhere, some is-
sues that must be considered are security, how long investigations and
trials are likely to take, the number of defendants, and the other crite-
ria used to select the seat of the Tribunal discussed in subpart A
above.
C. The Importance of Security in Choosing a Building for the ICC
70. One of the most important issues in choosing the premises of
the Tribunal is security. Obviously, access to the building must be con-
trollable. Beyond this, however, are other concerns. For example, it
would be preferable to avoid having adjacent buildings easily accessi-
ble to the public. Any space in the Tribunal building for parking vehi-
cles must be especially secure. Ideally, the building should be a safe
distance from streets. Finally, the building should be reasonably safe
from surveillance.
D. Major Expenditures Are Required To Make the Aegon Building in
The Hague a Secure Site for a Permanent Tribunal
71. The working assumption used in this paper is that the seat of
the ICC will be in The Hague. At present, the ICTY occupies the
Aegon building, an impressive edifice that formerly was the office of a
major international insurance company, Aegon, N.V.
72. The United Nations has invested considerable sums to make
the Aegon building into a suitable headquarters building for the ICTY.
Nevertheless, when the ICC is set up, consideration should be given
afresh as to whether the Aegon building is indeed the best place for
the seat of a permanent ICC. Of particular concern should be issues of
security. For example:
1. The Aegon building is adjacent to the Congresgebouw (Confer-
ence Center) in The Hague. A hotel is being constructed above the
Congresgebouw that overlooks the Aegon building. The ICC would
have to consider installing and maintaining security controls in
nearby buildings, including the Congresgebouw and its hotel. This
is estimated to cost $250,000 for metal detectors, plus an annual
cost of $400,000 for 15 full-time security guards, 1 supervisor, and
their equipment.
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2. A partial alternative would be to do major remodeling in the
Aegon building to move the current courtroom and the as yet in-
complete second courtroom into the interior portion of the Aegon
building. This is estimated to cost $3,000,000, but this does nothing
to secure much of the building, including its entrance and offices.
3. An essential security provision is to install barriers to control car
and truck traffic into and out of the Aegon garage. This is esti-
mated to cost $150,000.
4. The security of the Aegon building could be improved signifi-
cantly by closing the adjacent streets, Johann de Wittlaan and
Eisenhowerlaan. It would cost relatively little to do this - perhaps
$100,000 for traffic flow barriers and $250,000 to relocate the tram
lines on Eisenhowerlaan. However, there would be major disrup-
tions to traffic patterns in The Hague from the closure of Johann
de Wittlaan. The cost of this disruption, while non-monetary, needs
to be taken into account.
5. The ICC could consider buying the adjacent residential and office
buildings on northwest side of Eisenhowerlaan. This is estimated to
cost $6,000,000, but the buildings could be used as non-secure of-
fice space or as residences for Tribunal staff.
73. The expenses of securing the Aegon building could be so high
that the Committee on States Parties should consider whether to ei-
ther locate or construct a new building in a more secure location in
The Hague. This might require some assistance from the Government
of The Netherlands in locating a suitable site. The Netherlands may
wish to donate the land on which the Committee of States Parties
would pay to have a building constructed. The Committee should con-
sider establishing a building fund to pay for the cost of the building.
However, given the problems that the ICTY had in 1994, it seemed to
some observers that renovating the Aegon building had a higher prior-
ity for the United Nations than paying the expenses of investigations
The Committee should be sensitive to the need to fund ongoing inves-
tigations first.
E. Transition from the Ad Hoc Tribunals to the ICC
74. An issue with important administrative and financial implica-
tions - not to mention political and legal implications - is the rela-
tionship between the ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTY, and the
ICC. This subject is addressed here because it may not be possible for
both the ICTY and the ICC to occupy the Aegon building at the same
time.
75. Clearly, after the ICC Statute is approved, the United Nations
Security Council will have to decide whether to merge the caseload or
responsibilities of the ICTY and the ICTR into the ICC. The time pe-
riod between approval of the ICC Statute and its coming into force will
give the Security Council adequate time to make this decision. Merg-
ing the institutions offers advantages in consistency of prosecutorial
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and judicial decisions, as well as significant administrative cost sav-
ings amounting to millions of dollars a year.
76. For administrative and budgetary reasons, if nothing else, the
drafters of the ICC Statute should consider the possibility that the
ICC will be assigned certain responsibilities from the ICTY and the
ICTR. If this happens, the ICC will require a significant number of
prosecutorial and administrative staff at the outset and a more signifi-
cant budget than if the ICC were kept separate from the ICTY and the
ICTR. If the ICC undertakes some of the responsibilities of the ICTY
and ICTR, the United Nations should be required to contribute some
of the funding for any ongoing investigations or prosecutions.'8 The
Committee of States Parties of the ICC will have to consider whether
to appoint new or existing ICTY/ICTR judges and officials to posts in
the ICC.
77. This paper recommends that, at a minimum, the ICC should
inherit the long-term responsibilities of the ad hoc tribunals. This
would include:
" Prosecutions of indicted persons not apprehended until after
many years.
" Supervision of the terms and conditions of persons sentenced by
the ICTY or the ICTR.
* Appeals on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
* Continuation of efforts to apprehend indicted suspects still at
large.
* Maintenance of the archives of the ICTY and ICTR when they
are no longer active.
IV. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
A. Concepts
78. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is the largest component
of the ICC. As the experience of the ICTY and ICTR has shown, the
OTP will be the driving engine in the work of the ICC. The size and
organization of the OTP are determined, in turn, by the caseload of
the ICC.
79. The caseload of the ICC is difficult to predict with much cer-
tainty. Historical precedent suggests that the number of wars and
other situations that might have been referred to the ICC, if it had ex-
isted, is considerable. This implies a steady workload. On the other
hand, many experts believe that the end of the Cold War will, over the
long run, reduce the frequency of conflicts that would give rise to mat-
ters before an ICC. In addition, one of the goals of the ICC is to deter
the violations of international humanitarian law that are within the
18. For planning purposes in this paper, it is assumed that the United Nations pays
for the incremental costs of ICTY and ICTR investigations and prosecutions.
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mandate of the ICC. If the ICC is successful, its existence and effec-
tiveness will cause it to have fewer matters to handle than it would
have handled in the immediate post-World War II world.
80. We can expect that the ICC may have some very busy periods,
analogous to 1997, when there are two active ad hoc international
criminal tribunals. It is also possible that the ICC will go through pe-
riods of substantial inactivity. The structure of the OTP must reflect
these potential swings in the workload.
1. Minimize overhead, maximize capability
81. One way to accommodate swings in workload is to minimize
the overhead of the ICC when there are no active matters and yet also
be able to "ramp-up" quickly to be able to handle a large caseload if
the need arises. If there are no active matters, the ICC must strive to
keep costs to a minimum. High costs during periods of substantial in-
activity will diminish public support for the institution. The sight of a
large and (by the standards of many States) well-paid staff with ap-
parently little to do except polish the rules of procedure will discour-
age States from supporting the ICC until they need the ICC to do
something. As with a fire department, the ICC must be kept going if it
is to be able to respond quickly when called into action.
82. This means that the OTP will need a small, permanent staff of
a sufficient size so that it can respond quickly to crises. When a mat-
ter becomes active, someone has to be around to take swift steps to
preserve evidence and start interviewing witnesses. Someone else has
to be around to "ramp up" the office by mobilizing the full investiga-
tive and prosecutorial team. In an ongoing matter where crimes are
still being committed, lengthy delays to hire staff will diminish the
ICC's capacity to deter further crimes.
2. Model: The Military Reserve System
83. One model for the OTP to follow is the military reserve system
in use in many States. Table 2 shows how this analogy works:
Table 2
The Reserves Analogy for the Office of the Prosecutor
1. Permanent OTP Staff (the "active duty" staff).
2. Case Units (the "active reserves").
3. Advisers and Consultants (the "inactive reserves").
84. The permanent OTP staff is analogous to active duty military
forces: able to respond immediately to matters that arise. The active
duty forces also include those necessary to mobilize the "active re-
serve" Case Units of prosecutors and investigators. Unlike most mili-
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tary forces, however, for the OTP, the permanent staff would be signif-
icantly smaller than the number of prosecutors and investigators in
active reserves.
85. Those prosecutors and investigators who have retired or may
be unavailable to serve on full-time status with the ICC OTP may be
available nevertheless as an "inactive reserve" of advisers who can as-
sist on particular projects or can be consulted by the Prosecutor on a
confidential basis in making particular decisions.
86. Another key concept in the OTP is the creation of a Startup
Unit, for a short, initial period. The purpose of the Startup Unit is to
develop the procedures and protocols for the OTP. The Startup Unit
should draw in part on ICTY and ICTR veterans. The Startup Unit is
discussed in more detail in section IV B 2, paragraph 91, below.
87. The OTP must also have a Deployment Unit of administrators
responsible for handling the mobilization of the Case Units. This is
discussed in subsection IV B 3 a, paragraph 96.
88. The Case Units are the heart of the OTP during an active
matter. They handle the investigation and prosecution of cases. One
Case Unit must be a "ready reserve" unit able to be activated at short
notice - a week or less. (If the workload justifies it, this unit might
become part of the permanent staff.) This is discussed in section IV B
3 b, paragraph 97. Other Case Units would be activated on reasonable
notice, such as 30 days. See section IV B 4, paragraph 100.
89. If the workload is sufficiently great, the OTP should also have
specialized Support Units to handle technical aspects of investigations.
Support Units are discussed below in section IV B 5, paragraph 107.
B. Organization of the Office of the Prosecutor
1. The Permanent Staff
90. The permanent staff of the OTP should include:
- The CHIEF PROSECUTOR. As with the ICTY/ICTR, the Prosecutor
would hold the equivalent rank of a United Nations Undersecre-
tary-General.
* DEPUTY PROSECUTORS will be needed to head up Case Units. They
should be pre-selected, but should not be part of the permanent
staff.
' The IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR would include a Chief
of Staff and a Personal Assistant to the Prosecutor.
* An ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF that handles (i) administration, (ii)
budget and finance, (iii) personnel, and (iv) travel. This unit would
consist of five professionals - one in each functional area, plus one
chief of the unit - along with 3 support staff. Note that this repre-
sents a change from the way the ICTY and ICTR are organized. In
the ICTY and the ICTR, the administrators, who perform these
functions for the OTP, are located in the Registry, and report to
the Registrar, not the Prosecutor. In most governments and in the
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private sector, such an arrangement is unusual, to say the least. In
the case of the ad hoc tribunals, it created the potential, at least,
for conflicting priorities such as if the Registrar were to think one
task the most important and the Prosecutor were to think another
task deserved the most attention. Giving the Prosecutor the man-
agement responsibility for administrative staff who service the OTP
is an important and necessary step toward improving the adminis-
trative support for the OTP within the Tribunal. This will require
specific language in the ICC Statute to implement.
- A LEGAL SERVICES UNIrr that consists of (i) a counsel for interna-
tional humanitarian law and the law of war, (ii) a counsel for com-
parative criminal law and comparative criminal procedure, (iii) a
counsel for international legal assistance, including extradition,
mutual legal assistance and the transfer of prisoners. These three
professionals would be assisted by a paralegal (also known as a le-
gal assistant) and a secretary. These three counselors should be rel-
atively senior and should be world-class experts in at least one of
the fields for which they are responsible. One of their responsibili-
ties is to know who are the other experts in their respective fields.
* A RESEARCH UNIT whose purpose is to track open source informa-
tion, to keep in touch with governments, inter-governmental orga-
nizations, and other relevant organizations. The members of this
unit are not criminal investigators. (Under the plan proposed in
this paper, the Prosecutor has no permanent investigators on staff
until an investigation formally begins.) Instead, their purpose is to
monitor world developments for information that might be poten-
tially relevant if a matter were to arise. The office consists of i) a
chief of unit, (ii) a liaison to ministries of foreign affairs and inter-
governmental organizations, (iii) a liaison to ministries of defense
and regional security bodies such as NATO, (iv) a liaison to na-
tional police forces and INTERPOL, and (v) an archivist to pre-
serve records and evidence. As an example of how regional diver-
sity might apply, one of the four staff professionals in this unit
might be from a "neutral" country, one might be from an English-
speaking country such as the United States or the United King-
dom, one might be from France, Italy or another European country
whose police force enjoys international respect, and the fourth
would be from a southern country.
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Chart 3
Office of the Prosecutor
Permanent ("Core" or Full-Time) Staff
Administrative Legal Services Research
Staff [ Unit Unit
2. For the first 18 months after ICC startup
91. When the ICC is first established, during the first 18 months
or so, a group of 6-8 prosecutors, investigators and other professional
staff members, along with 2-4 support staff, should have the responsi-
bility of setting up the Office of the Prosecutor. The responsibilities of
this STARTUP UNIT would include:
" Establishing office procedures and protocols.
" Ensuring premises and equipment are operational.
" Establishing work plans for various contingencies, including hav-
ing matters arise in various parts of the world.
. Establishing initial contacts with governments, inter-
governmental organizations, and others.
" Helping to interview and hire the permanent staff-
* Working for ratification of the ICC treaty by States.
" Negotiating and signing cooperation agreements with States
Parties.
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Chart 4
Office of the Prosecutor
First 18 Months After ICC Startup
fr~& Le .#i~ea ~Startup
92. To ensure continuity with the ICTY and the ICTR, at least
half of the startup staff should have some kind of experience with ei-
ther one of the ad hoc tribunals. However, to ensure fresh thinking on
problems, at least a fourth member should be chosen from outside the
ICTY and ICTR.
93. The Startup Unit would be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. Af-
ter the Startup Unit was complete, the Deputy Prosecutor would pre-
sumably head up the "ready reserve" Case Unit.
94. At the end of the 18 month startup period, the Startup Unit
would formally be disbanded. Some Startup Unit staff would no doubt
continue to serve the Tribunal in other capacities. Some would serve
on the permanent staff of the ICC OTP. Others would serve on "re-
serve" Case Units.
3. During the initial weeks of an investigation
95. After the Prosecutor has made the written determination to in-
itiate an investigation, the OTP must "ramp up" its investigation of
the matter. This is done through two units: the Deployment Unit and
the "ready reserve" Case Unit.
a. The Deployment Unit
96. The purpose of the Deployment Unit is to mobilize a Case Unit
when a matter begins. The Deployment Unit would consist of 3-5 ad-
ministrators and 2-4 support staff. It must be available to begin work
on very short notice - as little as a week. As a practical matter, this
means that Deployment Unit staff should come from near the seat of
the Tribunal. Thus, if the seat of the ICC is The Netherlands, Deploy-
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ment Unit personnel might come from The Netherlands or Belgium.
Assuming that members of the Deployment Unit are government ad-
ministrators, their governments must agree to second those individu-
als for a period of 2-3 months at a time. Some may stay on indefi-
nitely, or they may be replaced by permanent staff if the workload for
the Deployment Unit justifies hiring permanent staff.
b. The "Ready Reserve" Case Unit
97. The purpose of the "ready reserve" Case Unit is to investigate
whether the matter should (a) go forward as a formal investigation by
the Prosecutor, (b) be referred to national prosecution, or (c) be
dropped. This unit also must be available on very short notice - about
a week or less. The unit should be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. To
ensure that a Deputy Prosecutor need not investigate crimes allegedly
committed by, or against, his own nationals, there should be several
Deputy Prosecutors available to the Prosecutor.19
Chart 5
Office of the Prosecutor
During the Initial Weeks of an Investigation
L Deployment
98. The size of the "ready reserve" Case Unit will depend on the
matter. In most cases, it may be sufficient to begin with a staff of 2-4
lawyers, 2-4 investigators, 1-2 legal assistants, 4-6 translators, 1 liai-
19. Which Deputy Prosecutor should take charge of a Case Unit is obviously a mat-
ter that should, in virtually all circumstances, be left to the discretion of the Prosecutor.
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son officer, and 3 support staff. The exact mix of personnel will depend
on the matter.
99. The call-up process for the "ready reserve" Case Unit means
that the number of personnel available must be slightly more than the
number that will actually be fielded. Despite the best intentions, other
professional or personal obligations may make someone unable to join
a Case Unit when a matter arises.
4. Case Units
100. As an investigation moves forward towards indictment and
prosecution, the OTP must be expanded into a larger organization.
Chart 6 shows how the OTP might operate. This is based on the expe-
rience of the ICTY and ICTR.
Chart 6
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101. Prosecution of a matter would customarily be in the hands of
a Deputy Prosecutor responsible for that matter. Each matter would be
the responsibility of anywhere from 1 to 20 Case Units, with 3-12 Case
Units being a more typical range.
102. In 1996, the ICTY and the ICTR formally had nine Case
Units each; however, in practice, the approach was more flexible than
this, as some Case Units were larger or smaller than their nominal
staff allotment. The exact number of Case Units in a Task Force will
depend on the specifics of the matter. For example, in the context of
the ICTY, there might be a Case Unit assigned to the ethnic cleansing
of Prijedor, with another Case Unit assigned to the siege of Sarajevo.
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103. Case Units would be grouped into "Task Forces." Thus, if the
ICC had existed when the two ad hoc tribunals were established, there
might now be an ex-Yugoslavia Task Force and a Rwanda Task Force.
104. Each Case Unit would consist of 10-20 professionals and sup-
port staff. Included in a Case Unit would be prosecutors, investigators,
legal assistants, liaison officers (to handle relations with governments,
local officials and the public), translators and interpreters, and support
staff. Case Units may need armed security guards for security in the
field. Case Units may also benefit from outside advisers on specific is-
sues. These could be "alumni" of the OTP and respected academics and
practitioners. These advisers would be the "inactive reserves" of the
OTP.
105. Case Units would be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. If the
ICC has many ongoing matters, a Deputy Prosecutor might handle
more than one matter. However, the factual expertise required to su-
pervise investigations and prosecutions means that a Deputy Prosecu-
tor will likely handle only one matter. Very small cases might not re-
quire a Deputy Prosecutor, but could be handled by a senior trial
attorney.
106. The Deputy Prosecutor would be assisted by the Chief of In-
vestigations. How the Deputy Prosecutor, the Chief of Investigations
and the Case Units relate to each other organizationally will depend
upon the matter being prosecuted, the phase of the investigation -
early in an investigation it may make more sense to have the Chief of
Investigations more involved than later in the prosecution phase
and even the personal backgrounds of those in charge.
5. Support Units
107. If the workload of the OTP is sufficiently large, the OTP
should add specialized Support Units to support the Case Units. These
units would be staffed permanently if the ICC has more than a few ac-
tive matters at a time. If active matters are few, the OTP would staff
Support Units through seconded personnel or by obtaining necessary
services or expertise directly from outside agencies, private contractors
or other organizations.
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Chart 7
Office of the Prosecutor
Assuming Many Active Matters
108. Examples of possible Support Units in an active OTP are:
a. Victim and Witness Unit
109. The Victim and Witness Unit would arrange for protection
and security of the prosecution's witnesses, when and where needed.
(A separate unit in the Registry would take care of witnesses for the
defense.) In some cases, witness protection is handled by Western-style
relocation to another country. In other cases, the witnesses may have
to be given protection within their own cultural milieu. This unit
would also handle logistics and counseling for witnesses who will be
testifying in court. This unit would consist of 3-20 people.
b. Litigation Support Unit
110. The Litigation Support Unit would handle document manage-
ment for investigations and prosecutions. The Unit would also handle
setting up computer databases for the OTP. This unit would consist of
5-50 people.
c. Computer Services Unit
111. The Computer Services Unit would handle computer support
and system maintenance for the OTP. This unit would consist of 3-10
people.
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d. Secure Communications Unit
112. The Secure Communications Unit would handle the ordering
and maintenance of secure communications equipment. Its purpose is
to permit secure communications between the OTP and field units.
This unit would consist of 1-10 people.
e. Research Unit (Expanded)
113. In most cases, the ICC OTP will have a good idea of who
should be prosecuted. In other cases, it will be necessary to use a
Strategy Team to identify the targets of investigations. Both the ICTY
and the ICTR have Strategy Teams. If the number of active matters
justifies it, the Research Unit should be expanded by an additional 5-
50 people to handle factual research other than field investigations.
f. Video and Photo Preservation and Analysis Unit
114. The Video and Photo Preservation and Analysis Unit would
ensure that videotape and photographic evidence is preserved for trial,
it would edit videotape for courtroom presentation, and it would han-
dle research into videotape evidence. This unit would consist of 2-10
people.
g. Press and Information Office
115. The Press and Information office of the OTP would handle
media relations and is responsible for developing a media strategy.
This unit would consist of 2 people. It would serve only the Office of
the Prosecutor; another PIO would serve the Court.
h. Forensic Pathology Unit
116. The Forensic Pathology Unit would perform and coordinate
post-mortem examinations of mass graves and similar evidence. It
would consist of 1-7 people.
i. Forensic Sciences Unit
117. The Forensic Sciences Unit would handle and coordinate sci-
entific investigations other than mass grave exhumation and analysis.
It would also act as liaison to major crime laboratories around the
world. Its personnel would also be available to testify as experts for
the prosecution. This unit would consist of 1-5 people.
C. Field Offices
118. Both ad hoc tribunals have used field offices out of which to
run their investigations. During the war in Bosnia, the ICTY managed
investigations out of its offices in The Hague. However, since the sign-
ing of the Bosnia Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995, the
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ICTY has begun to work more out of cities in the region, establishing
offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo and, to a limited extent, Belgrade. The
ICTR OTP has been based in Kigali, Rwanda, since the office has been
operational.
119. Clearly, the choice of whether or not to set up a field office
will depend on the specifics of the matter. Among the considerations
that should be used are:
- The availability of transportation links from the prospective field
office to the seat of the Tribunal.
" Communications infrastructure at the prospective field office.
" Security issues.
" The time difference between the prospective field office and the
seat of the Tribunal. As a practical matter, it is likely to be impos-
sible to run an investigation from headquarters if it is more than a
few hours away from the place where crimes are being
investigated.
- The anticipated length of the investigation. If the investigation is
likely to be brief, it may not be necessary to establish a formal field
office.
- Whether the case under investigation is a specific incident or a
series of acts over time.
- Whether the trial chamber will sit locally or at the seat of the
Tribunal. If the Trial Chamber will sit locally, the OTP will almost
certainly want to have a field office there.
120. In general, in the initial stage of a matter, the Case Unit should
probably be based in or near the area where the investigation takes
place.
D. Hiring
121. As with all appointed positions in the Tribunal, hiring of
personnel for the OTP must be based on qualifications and experience,
with due regard for geographical diversity. The staff should be re-
cruited internationally from the five regions of the world, representing
equitable geographical distribution.
122. The OTP will be relying significantly on seconded personnel
in order to avoid either (i) having to maintain a costly full-time staff or
(ii) having to face lengthy delays to hire staff whenever a matter
arises. In particular, most of the staff of Case Units will be secon-
darees from governments, IGO's, the private sector, and other relevant
organizations. Secondarees should be paid by the ICC.
123. The use of seconded personnel has generated some recent
controversy within the United Nations system. The United Nations Se-
curity Council expressly stated in resolutions 827 and 955 that it
urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions to contribute funds, equipment and services to the International
Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel. Despite this state-
ment by the Security Council, a recent Report of the Secretary-
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General 20 takes the position that secondment is
only acceptable on a temporary basis for specific short-term
projects or pending a transition, which should be accomplished
promptly, to budgetary posts funded from assessed contributions
. . . Gratis personnel should be accepted on an exceptional basis,
for a defined, limited period...21
124. There is likely to be opposition to the report of the Secretary-
General as the report is considered by the Fifth Committee. Regardless
of the merits, if any, of the Secretary-General's position as applied to
the ICTY and the ICTR, this position is not a viable option for an ICC
that must be able to "ramp up" quickly with qualified personnel when
a matter arises. The OTP of the ICC must be able to rely on second-
ment of qualified personnel, on terms acceptable to the Prosecutor, in
order to be able to handle important matters as soon as the Prosecutor
has decided to launch an investigation.22
E. Other Expenses
125. The OTP must also budget for other expenses of
investigations.
1. Travel expenses
126. The OTP must allow for substantial expenses for travel of in-
vestigators and prosecutors. Not having enough travel funds has been
a major impediment to the work of the ICTY and ICTR.
2. Secure computers and communications equipment
127. The OTP needs to have secure telephone and telefax equip-
ment. Its computer systems also need to be secured. Some computers
must be Tempest-certified to avoid such attacks. The OTP will need to
have experts keep up with the state-of-the-art in computer and com-
munications security.
3. LEXIS/NEXIS and other computer databases
128. The OTP must have access to computer databases that allow
cost-effective research into both legal and factual issues. LEXIS and
NEXIS are the best known; there are many others in English, French,
and other languages. One area of concern is that an unscrupulous per-
son at a database provider could analyze the searches of the OTP and
thereby learn what the OTP was investigating. The OTP must there-
20. See Gratis Personnel Provided by Governments and Other Entities, UN. GAOR,
51st Sess., Agenda Items 116, 120, 137, 139 and 140(a), U.N. Doc. A/511688 (1996).
21. Id. 1 68-69.
22. Secondment may be useful for the Registry, but the Registry should have
enough lead time to hire qualified personnel when the need arises.
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fore develop a database usage strategy to avoid giving away clues as to
what it is investigating.
4. Armored cars and vans
129. The OTP may need armored cars and vans to transport per-
sonnel in insecure areas, and also to transport prisoners even in safe
areas.
5. Equipment for mass grave exhumations
130. Many of the crimes investigated by the ICC OTP will proba-
bly involve mass grave exhumation and analysis. As the experience of
the ICTY and ICTR has shown, mass grave exhumations are expen-
sive, consuming at a minimum tens of thousands of dollars of disposa-
ble supplies and equipment.
6. Helicopters for transportation in countries where road trans-
portation is difficult or unsafe
131. Travel by road will not always be feasible where the OTP op-
erates. Local road conditions may be impassable during the rainy sea-
son, or roads and bridges may have been effectively destroyed during
an armed conflict. The OTP may, in some cases, need helicopters for
transportation.
F. Annual Meetings of the Staff of the Office of the Prosecutor
132. The Permanent staff and the "reserves" of the Office of the
Prosecutor need to meet annually. The OTP should hold an annual 4-
day conference at the seat of the Tribunal. The purpose of this meeting
would be to update the "reserves" on current legal, procedural, and
practical developments that would affect their work. The meetings
would also cross-fertilize, for the benefit of the OTP, any new skills
and techniques learned by the "reserves" in their regular work. The
meetings would also bring in speakers to lecture on legal, factual, or
political issues likely to arise during the next year ahead. This will al-
low the OTP to consult non-lawyers with regional or local expertise to
benefit from their factual knowledge. Finally, the meetings would
serve to establish and maintain personal relationships among OTP
staff If "reserves" are activated during the year, they can expect that
the work will require close teamwork.
V. THE REGISTRY
133. The Registry handles administrative and judicial support for
the Court and all those aspects of the ICC other than the Office of the
Prosecutor.
134. In concept, the Registry should follow the same principle as
the Office of the Prosecutor: minimize overhead in times of relative in-
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activity, and maximize capability to handle busy caseloads when they
occur. For the Registry, this will be easier than for the Office of the
Prosecutor. Because the Registry of the ICC will not have to support
the initial "ramp-up" of the OTP, the Registry will have sufficient time
to "ramp up" its operations in an orderly way. Thus, the Registry will
not need a "reserve system" to the degree required to make the OTP
effective. The Registry will likely have anywhere from 30 days to a
year to staff itself fully. It will have time to recruit qualified personnel
from the five regions of the world when, and as, they are needed to
staff the operations of the ICC.
A. The Permanent Staff
135. When the ICC is relatively inactive, the functions of the Reg-
istry will be somewhat limited. The permanent staff of the Registry
should include:
Chart 8
The Registry - Permanent Staff
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* The REGISTRAR. As with the ICTY/ICTR, the Registrar would hold
the equivalent rank of a United Nations Assistant Secretary-
General.
- The IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR. This would include a
Deputy Registrar and a Personal Assistant to the Registrar.
- An ARcHmIsT whose job it is to preserve the records of the ICC
and, presumably, the archives of the ICTY and ICTR when they
are no longer active. Preservation of all this material is vital for
the historical record. The Archivist will also be responsible for ar-
ranging exhibitions of ICC (and ICTY and ICTR) archives at muse-
urns and other exhibitions around the world. If an important part
of the ICC's function is to serve as a historical reminder of the im-
portance of international justice, this will be one of the most impor-
tant functions within the ICC.
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- A LIBRARY, staffed by a Head Librarian and 2 assistants. The i-
brary will maintain a collection of international legal materials rel-
evant to the work of the ICC and will serve as a resource for schol-
ars and practitioners around the world. The library will also be
responsible for making ICC (and ICTY and ICTR) materials availa-
ble to government officials, scholars, practitioners, journalists and
the public, worldwide, over the Internet, or by whatever future
means allow the most cost-effective delivery of information
worldwide.
- A CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISOR who will handle construction and
support work in the event the ICC (both the OTP and the Court)
need to establish field offices. This is a skill that, arguably, will not
be needed frequently, and some might argue it is not necessarily to
have someone permanently on staff who can do this. The experi-
ence of the ICTY and, particularly, the ICTR teaches otherwise.
The number of people who can do this kind of job extraordinarily
well is so small that the ICC cannot afford to take the chance that
the right person will available when the ICC's need arises.
" SECURITY GUARDS.
" GENERAL SERVICES.
" CONFERENCE SUPPORT. Even when the ICC has no active cases,
the Registry will need to support the plenary sessions of the judges.
These should be held twice a year. The Registry will also need to
support the Committee of States Parties once a year and to support
any executive council the Committee appoints to meet more
frequently.
B. The Registry During Active Matters
136. During active matters, the Registry will have to expand con-
siderably. The remainder of this subpart will discuss several of the
Sections and Units within the Registry.
Chart 9
The Registry - During Active Matters
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1. Administrative Services Section
137. The Registry will need to maintain separate units to handle
accounting, budgeting and finance, and personnel. The Administrative
Services Section will have to supervise the Electronic Support Services
Unit, the security guards, the Construction Supervision Unit, and the
General Services Unit.
138. Unlike the Registry of the ICTY and ICTR, the Administra-
tive Services Section will serve only the Registry, the Chambers (see
part VI below) and defense counsel (see subpart V B 8 below), not the
Office of the Prosecutor. Thus, its size will be smaller than the Admin-
istrative Services Section of the ad hoc tribunals.
139. Because the ICC will be funded by initial contributions from
States Parties, cash management skills will be important in this sec-
tion. When the ICC is relatively inactive, the budgetary needs of the
ICC should be relatively predictable. During an active matter, how-
ever, considerable expertise will be required to ensure that funds are
available when needed.
2. Electronic Support Services Unit
140. The Electronic Support Services Unit will handle computer
support and system maintenance for the Registry and the Chambers.
It will also be responsible for the audio-visual equipment in the court-
rooms and for technical liaison with the media. It will report to the
head of the Administrative Services Section.
3. Construction Supervision Unit
141. When the workload warrants, the Construction Supervisor
(see previous section) will be assisted by a unit that will be responsible
for establishing courtroom and office facilities for cases being tried in,
or near, where the crimes occurred. The unit would probably include a
contract officer and assistant. Much of the work will be done by
outside contractors acting under the supervision of the unit. The Con-
struction Supervision Unit will report to the head of the Administra-
tive Services Section.
4. Additional security guards and general services personnel
142. During an active matter, the ICC will require additional se-
curity guards and general services personnel. These units will report
to the head of the Administrative Services Section.
5. Press and Information Office
143. During active matters, a Press and Information Office (PIO)
will handle media relations for the Court and the ICC as an institu-
tion. (Press relations for the OTP are handled from within the OTP.)
The PIO will report directly to the Registrar.
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6. Judicial Support Services Section
144. In addition to the Administrative Services Section, the other
principal section of the Registry is Judicial Support Services. It will
handle support for trials. Separate units within this Section will han-
dle court management and support (responsible for court files), court
reporting (supervises court reporters, transcribes testimony, proofs,
and releases transcripts), legal support (provides legal advice to the
Registry), and the library. It also will supervise Court Management
and Support Unit, Language Services Unit and the Detention Unit. It
will report to the Registrar, but must be responsive to the needs of the
judges.
7. The Language Services Unit
145. The Language Services Unit will handle translation and in-
terpretation for the Registry and the Court. (Translation and interpre-
tation for the Prosecution is handled within the Office of the Prosecu-
tor.) The official languages of the ICC will be French and English, but
the unit must also be able to work in whatever language is used by
witnesses and defendants. This unit will report to the head of the Ju-
dicial Support Services Section. This is a change from ICTY practice,
where Language Services is within Administrative Services.
8. The Defense Counsel Liaison Unit
146. The ICC has an obligation to provide defense counsel to de-
fendants who cannot afford qualified counsel. The ICC may also have
to fund the cost of investigators, translators, and other expenses for
some defendants. Having full-time defense counsel paid by the Tribu-
nal (a "public defender's" office) is not likely to be cost-effective. In
many cases tried by the ICC, multiple defendants will require their
own counsel, as a lawyer's best argument is often likely to be that
some other defendant was more culpable than the lawyer's client. Sep-
arate counsel will be required in many cases, even where there are
multiple defendants with similar defenses.
147. Instead of full-time counsel for the defense, defense counsel
should formally be independent of the Registry, even if funded by it.
This creates the need for two types of supervision.
148. First, the Defense Counsel Liaison Unit should be headed by
a second Deputy Registrar. This Deputy Registrar reports directly to
the Registrar. The Deputy Registrar will be expected to speak directly
to the Registrar to ensure that counsel for the defense are provided
with adequate resources. Failure to provide adequate resources to de-
fense counsel in a timely way has been a major problem for both the
ICTY and ICTR.
149. Second, a Defense Counsel Advisory Board, consisting of
prominent outside attorneys from a variety of legal systems around
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the world should advise the Deputy Registrar on a variety of matters
pertaining to defense counsel. The Defense Counsel Advisory Board
should be consulted on such matters as compensation for defense coun-
sel, the amount of assistance required to assist lead counsel in a given
case, and rules regarding the activities of counsel for defendants.
150. Within the Defense Counsel Liaison Unit is a Defense Wit-
ness Support Unit. This unit will handle both witness support and,
where necessary, witness protection for the defense. (Witness support
and protection for the prosecution is handled within the OTP.)
C. The Detention Supervision Unit
151. When the ICC has suspects in custody (and earlier, if the
ICC is given, and accepts, responsibility for prisoners of the ICTY and
ICTR), a Detention Supervision Unit will be responsible for manage-
ment of those in custody.
152. Pre-trial detainees will, to the extent possible, be detained at
the seat of the Trial Chamber, wherever that may be. This is impor-
tant so that defense counsel can consult with their clients in prepara-
tion for trial.
153. Defendants convicted by the Trial Chamber may be kept in
prison at the seat of the Trial Chamber, or, as is more likely, they may
be transferred to the seat of the Appeal Chamber in The Hague. The
ICC will thus want to continue the relationship established between
the ICTY and the Scheveningen Prison just outside The Hague, where
ICTY prisoners are presently held awaiting trial.
154. If the Appeal Chamber upholds conviction, prisoners will be
detained either in a State that will receive them or in a facility man-
aged by the ICC. The idea of a prison exclusively for those convicted
by the ICC sounds unlikely, given the extraordinarily high security
that would be expected at an institution that incarcerates only those
convicted of the world's most heinous crimes. Logic suggests that dis-
persal of those convicted may make more sense.
155. Regardless of where prisoners serve their sentences, the ICC
should have a voice - and probably the controlling voice - in the
terms and conditions of sentence.
VI. CHAMBERS
A. Organization
156. The judicial organ of the ICC is divided into Chambers, or-
ganized as shown in Chart 10. A case is first brought before the In-
dictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC). This chamber
confirms indictments and thereafter hears preliminary legal and proce-
dural rulings until the case is ready for trial.
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157. The trial in the first instance is held before a Trial Cham-
ber.23 For present purposes, it is assumed that there will be three regu-
lar Trial Chambers, with the possibility of a separate chamber to hear
treaty crime cases for the reasons discussed above in subpart IIB. For
this reason, the Treaty Crimes Chamber is shown with dotted lines in
Chart 10. It is possible that there may be more than one Treaty Crime
Chamber.
158. Appeals from the decisions of the Trial Chambers are heard
by the Appeal Chamber. The PrepCom has not yet determined whether
judges may publish concurring or dissenting opinions. The Appeal
Chamber's judgments are final.24
159. Chambers also includes a Bureau to make administrative de-
cisions for the Court. The Bureau is discussed further in subpart VI D,
below.
B. Status and Compensation of Judges
160. The IPMC and the Trial Chambers consist of four judges, one
of whom is an alternate. The Appeal Chamber consists of either five or
23. The precise stage at which a case is passed from the IPMC to the Trial Cham-
ber will have to be addressed in the rules of procedure.
24. The drafters of the ICC Statute may want to make clear that decisions of the
ICC may not be appealed to national or other supranational courts.
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seven judges. Excluding the possibility of one or more Treaty Crimes
Chambers, this means that the Court will consist of a total of 21 or 23
judges.25
161. The only judges who will be on full-time status in The Hague
will be the four judges of the IPMC and the President of the Court.
Unless the workload of the Court is sufficiently great to justify full-
time status for other judges, other judges will be on a part-time status,
paid a nominal amount plus a per diem when on active service.
162. Compensation for judges should be based on the equivalent of
a United Nations Undersecretary-General. This is the compensation
level for judges sitting on the ICTY and ICTR.
163. Some creativity will be required to set a fair compensation for
judges who are not permanently sitting in The Hague. The PrepCom
has considered limiting the nature of outside work that part-time
judges could undertake while not sitting in the ICC. This will effec-
tively limit the pool of candidates for judicial appointments to already-
sitting judges and academics. The pool may be further limited because
only large and relatively prosperous States can easily afford to have a
senior judge on leave for what could be months at a time. Similarly,
only large and relatively prosperous academic institutions could afford
to have one of their finest scholars away from teaching, research, and
administrative responsibilities for an extended period. It is likely that
there will need to be some flexibility in allowing judges to earn outside
income.
164. A further complicating factor is the question of pensions for
ICC judges. In many States, judges are awarded relatively generous
pensions both because of their many years of service in the law, and
also to make it easier for judges of advanced years or infirmity to step
down with honor and dignity, knowing that their decision need not be
affected in any way by personal financial considerations.
165. The issue of pensions for ICTY and ICTR judges has come up
virtually every year before the United Nations' Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). ICTY and ICTR
judges have argued for parity between the ad hoc criminal tribunals,
whose judges serve 4-year terms, and the International Court of Jus-
tice, whose judges serve 12-year terms. Whatever the proper outcome
of that dispute, the argument for pensions for ICC judges is stronger.
25. Concern was expressed at a recent PrepCom session by one State that the
number of judges should be limited for reasons of economy. Seen in perspective, this con-
cern is misplaced. The cost to support a single additional judge, even on a full-time ba-
sis, is less than 2% of the baseline budget of the ICC, which assumes no active matters.
If the ICC has even a single active matter, the cost of an additional full-time judge is
likely to be less than one-tenth of one percent of the annual ICC budget. Economics
should not play a role in determining the proper number of judges in the ICC.
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166. Whatever proposal is adopted for compensation of judges of
the ICC, all those involved - both the judges and the States Parties
- should incorporate into their thinking that the Committee of States
Parties will review judges' compensation after the Court has been in
operation for several years. The importance of the judicial function is
so overwhelmingly important that the Committee may well decide, af-
ter a few years, to pay all judges on a full-time basis, notwithstanding
the additional cost this would involve. It will probably take several
years of experience with a part-time basis for compensation to con-
vince a skeptical international community that this additional cost is
justified by the need to have the most qualified candidates willing and
able to serve on the Court.
C. Plenary Meetings
167. All the judges of the Court should meet together once a year
in a plenary session. If the Court is busy, plenary meetings may need
to be held twice a year, as is the case with the judges of the ICTY and
ICTR.
168. At plenary sessions, the judges would adopt and amend rules
of procedure, rules regarding detention, rules governing defense coun-
sel and other matters. Some of these decisions will need to be ap-
proved by the Committee of States Parties (see Part VII below), but
the Committee will benefit from the considered thinking of the judges
on these issues.
D. The President and the Bureau
169. The judges of the ICC should annually elect a President from
among the judges of the Appeal Chamber. Each of the other chambers
would also elect a presiding judge for that chamber. The presiding
judge of the IPMC would serve ex officio as the First Vice President of
the Court. A Second Vice President would be elected by the judges of
the Trial Chamber.
170. The President of the Court and the presiding judge of the
IPMC would together serve as the Bureau of the ICC. Both the Presi-
dent and the presiding judge of the IPMC are full-time residents at
the seat of the Tribunal. The Second Vice President, who would not be
a full-time resident at the seat of the Tribunal, would serve on the Bu-
reau only in the event of the death or disability of the President or the
First Vice President.
171. The Bureau's functions are:
- To issue formal orders activating the Trial Chambers or the Ap-
peal Chamber, as needed.
- To make the initial decision where the Trial Chamber should
hear cases. (The Trial Chamber may review this decision.)
- To prepare and propose the agenda for plenary meetings of the
judges.
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- To decide issues involving recusal or disqualification of judges,
and the assignment of judges to chambers.
- To propose amendments to the rules of procedure and other rules
(though other judges may also make such proposals).
* To make other decisions relating to the functioning of the judicial
organ of the Tribunal.
172. On some issues, such as when considering changes in the
rules of procedure, the Bureau should consult with the Prosecutor or
the Registrar.
173. Because the Bureau consists of two judges, it should act by
consensus whenever possible, but in the event of a difference of opin-
ion, the decision of the President should prevail.
174. Administrative support for the Bureau should include one le-
gal assistant, one administrative assistant, and one secretary.
E. The Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber
1. Composition and Purpose
175. The Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC)
consists of four judges who are full-time residents at the seat of the
Tribunal. Three judges are regular members of the IPMC and one
judge serves as an alternate in case one of the three regular judges is
unable to participate for any reason.
176. The IPMC serves the following purposes:
* The IPMC issues rulings prior to the confirmation of
indictments.
* The IPMC confirms indictments sought by the Prosecutor.
* The IPMC issues rulings subsequent to indictments if Trial
Chamber has not yet been convened.
* The IPMC may appoint one of its members to serve as a super-
vising judge to protect the rights of as-yet unidentified defend-
ants in cases where this is required.
177. In addition to the four judges, the IPMC will be supported by
one legal assistant, one administrative assistant, and one secretary.
During active matters, the IPMC should have an usher to assist with
court sessions.
2. Role of the Alternate Judge in the IPMC and Trial Chambers
178. There are many issues regarding the role of the alternate
judge for the drafters of the ICC Statute to consider.
179. The first and most fundamental question is whether to allow
for alternate judges at all. This paper strongly endorses the use of al-
ternate judges in the IPMC and the Trial Chambers. When a matter
has come before the IPMC or a Trial Chamber, the judges will become
familiar with a body of factual issues that gave rise to that matter.
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Continuity is important. It would be disruptive - not to mention a
poor use of limited judicial, prosecutorial, and defense resources - if
the judges' familiarity with those issues were to be lost if a chamber
had to re-start completely when a judge could no longer continue with
a case.
180. In particular cases, especially those before the Trial Cham-
bers, trials may be lengthy affairs. Any number of reasons might cause
a judge not to be able to participate completely through a lengthy
trial. Losing a sitting judge during an ICC trial could be particularly
costly and disruptive. For example, if a judge has to be replaced and
witnesses have to be re-heard, it would be expensive to bring back wit-
nesses who have already testified. Some witnesses might not want to
come back. What happens then? One possibility is that the judges who
heard the witness the first time would consider that witness's testi-
mony, while the new judge would be able to consider only a written or
video transcript, without regard to the judge's personal observations of
the witness's credibility and demeanor. The more likely outcome is that
the witness's testimony could not be considered by any of the judges.
This creates potential for serious mischief, as there could be significant
tactical advantages to the prosecution or the defense to force out one
judge and thereby lose the testimony of a damaging witness. The alter-
native - going forward after replacing a judge with another judge who
has not heard the evidence and been able to form a first-hand opinion
about the credibility of the witness - creates grave problems of per-
ceived injustice to one or both sides in the trial.
181. For these reasons, it is vitally important that the IPMC and
Trial Chambers have an alternate judge. This is not so necessary on
the Appeal Chamber, where all submissions except oral argument
would be in writing. Also, the loss of a judge from a five-member or
seven-member chamber would be relatively less severe than the loss of
one-third of a three-judge Trial Chamber.
182. Assuming that there is an alternate judge in the IPMC and
Trial Chamber, what is the role of the alternate in proceedings? This
paper submits that the alternate judge should participate as fully in
the trial as any other judge. However, only the three regular judges
should participate in deliberations. If one of the regular judges fell se-
riously ill during deliberations, it would not be so much of a burden to
repeat deliberations with the alternate judge present.
183. Another option is to have the alternate judge participate in
deliberations but not to vote. This gives the alternate judge more
power than simply that of a "back-up" to the regular judges.
184. One possibility independent of the two options just discussed
is to choose the alternate judge by lot at the start of deliberations.
This makes all judges equal during trial (except for the role of the pre-
siding judge at trial), and prevents any judge from being seen to have
"second-class" status by virtue of being the alternate judge. On the
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other hand, the Committee of States Parties may prefer to choose
which judges sit as regular members and which judge serves as the al-
ternate judge.
F. Trial Chambers
185. The Trial Chambers do not permanently sit at the seat of the
Tribunal. Instead, they are activated by order of the Bureau when
they are to consider active cases. Normally, a Trial Chamber should
expect 30 days' notice before being required to hear a case. This should
give the judges time to arrange their affairs and take up residence at
the seat of the Tribunal. It will also allow time to determine where the
Trial Chamber should hear cases. The initial choice of location should
be made by the Bureau, but the Trial Chamber should have the power
to decide where to hear cases if it is persuaded that one or another lo-
cation would best serve the interests of justice.
186. Initially, there should be three Trial Chambers. This number
may need to be increased by the Committee of States Parties if the
caseload warrants it.
187. Each Trial Chamber includes three regular judges and one al-
ternate judge. (For a discussion of alternate judges, see section VI E 2,
180, above.)
188. Administratively, when a Trial Chamber is active, it should
have a support staff of one legal assistant, four law clerks, one admin-
istrative assistant, one secretary, and one usher.
189. Depending on the nature of the matter, an active Trial
Chamber may also require its own computer specialist and its own
document management specialist. Under ordinary cases, the Trial
Chamber can rely on the Registry for this support. However, if the
Trial Chamber is located away from the seat of the Tribunal, or if the
matters before the Trial Chamber are especially sensitive, the com-
puter and the document management specialists should be under the
administrative control of the Chamber.
G. The Appeal Chamber
190. The Appeal Chamber does not sit permanently at the seat of
the Tribunal. Instead, it would be activated by the Bureau on 90 days'
notice when a matter is brought to the Appeal Chamber. In many
cases, the rules should provide sufficient guidance for an appeal to be
lodged formally with the Appeal Chamber even though most of its
judges have not yet gathered together.
191. The Appeal Chamber consists of five or seven judges. The
President of the Court presides over the Appeal Chamber. There are
no alternates.
192. The administrative staff of the Appeal Chamber, when active,
would include one legal assistant, five or seven law clerks (one for
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each judge), one administrative assistant, two secretaries, and one
usher.
VII. COMMITTEE OF STATES PARTIES
A. Management Oversight of the ICC
193. Overall responsibility for management oversight of the ICC is
in the hands of the Committee of States Parties. The Committee in-
cludes all States that are a party to the treaty establishing the ICC.
The Committee should meet at least annually, though it must be pos-
sible to hold emergency meetings of the full Committee if needed. Each
State has one vote in the Committee. An Executive Council, discussed
below, must be available to meet more frequently.
194. The purposes of the Committee are:
- To be responsible for management oversight. The Committee
must avoid getting involved in specific cases.
- To elect Judges, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar. If a vacancy
occurs between sessions, the Executive Committee may fill the va-
cancy until the next meeting of the Committee.
" To add Trial Chambers, if needed.
" To approve rules of procedure, rules on detention, rules relating
to defense counsel, and so on.
- To approve budgets and to apportion costs. Budgeting should be
on a two to three years-ahead basis.
" To direct the audit of accounts.
" To appoint an Investigator General who could, if the need should
ever arise, look into causes of misconduct by Tribunal officials.
- To establish, if the need is sufficient, an administrative tribunal
for ICC personnel.
- To make the final decision on charges of misconduct against se-
nior Tribunal officials.
195. To ensure that States meet their financial obligations to sup-
port the ICC, States that are not current on their financial obligations
may participate in the Committee but have their vote suspended.
B. The Executive Council
196. The Executive Council is an organ of the Committee of States
Parties and provides a means for more frequent management meetings
to assist the work of the ICC. Its purposes are:
- To review possible candidates for judges, the Prosecutor and the
Registrar, and to make nominations to the Committee.
- In the event of a vacancy in the Prosecutor or Registrar, the
normal scenario would be for the principal Deputy Prosecutor or the
Deputy Registrar to assume the formal responsibilities of Prosecutor or
Registrar. However, in some cases, it may be necessary for the Execu-
tive Council to make interim appointments for someone to serve as
acting Prosecutor or Registrar.
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* To work with the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Bureau to
develop budgets for presentation to the Committee of States Parties.
197. The Executive Council acts by majority vote. There should be
no vetoes. It should meet at least quarterly, with urgent consultations
made on an as-needed basis. Each State on the Executive Council
must have a designated representative at the seat of the Tribunal or
within a few hours' train ride. For example, if the seat of the Tribunal
is The Hague, a designated representative could be permanently based
in Brussels and still be able to participate in urgent meetings of the
Executive Council.
198. The size and manner of election of the Executive Council is
beyond the scope of this paper. Major contributors are likely to insist
on seats. However, any State that is not current on its financial obliga-
tions may participate in the Executive Council, but should have its
vote suspended.
VIII. COST ESTIMATES
199. This Part will present cost estimates for the ICC under a va-
riety of operating assumptions. Many of those assumptions have been
set out in Parts III-VII of this paper. In addition, however, there are
some philosophical assumptions that affect resource demands. These
assumptions should be addressed explicitly.
A. Some Philosophical Assumptions That Affect the Budget
1. The ICC prosecutes "Big Fish"
200. Limited resources, both economic and judicial, mean that the
ICC should focus its attention on the most serious of crimes and the
most culpable of defendants - the so-called "big fish." Thus, the num-
ber of defendants per matter will be on the order of 1-100, but not in
the thousands or tens of thousands, even where (as in Rwanda) the
number of culpable persons is very large.
201. The experience of the ICTY and ICTR suggests that it may be
easier to prosecute cases against high-level perpetrators rather than
against lower-level trigger-pullers. The doctrine of command responsi-
bility helps produce this result. In a case involving, for example, a
camp guard, the prosecution must tie the defendant to a specific crime
more than just an ordinary murder, rape, or beating. Given the uncer-
tainty of human memory under the most stressful of situations, such
cases are a challenge to present. In contrast, there is usually less un-
certainty over who is the commander of a military unit or installation,
or who holds high public office.
2. Complementarity will encourage more national prosecutions.
202. The existence of an ICC, along with the principle of comple-
mentarity, will encourage more national prosecutions of mid-level and
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low-level perpetrators. The assumption is that States will want to
prosecute their own where politically feasible. In many cases, both ex-
ternal and internal political pressures may call for the prosecution of
top-level perpetrators by an international tribunal, namely the ICC.
This will relieve the ICC of the need to focus investigative and
prosecutorial resources on relatively lower-level participants.
3. Prompt investigations reduce costs - as well as increase
deterrence
203. The delays in startup of the ICTY and ICTR have driven
home the fact that prompt investigations can reduce costs. Prompt mo-
bilization of ICC OTP Case Units will enable witness interviews to be
undertaken before witnesses are dispersed. Evidence can be gathered
quickly before it is lost.
Chart 11
Conceptual Illustration of How Time Affects
the Cost of Gathering Information
Cost to know what's going
on in the world this minute:
$ tens of millions
(intelligence services)
Cost to investigate a case that
happened several years ago:
$ millions (ICTY/ICTR)
Cost to know what's going on
in the world a few hours ago: Cost to investigate a case that
$30 month (CNN) happened last week:
$ thousands (local police)
Cost to know what went on
in the world yesterday: $0.60
(newspaper) Time
204. In general, the cost of gathering information increases when
investigation is delayed. Chart 11 is a conceptual illustration of this
principle. If a State wishes to know what is happening elsewhere in
the world on a real-time basis, the State must employ intelligence
agencies or national technical means, at a cost in the tens of millions
of dollars. To find out what is happening on a few select stories within
the past several hours, the cost drops to the subscription fee for CNN
or other television news sources. To find out what happened within the
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last 24-48 hours, the cost is reduced further to the price of a good
newspaper, a fraction of a dollar a day.
205. Over time, however, the cost to reconstruct information in-
creases. To investigate a major crime that occurred last week, a local
police force may spend thousands of dollars to have half a dozen police
investigators interview witnesses from the crime scene. Within a week
of the crime, the witnesses have not had a chance to disperse, and
their memories are relatively fresh. It may be necessary to interview
only 4 or 5 witnesses to find out what, a year later, would require in-
terviews of 15 or 20 witnesses.
206. The problem faced by the ICTY (and, to a lesser extent, the
ICTR) was that, years after the crimes occurred, witnesses were widely
dispersed. For example, survivors of crimes in Bosnia had been relo-
cated throughout Europe, Asia, and North America. In addition, many
witnesses had not moved far in distance but had moved to places
whose authorities would not make them available to ICTY
investigators.
207. A final point about the importance of a rapid response is that
knowledge that the Prosecutor is moving quickly may help deter some
crimes from occurring. In a number of instances - Rwanda being but
one example - perpetrators of massive crimes have counted on little
or no international media attention to give them time to commit their
crimes. A Prosecutor with a rapid-response capability can help to mo-
bilize international attention. International media attention may dis-
courage crimes from being committed in the first place.
208. The key to rapid response is a staff of people with the cash
resources to secure necessary transportation and other specialized in-
vestigative resources for the case at hand. Money but no staff would
require the Prosecutor to take the time to recruit staff before going out
into the field. Correspondingly, investigators without travel money are
just as unable to get out into the field. Sometimes the investigators
will need cash to hire extra security; other times, they may need their
cash for forensic equipment. It is impossible to predict with absolute
certainty what will be the most urgent need when a matter arises, but
both ready staff and ready cash must be available at once.
B. A Baseline Budget
209. As discussed above in section IV A 1, 81, the baseline
budget of the ICC - those resources that will be required when there
are no active matters - should as small as possible, consistent with
the need to be able to respond quickly when a matter arises.
1. Staffing
210. Appendix A is an outline of a staffing table for the Office of
the Prosecutor, the Registry and Chambers. It shows, at the top, sala-
ries for grades that approximate those of the United Nations system,
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ranging from the top - Undersecretary-General, for the judges and
the Prosecutor - down through P-2, general service level, and secur-
ity. The personnel figures shown reflect the baseline or core staff de-
scribed above in sections IV B 1, 90, and V A 1, 135. Other units
that would become activated at a later time are also shown.
211. Table 3 summarizes the staffing required for the baseline
budget of the Tribunal:
Table 3
Summary of Staffing Table - Baseline Budget
Professionals Support Staff Total
Office of the Prosecutor 15 8 23
Registry 7 23 30
Chambers 7 5 12
Total 29 36 65
2. Annual baseline budget
212. Appendix B shows a detailed baseline budget for the ICC. As-
suming there are no active matters, the budget is estimated at $12.4
million a year. Table 4 summarizes the figures shown in Appendix B.
3. Startup expenses.
213. Appendix C shows a detailed budget for the startup expenses
of the ICC. Startup expenses are estimated at $13.8 million. Table 5
summarizes the figures shown in Appendix B.
4. Additional security at the Aegon building vs. the cost of a new
building for the ICC
214. This does not include the cost to upgrade security at the
Aegon building as discussed above in subpart III D, 71, or, in the al-
ternative, to build a new facility to house the Tribunal. Appendix C
also presents an estimate of these costs, which total $11.75 million,
though some of the costs are in the alternative. In particular, if the
courtrooms are relocated to the interior of the Aegon building, at an
estimated cost of $3,000,000, then the need to increase security at the
neighboring Congresgebouw, at a cost of $2,250,000, is diminished.
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Table 4
Summary of Baseline Budget
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries
Travel
Office Expenses, Furniture and Equipment
Annual Meeting
OTP Subtotal
The Registry
Salaries
Travel
Office Expenses, Furniture and Equipment,
and Committee of States Parties
Rent and Related Services
Registry Subtotal
Chambers
Salaries
Travel
Chambers Subtotal
Subtotal
10% Reserve for Contingencies
Total
2,085,000
40,000
115,750
185,000
$2,421,250
$1,808,875
30,000
2,227,900
3,324,640
$7,391,415
$1,477,688
20,000
$1,497,688
$11,310,353
$1,131,035
$12,441,388
1997
Estimate
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215. To the $11.75 million cost to upgrade security must be added the
rental that the ICC would pay for the Aegon building. By the time of
possible occupancy of the Aegon building by an ICC, the United Na-
tions will be paying $2,954,500 for rent, cleaning and building mainte-
nance. Over five years, the rental on the Aegon building would total
$14.77 million. 26
Table 5
Summary of Startup Expenses
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries
Travel
Office Expenses, Furniture and Equipment,
Computers and Secure Communications
OTP Subtotal
The Registry
Furniture
Computers
Audiovisual and Communications
Equipment
Deployable Field Office
Registry Subtotal
Subtotal
10% Reserve for Contingencies
1,700,000
$8,850,000
$12,511,141
$1,251,114
Total
26. Given that the building rental by 1999 would be approximately $2.45 million,
this would imply a purchase price of between $20.4 million and $40.8 million, depending
on the implied discount rate (these estimates assume a discount rate of between 6% and
12%). This estimate excludes any applicable taxes. To determine a fair purchase price for
the Aegon building would require a formal appraisal. If the ICC is going to stay in the
Aegon building, the building should probably be purchased by the Tribunal.
Estimate
$2,248,375
150,000
1,262,766
$3,661,141
$2,000,000
4,500,000
650,000
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216. Thus, the total cost for the Aegon building with enhanced se-
curity could be $26.5 million over a five-year period, with additional
rental and other expenses beyond year five in addition to this. In con-
trast, if the Government of The Netherlands will donate a suitable site
in The Hague, a new building could probably be constructed for $15
million to $25 million that would be more secure and better suited for
the needs of the Tribunal. A new building may be more cost-effective
in the long run.
C. One to Two Active Matters
217. The cost to investigate and prosecute an active matter from
start to finish is so dependent on the specific facts of the matter that
any estimate is little more than an order-of-magnitude approximation.
Indeed, the experience of the ICTY and the ICTR provides little worth-
while guidance.
218. The first budget for the ICTY was a four-line-item budget of
$31.2 million on the last page of the Secretary-General's report that
formed the basis of the ICTY's Statute, adopted in May 1993.27 This
became the basis for a budget of $33.2 million in December of 1993, 28
later revised to $32.6 million in March of 1994.29 This budget was for
what, at the time, were the remaining seven quarters in the biennium
1994-95. This was increased slightly, so that the ICTY's expenditures
for 1994-95 were approximately $35.8 million (net).30 The ACABQ ap-
proved a one-year budget for the ICTY for 1996 that was approxi-
mately $40.8 million (gross),31 and for the ICTR, $38.8 million (gross). 32
There are indications in the budget made public by the Secretary-
General that both Tribunals are expected to seek substantial increases
for 1997. 33 In the meantime, the Secretary-General has sought what
27. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, Addendum, Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1
(1993).
28. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for the Serious lolations of International Humanitaarian Law Committed in the Ter.
ritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN. GAOR, 5th Comm., 48th Sess., 1 56,
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/48/44 (1993).
29. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 5th Comm., Addendum, 48th Sess.,
9 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/48/44 (1994).
30. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Respondible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Comm., 51st Sess., Table 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/51/30 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
supra note 5, at Table 1.
33. Id. at 1, for the ICTR; for the ICTY, see Financing of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Human-
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amounts to a zero-growth budget, in terms of staff, in the provisional
dollar amounts for 1997 of $53.5 million (gross) for the ICTY and
$46.7 million (gross) for the ICTR.
219. Even with these budgets, there are substantial unmet needs
that both the ICTY and ICTR have. These include:
- WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY, OR RELOCATION. At present, a small
staff in each Tribunal tries to arrange witness relocation. As a
practical matter, this can be done only in high-profile cases. Many
witnesses who deserve special protection, security, or relocation
simply cannot get it.
- TRANSPORTATION. Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have adequate
transportation for investigators.
- MASS GRAVE EXHUMATION. So far, both ad hoc tribunals have been
able to rely on voluntary contributions to undertake mass grave ex-
humations. This is not sustainable. It would be imprudent to as-
sume that voluntary contributions will always be available to pay
for these essential investigative needs.
220. Clearly, the budgets for the ICTY and the ICTR are not yet
at equilibrium between the needs of those matters and the resources
available to bring those matters to a successful conclusion.
221. Based on experience thus far, and given the range of matters
that an ICC would have to investigate, it seems reasonable to plan on
a cost for an active matter between a minimum of $10 million and a
maximum of $150 million a year, with the most likely scenario being
between $30 million and $60 million a year. These assumptions in-
clude an allowance of $10 million per matter to establish field offices
and courtroom facilities away from the seat of the Tribunal.
222. It should be recognized that these budget figures are in addi-
tion to the baseline budget, but they also imply a significantly stronger
investigative and prosecutorial effort than either the ICTY or the
ICTR has been able to mount to date. For example, about $10 million
of the baseline budget of the ICC is included in the ICTY's $30 mil-
lion-$40 million budget. This includes rental on the Aegon building,
salaries for some Tribunal personnel, equipment, and the like.
D. Three or More Active Matters
223. If the work of the ICC involves several ongoing matters at
once, the cost of each additional matter would probably not be as great
as the first one or two active matters then underway. Standard princi-
ples of economics suggest that the marginal cost of each additional in-
vestigation ought to be less. Table 6 below illustrates this principle.
itarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Report of
the Secretary General, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/51/30, (1996).
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E. Financing
224. Initial discussion has already taken place on how the ICC
should be financed.34
1. Assume financing from States Parties by class
225. This paper recommends that the ICC be financed by the
States Parties, by class. In this way, one State is not responsible for
the dominant share of the ICC's expenses. (Nor could one State claim
a dominant voice in the management of the ICC.) The wealthiest
States Parties should all pay the same share. Second-tier States Par-
ties would pay a lesser amount, and so on. The number of classes is
somewhat arbitrary; but five seems a reasonable number.
Table 6
Cost of Many Active Matters at Once
Annual Cost per Annual Cost per
Matter for One or Matter for Three or
Two Matters More Matters
Minimum Cost $10 million $5 million
Maximum Cost $150 million $100 million
Range of Most $30-$60 million $20-$50 million
Likely Matters
2. States that bring complaints should not ordinarily be expected
to contribute to the cost of that case
226. While some have suggested that States that bring complaints
should pay for the costs of investigation and prosecution of those com-
plaints, this paper takes the view that this should not be required. Re-
quiring contributions in every case creates the appearance of a conflict
of interest between those paying the bills and those who must, impar-
tially, conduct the investigation. Instead, the cost of the case should be
apportioned among the States Parties by class as part of the cost of in-
ternational justice.
34. See, e.g., Committee Is Told Proposed International Criminal Court Should Be
Complementary to National Jurisdictions, U.N. press release, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2876,
(1995); Preparatory Committee for International Criminal Court Continues Discussing
Creation of Court by Treaty, U.N. press release, U.N. Doc. GA/112808, (1996); Preparatory
Committee for International Criminal Court Concludes Second Session, U.N. press re-
lease, UN. Doc. GA/L'2813, 30 August 1996. See also Institute for Global Policy, Pros-
pects for the Financing of an International Criminal Court, 1996.
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227. Voluntary contributions should not be refused. They should
be accepted at the discretion of the Prosecutor or the Registry, as the
case may be.
3. States Parties that bring Treaty Crime complaints may con-
tribute to cost of that case
228. In treaty crime cases, funding by the States bringing the case
to the ICC may be appropriate. Presumably, all involved States would
agree on a percentage share of costs to be paid by each of them.
Wealthier States may want to contribute to a voluntary fund so that
smaller States Parties are not prevented from bringing treaty crime
cases.
4. Sixty States Parties should be able to give the Tribunal ade-
quate funding that its successful startup is assured
229. If each of 60 States Parties sign the treaty setting up the
ICC, and each State pays $1 million upon signing the treaty, this
would give the Tribunal a startup fund of $60 million. This sum
should be adequate to finance startup costs and one large or two small
active matters during the first year or two of operations. The Commit-
tee of the States Parties will then have a year to review a budget for
subsequent years.
5. The ICC should budget three years ahead
230. The ICC should adopt the practice of preparing budgets three
years ahead, so that the States Parties can plan how to fulfill their fi-
nancial obligations to the Tribunal. Presumably, in any given budget
year, the budget for the next year should be highly specific, the budget
for two years out will be general, and the budget for three years ahead
would be contingent. Requiring advance planning will be an important
exercise to ensure that ICC staff and the States Parties have ade-
quately planned for the Tribunal's future needs.
IX CONCLUSION
231. With only a limited amount of PrepCom time available, now
is the time for those involved in drafting the ICC Statute to consider
administrative and financial issues affecting the future of the ICC:
- EASIER TO Do Now THAN LATER. Small changes can be made now
to the ICC Statute to improve administrative efficiency. Those
changes, at the present time, are likely to be non-controversial.
Changing the Statute at a later date may be difficult.
- A SUCCESSFUL START FOR THE ICC Is VITAL. If the ICC is seen
from the outset as doing justice, its authority and legitimacy will
be strengthened. This strength will not only increase cooperation
with the ICC, it should also help deter violations of international
humanitarian law from being committed. Administrative and finan-
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cial issues must not be allowed to cause the ICC to stumble. A first
success will create the momentum for further successes.
- MANY LESSONS ARE AVAILABLE FROM EXPERIENCE OF ICTY AND
ICTR. The experiences of the ICTY and the ICTR have taught the
international community much about what an international crimi-
nal tribunal needs to succeed. That experience should be applied in
the drafting of the ICC Statute.
• PROPER HANDLING OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCILL ISSUES ARE
ESSENTIAL FOR THE ICC'S SUCCESS. For the ICC to succeed, consider-
able efforts and talents from States Parties and from the best ju-
rists, prosecutors, investigators and administrators will be essen-
tial. The Statute of the International Criminal Court must provide
a sound administrative and financial foundation to ensure that the
ICC becomes an effective instrument of international justice.
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Administrative and Financial Issues of the
International Criminal Court - Appendices
Appendix A - Staffing
($ Thousands) USG ASG D-2 D-I P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Base Salary 145 125 115 105 95 85 75 50 40 30 30
Full-Cost 181 156 144 131 119 106 94 63 50 38 38
(+25%)
(Figures shown are rounded to nearest thousand; unrounded figures used in
calculations)
Staffing Table
Office of the Prosecutor-Permanent Staff
Prosecutor I
Chief of Staff
Personal Asst. I
Administration Unit
Ch. Admin. 1 I
Budget Officer 1
Personnel Officer 1 I
Travel Officer I I
Legal Services Unit
Counsel 3 1 1
Research Unit
Director 1
Staff 1 2 1 1
Column Totals 1 0 0 3 4 3 3 1 3 5 0
Total Professionals 15 Support Staff 8
Startup Unit
Staff 1 2 2 2 2 4
Deployment Unit
Staff 1 1 3 4
First Case Unit
Lawyers 1 1 2 1 2 2
Investigators 1 2 1 1
Translators 1 2 3
Liaison Officer I
Victim & Witness Unit
Staff I 3-10 1-8 3-5
Litigation Support Unit
Staff 1 2-5 2-5 20-40
Computer Services Unit
Staff 1 0-1 0-1 2-8
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USG ASG D-2 D-I
Secure Communications Unit
Staff
Research Unit (expanded)
Staff
Video Preservation and Analysis Unit
Staff
Press and Information Office
Staff
Forensic Pathology Unit
Staff
Forensic Sciences Unit
Staff
P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
1 0-1
The Registry
Registrar
Deputy Registrar
Personal assistant
Archivist
Library
Head Librarian
Staff
Other
Construction Supervisor
General Services
Guards
Conference Support
Column Totals 0 1
Total Professionals
1 0 2 2
Support Staff 23
1 1 10 12
During Active Matters
Administration Services
Administration
Budget & Finance
Electronic Support Services Unit
General Services
Guards
Construction Supervision
Judicial Support Services
Court management and Support
Court Reporting
Legal Support
Language Services Unit
Library
Other
Press and Information Office
I I
varies varies
varies varies varies
varies varies varies
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USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Defense Counsel Liaison Unit
Defense Counsel Liaison Unit 1 2 2
Defense Witness Support Unit 1 I
Defense Counsel (outside) varies varies varies varies varies
Detention Supervision Unit
Supervisor
Guards varies
Administrator
Chambers
Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber
Judges 4
Secretaries I
Legal Assistants/Clerks
Active Matters
Usher
The Bureau
Judges 1
Staff I I I
Column Totals 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 0
Total Professionals 7 Support Staff 5
Appeal Chamber - When Active
Judges 6
Secretaries 1 2
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 7
Usher I
Active Trial Chambers (1st active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries 1
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 4
Usher 1
Active Trial Chambers (2d active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries 1
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 4
Usher I
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USG ASG D-2 D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Active Trial Chambers (3d active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 4
Usher
Other
Computer Specialist
Document Management Specialist
When No Active Matters
Total Professionals 7
Maximum Professionals 69
Support Staff 4
Support Staff 23
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Appendix B - Baseline Budget
(Assuming no active matters)
All figures in US$
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries
Salaries at Full Cost 2,050,000 See staffing table.
/ USG, OASG, OD-2, 3 D-I. 4 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 P-2/1, 3 GS-PI, 5 GS-OL, 0 Security
Temporary Assistance 20,500 1% of salaries, based on ICTY 1995 experience.
and Overtime
Consultants and Experts
Travel
Travel for Permanent
Staff
Other Expenses
General Operating
Expenses, Supplies and
Materials
Furniture Maintenance
and Replacement
Computer Database
Maintenance and Expenses
Annual Meeting
Travel
Language Services for
Meeting
Speakers' Honoraria
The Registry
10,000 Assumption.
Subtotal: $2,080,500
40,000 Assumes no matters become active.
Subtotal: $40,000
30,750 1.5% of salaries, based on ICTY 1996 (ICTY 1995
was 0.5%)
5,000 Assumption. Acquisition of furniture is covered
under Startup Expenses.
80,000 Hardware and software maintenance, subscriptions
to electronic services
Subtotal: $115,750
157,500 Assume 50 people travel at an average cost per
person of $1500 airfare, $350/day hotel+meals for 4
days, and $250 for taxis and incidentals
20,000 Contract translation for four days.
7,500 Assume 5 speakers at $1500 each.
Subtotal: $185,000
OTP Subtotal: $2,421,250
Salaries
Salaries at Full Cost 1,625,000
0 USG, I ASG, 0 D-2, I D-1, 0 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, I P-2/I, 1 GS-PL, 10 GS-OL, 12 Security
Temporary Assistance 173,875 10.7% of salaries, based on ICTY 1996 experience.
and Overtime
Consultants and Experts 10,000 Assumption.
Subtotal: $1,808,875
Travel
Travel for Registry Staff
Other Expenses
General Operating
Expenses, Supplies
and Materials
30,000 Assumes no matters become active.
Subtotal: $30,000
2,000,000 ICTY 1995-97 have budgeted $4 million-$5 million
VOL. 25:2
ORGANIZATION 393
Furniture Maintenance 5,000 Assumption. Acquisition of furniture is covered
and Replacement under Startup Expenses.
Computer Database 20,000 Hardware and software maintenance, subscriptions
Maintenance and Expenses to electronic services.
Hospitality 2,900 ICTY 1997.
Expenses of Conference 200,000 Estimated cost of translators, setup, rental of
of States Parties conference facility. Assume that each State pays its
own direct costs.
Subtotal: $2,227,900
Operating Expenses
Rent 2,766,700 Based on rental of all of Aegon building. Another
approach would be to have a small office for core
staff and to acquire additional office space only when
necessary.
Detention Facilities 50,000 An "option" on jail cells at Scheveningen prison.
Cleaning Service 212,700 ICTY 1997. Assumes all of Aegon or equivalent
space.
Supplies 295,240 20% of ICTY 1997 supplies.
Subtotal: $3,324,640
Registry Subtotal: $7,391,415
Chambers
Salaries at Full Cost 1,331,250
5 USG, 0 ASG, 0 D-2, 0 D-i, 0 P-5, 2 P-4, 0 P-3, 0 P-2/1, 2 GS-PL, 3 GS-OL, 0 Security
Common Costs of Judges 133,125 10% of salaries.
Overtime 13,313 1% of salaries
Travel 20,000 Estimate.
Chambers Subtotal: $1,497,688
Subtotal
Reserve for
Contingencies
11,310,353
1,131,035 10% for contingencies
12,441,388
1997
Total
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Appendix C - Startup Expenses
(During the first 18 months)
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries
Startup Unit Salaries at
Full Cost
Relocation allowances
for Permanent Staff
Relocation allowances
for 40% of Startup Unit
Consultants and Experts
Travel
Travel for Startup Unit
Staff
Other Expenses
General Operating
Expenses, Supplies and
Materials
Furniture Acquisition
Secure Communications
Equipment - 2 satellite
earth stations (wait to
buy until needed)
Computers
The Registry
Office Equipment
Furniture
Computers
Audiovisual equipment
Communications
Equipment
Field Office
Pre-Fab Office for
Deployment in the
Field
1,584,375 For 1.5 years. See staffing table.
460,000 Assume average of $20,000 per person.
104,000 Assume 60% of Startup Unit comes from ICTY.
100,000 Assumption.
Subtotal: $2,248,375
150.000 Assumption.
Subtotal: $150,000
23,766 Same 1.5% of salaries as Baseline Budget.
460,000 Based on ICTY 1995+1996; much ICTY 1994
furniture was donated by Aegon.
545,000 Based on ICTY 1997 cost of satellite earth stations
($555,000 for 3 earth stations) plus 8 secure
telephones and 8 secure fax machines (ICTY
budgeted $25,000 for 2 secure telephones and 2
secure faxes) plus $75,000 for other equipment.
234,000 36 workstations plus related peripherals; 4
Tempest-certified computers.
Subtotal: $1,262,766
OTP Subtotal: $3,661,141
2,000,000 Based on $3.4 million for ICTY in 1994-95, $1.3
million in 1996 and 2.8 million in 1997. This assumes
some furniture will need to be bought for temporary
quarters, but that eventually the Aegon building (or at
least its furniture) will be available.
4,500,000 Will probably have to upgrade computers used by
ICTY.
250,000 Will eventually use ICTY equipment, but will need
some for evidence preservation purposes in the
meantime.
400,000 Secure telephones, radiotelephones and computers.
Cannot wait until a matter arises to acquire this
equipment.
1,700,000
Registry Subtotal: $8,850,000
1997
Subtotal
Reserve for
Contingencies
Total
ORGANIZATION
12,511,141
1,251,114 10% for contingencies
13,762,255
Improving Aegon Building Security
Congresgebouw
Metal Detectors
15 Security Guards for
5 Years, Plus Supervisor
Courtroom Remodeling
Barriers to Garage
Close Johann de Wittlaan
Eisenhowerlaan near Aegon
250,000
2,000,000 Assume guard + equipment is $25,000/year
3,000,000 May not be feasible given building interior.
150,000
350,000 Does not value the effect of a major disruption to
traffic in The Hague.
Buy Adjacent Residential 6,000,000 Does not value benefit to ICC of having non-secure
Office Buildings on Northwest office space or residences for Tribunal staff.
Side of Eisenhowerlaan
Total for Additional Aegon 11,750,000
Security
Figure above does not include rent on the Aegon building
Rent Through 2007 2,450,800 ICTY 1997 excl. courtroom renovation
Cleaning Cost (annual) 212,700 Based on ICTY 1997 use of space
Building Maintenance 29 1,000 Based on ICTY 1997 use of space
(annual)
Total
Five-year rental
Total Cost to Secure
Aegon
Building and Rent for
Five Years
2,954,500
14,772,500
26,522,500
Alternative: Constructing a New Building for Tribunal
Likely Minimum
Likely Maximum
15,000,000
25,000,000

Observations Concerning the 1997-98
Preparatory Committee's Work
M. CHERIF BAssIouNI*
I. INTRODUCTION'
1. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago proposed the creation of an In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) to the General Assembly of the
United Nations (UN) to aid in the fight against narcotics trafficking.
This proposal revived the UN's work in connection with the establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court. Previously, two special com-
mittees of the General Assembly had painstakingly developed in 19512
and 19533 draft statutes for a permanent International Criminal
Court, but it had been tabled as a result of the "cold war." The only
other UN initiative was in 1980 when a draft statute for the establish-
ment of an international criminal jurisdiction to enforce the Apartheid
Convention 4 was proposed, but it too was left without follow-up.
2. While there was little hope for the prospects of an ICC between
1989 and 1992, a chain of events was set in motion when the UN Se-
* All rights reserved to the author. Printed from ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENALE, 13 NouvELLEs ETUDES PENALES 1997. Professor of Law, President, Inter-
national Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; President, International Asso-
ciation of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences; Vice-Chairman, UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court; Former Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international humanitarian
law in the Former Yugoslavia. The views expressed herein are solely the author's. The
research assistance of Daniel Mac Sweeney is acknowledged.
1. See Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22
(1996)[hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee].
2. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 - 31 Aug. 1951,
U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, annex I, UN Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951
ICC Draft Statute]. For a history of international efforts to establish an International
Criminal Court, see BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP To-
WARDS WORLD PEACE (1980).
3. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July - 20
Aug. 1953, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, annex, UN Doc. A/2645 (1954) [hereinaf-
ter 1953 Revised ICC Draft Statute].
4. DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO
IMPLEMENT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF Apartheid, Jan. 19, 1980, UN Doc. E/CN.411416 [hereinafter APARTHEID STAT-
urE]. The text, developed by this writer, is commented on in M. Cherif Bassiouni and
Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the establishment of an international criminal court for
the implementation of the Apartheid Convention and other relevant international instru-
ments, 9 HOFsTRA L. REv. 523.
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curity Council in Resolution 7805 established a Commission of Experts
to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the For-
mer Yugoslavia. 6 This was the first time since World War II that the
international community provided for the investigation of violators of
international humanitarian law. In its first Interim Report, the Com-
mission of Experts stated that the establishment of an ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunal would be "consistent with the direction of its
work."7 Recalling that report, the Security Council in Resolution 808
proceeded to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTFY).8 The Resolution stated that the Security
Council: "[diecidefd] that an international criminal tribunal shall be
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991[.] 9
The Security Council followed the same procedure in 1994 in con-
nection with the events in Rwanda, and established the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).10 The events in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda shocked the world out of its complacency and the idea of pros-
5. S.C. Res. 780, UN SCOR, 47th Year, 1992 S.C. Res. & Dec. at 36, para. 2, UN
Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
6. United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia. For the Commission's Final Report, see Final Report of the Com-
mission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) U.N.
SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/19941674 (May 27, 1994) and the Annexes to the Final Re-
port, U.N. Doc S/19941674/Add.2 (1994). For a description of the Commission's work, see
M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI, THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT To SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION .780: INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Occasional Paper No. 2, International Human Rights
Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law (1996).
7. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Feb.
9, 1993, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., para. 74, UN Dec S/25274 (1993), transmitting Interim
Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992).
8. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, UN Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) [hereinafter ICTFY]. For a Commentary on the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNi (wrrIH THE COLLABORATION OF PETER
MANIKAs), THE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLA-
VIA (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
9. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 8, para.1.
10. On the basis of the precedent of the Former Yugoslavia, the Security Council es-
tablished a similar Commission of Experts in S.C. Res. 935, UN SCOR, 49th Year,
3400th mtg., at 1, UN Dec. S/RES/935 (1994). That Commission did not, however, en-
gage in investigations and lasted only three months. The Security Council subsequently
set up a judicial mechanism for Rwanda with ties to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia in S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 1, UN
Doc. SIRES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. For a Commentary on the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, see Larry D. Johnson, The International Tribunal
for Rwanda, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr PENAL 211.
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ecuting those who committed international crimes acquired a broad
based support in world public opinion and in many governments.
3. Largely out of the 1989 initiative of Trinidad and Tobago, and
the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on the draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1 the General As-
sembly in resolution 47/33 of November 25, 1992, requested that the
(ILC) undertake the elaboration of a draft statute for a permanent In-
ternational Criminal Court. By the time that this draft was produced
in 1994, the climate in which it was viewed had changed significantly
due in large part to the tragic victimization in the Yugoslav and
Rwandan conflicts, and the fact that the Security Council had estab-
lished in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia 12 and in 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.' 3 In order to guide its work in drafting a statute for the ICC,
the ILC looked to international precedents. They are: the Nuremberg 14
and TokyoI5 tribunal statutes, the 195116 and 195317 ICC draft stat-
utes, the 1980 draft statute for the creation of an international crimi-
nal jurisdiction to enforce the Apartheid convention,"' the 1993 ICTFY
Statute,19 and the 1994 ICTR Statute.20
4. In 1994, the ILC completed a draft statute for an ICC and rec-
ommended to the General Assembly to call a conference of plenipoten-
tiaries "to study the draft statute and to conclude a convention on the
establishment of an international criminal court."21 However, the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly, at the instigation of States reluc-
tant to see the court come into being so rapidly, declined to call a dip-
lomatic conference as the ILC had requested. Instead, the General As-
sembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to review the ILC's 1994
11. Concerning the 1991 draft Code against the Peace and Security of Mankind, see
Commentaries on the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 11 Nouvelles 9tudes Pdnales (1993).
12. See generally BAssiouNi, supra note 8.
13. See generally Larry Johnson, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RwANDA, supra
note 10.
14. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (London Charter), signed at London, August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59
Stat.1544, E.A.S. No.472 (entered into force, Aug. 8, 1945), annex, Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).
15. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST PROCLAIMED AT TOKYO, Jan.
19, 1946, and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (entered into force Jan. 19, 1946),
ANNEX, CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAsT (Tokyo).
16. 1951 ICC Draft Statute, supra note 2.
17. 1953 Revised ICC Draft Statute, supra note 3.
18. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 9
NouvELLs 9TUDES PENALES (1993).
19. ICTFY Statute, supra note 8.
20. ICTR Statute, supra note 10.
21. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 46th session,
Official Records of the General Assembly, 49th Session, Suppl. No. 10, para. 90, A/49/10.
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draft statute.22 According to GA resolution 49/53 of 9 December 1994,
the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was: "to review the major sub-
stantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft statute pre-
pared by the International Law Commission and, in the light of that
review, to consider arrangements for the convening of an international
conference of plenipotentiaries." 23
The General Assembly hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee would
resolve the differences between States favoring the establishment of an
ICC and those who were opposed or reluctant to see this result in the
short term. The Ad Hoc Committee met for two sessions in 1995, but
failed to come to sufficient agreement to call a conference of plenipo-
tentiaries. However, these meetings had the positive effect of allowing
States to familiarize themselves with the issues involved in the crea-
tion of an International Criminal Court. The educational value pro-
duced by the work of the Ad Hoc Committee served a beneficial pur-
pose and led to the establishment of a Preparatory Committee in 1996
(PrepCom). The mandate of the 1996 PrepCom 24 was explicitly goal-
oriented. The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee discussed the principal ideas
that made the work of the 1996 PrepCom more specific. Consideration
of the benefits of the meetings of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee must be
tempered, however, with an acknowledgment of the difficulties that
still hinder elaboration of the draft statute. Proponents of the ICC
have had to face something of a constant effort to keep the process
moving forward. Due to the unfamiliarity of many with the important
topics involved, and the related desire of all parties to cast a court
which would be most useful, in their eyes, the process has sometimes
seemed to delay meaningful progress. Regarding the number of propos-
als that have been made by States and the fact that the PrepCom has
at times found it difficult to deal with them efficiently, it would proba-
bly be unfair to say that a purposeful war of attrition was being waged
by opponents of the court, nevertheless the costs that governments had
to bear in sending experts from capitals to long meetings in New York
was felt by many delegations.
5. Building the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the 1996 PrepCom
was mandated by the General Assembly:
to discuss further the major substantive and administrative issues
arising out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law
Commission and, taking into account the different views expressed
during the meetings, to draft texts, with a view to preparing a
widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an interna-
tional criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a con-
22. See G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., agenda item 137, UN Doc. A/RES/
49/53 (1994).
23. G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N GAOR, 50th Sess. agenda item 142, UN Doc. A/RES/50/46
(1995).
24. See infra.
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ference of plenipotentiaries, and [it was] also decide[ed] that the
work of the Preparatory Committee should be based on the draft
statute prepared by the International Law Commission and should
take into account the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and written
comments submitted by States . . . and, as appropriate, contribu-
tions of relevant organizations.25
As stated above, this mandate had a more specific, goal oriented
character and was therefore due progression from the earlier mandate
of the Ad Hoc Committee. The 1996 PrepCom did not, however, pro-
duce a "consolidated" text of a draft statute, and only succeeded in cre-
ating a report which compiled various proposals. On the basis on this
work, the 1996 PrepCom proposed to the General Assembly to con-
tinue its work with an enhanced mandate and meet for another nine
weeks in 1997-98 before a diplomatic conference could be held. With
all of this in mind, the 1996 PrepCom, in its report to the Sixth Com-
mittee stated: "recognizing that this is a matter for the General As-
sembly, . . . on the basis of its scheme of work, considers that it is re-
alistic to regard the holding of a diplomatic conference of
plenipotentiaries in 1998 as feasible."26
The weakness of the language in this recommendation is, however
troubling. The insistence by some delegations on the inclusion of a
footnote in the recommendations of the 1996 PrepCom reserving their
positions on its findings and its decision to move towards a diplomatic
conference in 1998 necessitates caution. The footnote states that:
"[slome delegations expressed reservations on the conclusions of the
Preparatory Committee and felt that these conclusions do not prejudge
the position of the States in the General Assembly."27
The lack of imperative to complete its work by April 1998 in the
language of the recommendation to the 1996 PrepCom raises concerns.
It raises the prospect that the 1997-98 PrepCom work could delay the
convening of the conference in June 1998. The wording of the General
Assembly resolution is not sufficiently peremptory to concentrate the
minds of delegates to bring the process to end by April 1998. This
prospect may offer opponents of the court a method by which to delay
the outcome. Nevertheless, the General Assembly's resolution is quite
specific.28 It mandates the 1997-98 PrepCom:
(a) to meet three or four times up to a total of 9 weeks before the dip-
lomatic conference. To organize its work so that it will finalize its work
in April of 1998 and so as to allow the widest possible participation of
States. The work should be done in the form of open-ended working
25. G.A. Res. 50/46, supra note 23, at para. 2.
26. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at para. 370.
27. Id. vol. 1, at 77, n.12.
28. Report of the Sixth Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., agenday item 147, UN Doc. A/51/627 (1996). This res-
olution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1996.
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groups, concentrating on the negotiation of proposals with a view of
producing a widely acceptable draft consolidated text of a convention,
to be submitted to the diplomatic conference. No simultaneous meet-
ings of the Working Groups shall be held. The working groups should
be fully transparent and should be by general agreement to secure the
universality of the convention. Submission of reports of its debates will
not be required. Interpretation and translation services will be availa-
ble to the working groups.
(b) The subjects to be dealt with by the Preparatory Committee are:
1. List and definition and elements of crimes
2. Principles of criminal law and penalties
3. Organization of the court
4. Procedures
5. Complementarity and trigger mechanism
6. Cooperation with States
7. Establishment of the ICC and relationship with the UN
8. Final clauses and financial matters
9. Other matters
The renewed mandate of the 1997-98 PrepCom is a more positive,
goal oriented statement than that of the 1996 PrepCom, and it en-
hances the prospects for successful progression to the negotiation stage
of the process. 29
6. It must be emphasized that all the language necessary for the
creation of an acceptable consolidated statute has been adopted in the
1996 General Assembly resolution. At this stage, a genuine and disci-
plined drafting effort is necessary in 1997-98 in order to fully exploit
the opportunities offered by the General Assembly's positive mandate
to the PrepCom. As explained below, limited member drafting groups
would be a positive way to allow focussing on creation of an acceptable
text. However, the fact that the General Assembly resolution refers to
the use of open-ended working groups means that a more diversified
effort must be made to avoid the shortcomings that have been in evi-
dence in the 1996 PrepCom. To this end, the role of the chairs of the
working groups is vital, as is the role of the Bureau. A positive and
genuine drafting effort to consolidate the various proposals is, there-
fore, required.
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
7. A successful drafting undertaking of this nature is not easily
achieved with open-ended multiple working groups. Problems have
hindered this process in the past, such as: lack of broader participation
due to under-representation of Member-States; the fact that some dele-
gations have only one representative who has responsibilities broader
than the ICC alone, and therefore cannot be adequately prepared to
29. Id.
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deal with all the technical issues that must be addressed by the work-
ing groups; and the fact that some delegations lack sufficient expertise
in the the complexities of the subject matter.
8. While a limited and fixed membership for each working group
would be the most efficient method to produce within a relatively short
period of time, a satisfactory text, equivalent results must be achieved
using the broader system envisaged by the 1996 resolution. So far, the
work of the 1996 PrepCom has been on the basis of open participation
to all member States, and all decisions have been made by consensus.
That process has been important as a method of exchanging views and
clarifying issues. But it has not been effective as a drafting process.
The forthcoming 1997-1998 PrepCom must therefore change focus,
method, and speed of work. This will depend on the dynamics of each
working group and on the choice and expertise, as to subject matter, of
the working groups' chairs.
9. It should also be noted that some Member-States, particularly
among the less developed countries, may not be represented at the
1997-98 PrepCom, due to their lack of sufficient personnel and due to
the costs of attending the PrepCom. The absence of these governments'
delegations at the PrepCom is deleterious to the objective of making
this effort truly universal. It will also make it more difficult at a later
time, to induce these governments to become parties to the Convention
establishing the ICC. Thus, some efforts should be made to ensure the
participation of these governments through contributions to the special
fund which the 1996 resolution for the establishment of an ICC re-
quests the Secretary-General to establish for that purpose.30
10. To avoid some of the difficulties that have affected the
PrepCom and the Ad Hoc Committee, the chair's proposed plan is to
have two working groups each day but alternating between morning
and afternoon so that governments with small delegations can partici-
pate in all working groups and so that all working groups will have si-
multaneous interpretation.
11. The Chair's latest informally proposed schedule is as follows: 31
SESSION 1 - FEBRUARY 10-21, 1997
30. 1996 Sixth Committee Report, supra note 28, at para. 7.
31. This working programme for the first two sessions of the PrepCom was circu-
lated by the Chairman to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations on November
15, 1996. As is customary, it is a draft, and will be proposed to the Plenary for its ap-
proval. The working program for the third session of 1997 is still under consideration.
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Week 1 Opening with a plenary meeting
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Sessions Afternoon Sessions
-List and definitions and elements of -Principles of criminal law and
crimes, penalties.
Week 2
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-List and definitions and elements of -Principles of criminal law and
crimes. penalties.
-Procedures (if time permits).
Closing session in a plenary meeting.
SESSION 2 - AUGUST 4-15, 1997
Week 1 Opening with a plenary meeting in Week 1
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-Complementarity and trigger -Procedures
mechanisms.
Week 2
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-Complementarity and trigger -Procedures
mechanisms.
-Organization of the Court.
III. CATEGORIES OF DRAFTING ISSUES
12. The drafting issues facing the 1997-98 PrepCom fall into three
categories. They are:
(a) Parts of the Statute involving technical and substantially
technical issues;
(b) Parts of the Statute involving a mix of political judgments
and technical issues; and
(c) Parts of the Statute involving political judgments.
Each one of these parts presents a different set of problems and draft-
ing progress. Each one of these parts will, therefore, have to be dealt
with in such a way as to address those differences. Following is an as-
sessment of the expected progress on the various parts of the statute,
in light of the experiences of the 1996 PrepCom, and based on the
above three categories of drafting issues.
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A. Parts Involving Technical and Substantially Technical Issues
1. Rules of Procedure and Evidence
32
13. At the second session of the 1996 PrepCom an informal work-
ing group was established. It used a text presented by Australia and
the Netherlands 33 as a basis for its work. The working group then re-
ceived a significantly large number of additional proposals and amend-
ments and this caused that part of the text to become unmanageable.
A different approach is however needed in 1997-98 because the goal is
not to produce a comprehensive code of criminal procedure and evi-
dence with extensive details. Instead, the approach should be to de-
velop in the statute, general principles of procedure and evidence,
while an annex could contain more detailed provisions. The annex
would expressly have the character of guidelines, and hence not be
deemed of the same order as the rest of the Statute. Equally, the Stat-
ute could provide that this annex could be amended by the Committee
of States Parties on the recommendation of the ICC. This approach
would also open the way for the ICC to develop rules of court to sup-
plement the rules of procedure and evidence on the basis of the ICC's
future experience. Since Rules of Court would be subject to the ap-
proval of the Committee of States Parties, there should be no appre-
hension that the ICC would act with total independence on such a
quasi-legislative undertaking. This approach would make the 1997-98
PrepCom's work on this part of the Statute more fruitful.
14. In 1997-98 this working group would benefit from the partici-
pation of delegates with specific expertise in comparative criminal pro-
cedure, and with an understanding of the particularities of interna-
tional criminal investigations and prosecution of international criminal
cases.
2. Organization of the Court"
15. Some progress was achieved on this part at the second session
of the 1996 PrepCom. An examination of the written proposals and re-
32. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 47-61, vol. II,
at 150-234.
33. Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 12 - 30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.249/L.2
(1996). A meeting was held July 11-13, 1996, at the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences which was attended by 34 experts acting in their individ-
ual capacities from 20 countries. These experts were delegates to the 1997 Prep Com.
The meeting was also attended by NGO observers. Three texts were produced and are
referred to hereinafter. The draft text on Rules of Procedure and Evidence was prepared
by Australia and presented to the July 1996 Siracusa group of experts. On the basis of
observations and discussions during that meeting, Australia updated the text and sub-
mitted it to the Second Session where an informal working group was established to re-
view it as well as other submissions.
34. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 11-15, vol. II,
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view of the oral statements made by delegations at the 1996 PrepCom
indicates that most of the delegations' intended textual proposals have
been made. This should therefore expedite the work of that working
group in 1997. Some basic issues however may not be fully resolved in
1997 because of their political judgments content. The 1997 delegates
may not have sufficient instructions from their governments to make
such judgments or they may be instructed to defer these choices to a
later time, including possibly the diplomatic conference. This situation
could delay reaching a consensus on this part, but without necessarily
delaying the drafting which could have alternative bracketed texts.
These issues include: (a) the number of judges and the method of their
appointment; (b) the qualifications and method of appointing the pros-
ecutor; (c) the permanent presence of all judges at the seat of the
Court; (d) the role and powers of what the ILC's 1994 draft refers to as
"The Presidency;" (e) the enactment of rules of court; and (f) (which is
probably the most important of all these issues) the role and responsi-
bilities of the Committee of States Parties. The question of the Com-
mittee of States Parties has not yet been adequately addressed by the
1995 Ad Hoc Committee and the 1996 PrepCom. It is further dis-
cussed below at paragraphs 36 and 37. The above issues, with the ex-
ception of (f), have a lower political judgment content than other issues
discussed below and thus, it may be possible to make significant pro-
gress in 1997-98 on this part.
16. The International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul Uni-
versity has prepared a study into the Financial and Administrative
Implications of the ICC which follows in this publication. This study is
based on the experiences of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, and
the Commissions of Experts that preceded them. The facts and figures
presented are based on the discussions of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee
and the 1996 PrepCom.
17. In this context, it is necessary to mention one further issue
which has not yet been dealt with by the 1996 PrepCom. This is
whether the appeals chamber of the Tribunal will give a single, col-
legiate judgment, or whether each judge will have the right to give his
or her own separate opinion, including dissenting or concurring opin-
ions with the majority. The detrimental consequences of a relatively
large number of broadly dissenting opinions is well illustrated by the
effect which the appeal decisions in the Tadic35 case before the ICTFY
had on the jurisprudence of that Tribunal. The disparity between the
various appeal judge's conclusions, and between the arguments which
they used to reach those conclusions, did not serve well the develop-
ment of a coherent jurisprudential basis for the Tribunal. If the juris-
at 7-54.
35. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72 (2 Oct 1995), Decision of
the Appeals Chamber on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, 1996.
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prudence of the ICC is to become similarly fractured due to the num-
ber and diversity of opinions given by the members of its appeals
chamber, this could create difficulties for the development of interna-
tional criminal law. Alternatively, the argument can be made that a
plurality of opinions helps to develop the law of the system. With this
in mind, it is proposed that the appeals chamber initially give single,
collegiate judgments, but once the Committee of States Parties is satis-
fied that the jurisprudence has developed sufficiently, it can decide to
allow individual dissenting and concurring opinions. This question
should be reviewed by the Committee of States Parties after the first
five years of the ICC's existence.
3. General Principles of Criminal Law36
18. Progress has been made at the second session of the 1996
PrepCom by the informal working group on this part which relied es-
sentially on a text submitted by Canada. 37 Several other exhaustive
proposals have been made by France and Japan, and it is not likely
that new proposals of a substantially different nature will be made in
1997-98. That working group will however face some difficult doctrinal
legal questions and will need to bridge the gaps between different le-
gal systems. A balance between legal and diplomatic expertise which
will allow progress on that specialized issue will be needed on that
working group. Some substantive legal issues pertaining to this part
will however depend on the resolution of certain political judgment is-
sues and the working group would have to prepare some alternate
bracketed texts. The major issues that are likely to arise are in con-
nection with: (a) recognition of penal judgments; (b) double jeopardy or
non bis in idem; (c) the mental element for each of the four crimes
presently deemed to be within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court;
and (d) penalties.
19. As to issues concerning (a) and (b), the relevant textual provi-
sions will depend on political judgment issues concerning "complemen-
tarity" and the relationship of the ICC to national criminal jurisdic-
tions, and more particularly whether the ICC will have "primacy" in
that relationship. The two issues needing particular attention are: (c)
the mental element and (d) penalties. As to (c) the mental element, it
seems necessary to develop not only generally applicable provisions,
but also specific provisions on the mental element required for each of
36. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 41-47, vol. II,
at 79-104.
37. Applicable Law and General Principle of Law: Working Paper Submitted by Ca-
nada, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 12-30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.249/L.4.
The draft Canadian text was presented at the July Siracusa meeting of experts where it
was discussed. Canada then made the appropriate changes based on the Siracusa discus-
sions and submitted the text at the second session.
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the crimes within the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC. This is necessi-
tated by the diversity of these crimes and their peculiarities in light of
their history and development. Furthermore, as to the four crimes
presently contemplated to be within the inherent jurisdiction of the
ICC, the particularized mental element as to each of these crimes
should also distinguish between what is required for decision-makers
and what is required for executors, down to the lowest echelons of the
chain of command.
20. As to (d) penalties, the Statute should contain principles and
guidelines for penalties, leaving to the ICC the initiative of proposing
specific penalties provisions to the Committee of States Parties for ap-
proval, within the basic principles and guidelines set forth in the Stat-
ute. That will facilitate the 1997-98 PrepCom's task and at the same
time insure a more reflective and deliberate set of penalties which will
have the benefit of the ICC's expertise.
21. Because of the highly technical nature of this part, the work-
ing group should avoid ambiguous textual language, which may pro-
duce acceptable compromise results at the 1997-98 PrepCom but which
would, because of their lack of precision, create future difficulties. The
more this working group accomplishes, the less burden will fall on the
diplomatic conference which will be more concerned with other issues
involving political judgments and may not, therefore, be adequately
prepared to deal with the complicated technical issues presented by
this part. Notwithstanding the above, this working group is antici-
pated to proceed well and to produce a text with bracketed provisions
for unresolved questions.
22. There are a number of other issues that should be mentioned
at this point. The 1996 PrepCom has accepted the position that the
ICC's jurisdiction will be solely prospective. This is a major concession
which may create the impression that the four core crimes of the ICC's
jurisdiction are not punishable before the establishment of the ICC.
Such a perception would be incorrect, and would seriously undermine
the efforts of some states to prosecute violators within their own na-
tional legal systems. Hence, it would be useful to include a provision in
the statute to avoid the implications of an interpretation that would
lead to the conclusion that past violators cannot be prosecuted before
national tribunals.
23. Another danger to be avoided is the implication that statutes
of limitation can apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. This is contrary to the 1968 UN Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity,3 8 and the 1974 European Convention on the Non-
38. United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 6, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68
(entered into force Nov. 11, 1970).
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Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes.m Therefore, it must be clear that while the ICC will
only deal with crimes which occur after its establishment; it does not
imply that national legal systems cannot prosecute such crimes under
the theory of universality or other theories, or that statutes of limita-
tions can apply to genocide, crimes against humanity and to war
crimes. Indeed these are crimes contemplated to be within the inher-
ent jurisdiction of the ICC, are jus cogens and create obligations erga
omnes.
B. Parts Involving Substantially Mixed Political and Technical Issues
1. Rules of Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance 4°
24. While this part appears to be essentially technical, and it is, it
nonetheless depends on a fundamental political judgment concerning
the relationship of the ICC to States Parties and to other States. If the
Court is deemed to have "primacy" over national systems (like the
ICTFY41 and the ICTR42), the framework of cooperation will be sub-
stantially different than if the ICC is deemed to be the equivalent of
any other State engaging in bilateral relations. One of the proposals
currently before the PrepCom concerning the relationship between the
ICC and States Parties places the ICC at the same level as any State
engaging in bilateral relations with another State concerning inter-
state cooperation in penal matters. That approach presents serious
problems of enforcement for the ICC. It must be emphasized that in
order for the ICC to be effective it should have "primacy" on the basis
of the provisions of the Statute.
25. The 1996 PrepCom established an informal working group on
this part and considered a text submitted by South Africa and
Lesotho.4 Understandably, this working group did not resolve the po-
litical judgment question raised above which affects the overall struc-
ture of this part and it is unlikely that the 1997-98 PrepCom will be
able to do so. However, if the drafting continues on the premise that
the ICC does not have "primacy" over the national legal systems of the
States Parties, it will make the whole scheme of cooperation only as
39. European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82.
40. See Report of the Preparatoty Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 68-74, vol. II,
at 245-85.
41. ICTFY Statute, supra note 8, art. 9.
42. ICTR Statute, supra note 10, arts. 8 & 9.
43. International Cooperation and Judicial (Mutual) Assistance: Working Paper Sub-
mitted by South Africa and Lesotho, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 12-30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/L.5. The draft of that text was prepared for the July 1996
Siracusa meeting of experts where it was discussed. Thereafter, South Africa made the
appropriate changes and the text was presented at the Prep Corn's Second Session.
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good as the national laws and practices of each State Party (since the
Court would have to go through the procedures of each State Party in
accordance with the laws of each State Party). If this approach
prevails, it may turn out to be the Achilles Heel of the ICC. Some new
and imaginative ideas are therefore necessary in order to avoid the
sensitivity expressed by some governments concerning the "primacy"
approach reflected in the Statutes of the ICTFY" and ICTR45 and yet
avoid placing the ICC in a subordinate position to national legal sys-
tems. The working group should, therefore, prepare alternative texts
in brackets to allow the Diplomatic Conference to make an easy selec-
tion so that the Diplonatic Conference does not have to engage in pro-
longed drafting that would repeat the discussions of the 1996, and pre-
sumably the 1997-98 PrepCom's work, thus delaying its conclusion.
C. Parts Involving Political Judgments
1. Nature of the ICC4
26. The ICC is to be an international treaty-created body. The
Convention will govern the relations of the new institution and State
Parties, as well as the relations between the ICC and the UN. This
seems to be a policy choice which may not necessarily be the best one
to make. The benefits of establishing an international criminal justice
system as an integral part of the United Nations system, such as the
International Court of Justice, outweigh all the perceived negative im-
plications of the UN's bureaucracy and its present financial difficulties.
But that policy choice which emerged from the deliberations of the Ad
Hoc Committee and the 1996 PrepCom may hopefully still be subject
to reconsideration, although that prospect appears doubtful.
2. Naming47
27. The ICC should more appropriately be named the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal because the Court is the adjudicating or judi-
cial organ of the institution. To refer to the Court as the entire institu-
tion and also to the Court as the judicial organ within the institution
can create unnecessary confusion. This was the Choice of the Security
Council when it established the ICTFY and the ICTR.
44. See ICTFY Statute, supra note 8, art. 9 (which provides for primacy).
45. See ICTR statute, supra note 8, arts. 8 & 9 (which provide for primacy).
46. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 8-9, vol. II, at 3-6.
47. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute International Criminal Tribu-
nal, 9 & 10 NOUVELLES 9TUDES PENALES (1993).
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3. Relationship between the ICC and National Jurisdictions8
28. The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee 49 and 1996 PrepCom ° selected
the term "complementarity" to characterize the nature of the ICC and
its relationship to national legal systems. This term is an English
transposition of the French term complementaritg. But to know the ori-
gin of that term does not necessarily contribute to the clarity of its
meaning, nor the specificity of its import. Some see it as jurisdiction-
sharing concept to be amplified, such as the Maastricht Treaty l con-
cept of "subsidiarity" which does not detract from the primacy of the
Treaty of European Union. Others see the term "complementarity" as
meaning that the ICC can be seized with a matter only after national
jurisdictions have agreed to it or whenever said jurisdictions are una-
ble to act fairly and effectively. Complementarity should not however
be interpreted in a way that places the ICC in a subsidiary position to
national criminal justice systems. To do so might frustrate the pur-
poses and work of the ICC.
29. There are four core international crimes which are to be the
ICC's inherent subject-matter jurisdiction:52 "aggression;" "genocide;"
"crimes against humanity;" and "war crimes." These are crimes that af-
fect or have the potential of affecting the peace and security of human-
kind, that shock the universal human conscience, and that are deemed
part of jus cogens. Prosecuting violators of these crimes is therefore as
much the separate task of States as it is the collective task of the in-
ternational community. Such prosecutions and the enforcement of judi-
cial orders and judgments inherent thereto will require the action and
cooperation of all States Parties. Thus, these crimes are best suited to
be within the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC, even if national jurisdic-
tions are given, whenever appropriate, the opportunity to act. In this
respect, the formula adopted in the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY)s3 in Articles 9 and 10,
constitutes one of the models to draw upon.54 Quite clearly, the ques-
tion of primacy of the ICC, and how it is to be exercised, has to be
resolved.
30. "Complementarity" is a useful concept to draw upon in deter-
mining the relationship of the ICC and national legal institutions, but
48. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 36-41, vol. II, at
55-78.
49. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 6-10, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
[hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
50. See UN Doc. A/51/22, supra note 1.
51. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuROPAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.(C 224) 191 (1992).
52. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 49; see also Report of the Pre-
paratory Committee, supra note 1.
53. UN Doc. SJRES/835.
54. See generally BASSiOUNI, supra note 8.
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it is not useful in respect of the relationship between the ICC and the
Security Council. Indeed, the Council may refer matters to the ICC,
and may be called upon to enforce ICC decisions. Thus, the relation-
ship between the ICC and the Security Council must necessarily be ar-
ticulated on a different basis than that on which the relationship be-
tween the ICC and the national jurisdiction is established. However,
this does not exclude a differentiated approach concerning each crime.
That differentiated approach should be reflected in the Jurisdictional
Triggering Mechanisms.55
31. States Parties to the convention establishing an ICC will have
to cede some jurisdiction to the ICC, and to give effect to the orders
and judgments of the Court. Jurisdictional cession and the recognition
of orders and judgments of an international judicial organ by domestic
legal orders will depend on national constitutions' limitations and
other aspects of national ordre public. But this should not be a way by
which to stifle the work and judgments of the ICC. Furthermore, there
should not be any significant disparity in the relationship between the
ICC and each and every State Party. Otherwise, the ICC's judgemnts
and orders will lack uniformity of enforcement and that will affect the
fairness and effectiveness of the system as a whole.
32. Some member-States may deem the ICC an extension of their
own national judicial systems. Others can characterize it as an alter-
native judicial body or another forum to which cases can be ceded to or
transferred as in the model of the European Convention on Transfer of
proceedings in Criminal Matters. 56 Each State Party will have to ac-
commodate its participation in this new international judicial system
in a manner that is more consonant with the requirements of its own
national legal system, but without sacrifice to the equal and fair treat-
ment of ICC judgments.
4. Definition of the Crimes57
33. On the basis of the Ad Hoc Committee's Report58 and the 1996
PrepCom Report,59 the following appears to be the likelihood of the
1997-98 PrepCom's direction.
Aggression - Whether aggression is included, how it is defined, and
whether only the Security Council will be able to refer a situation in-
55. See infra.
56. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 1972,
73 European Treaty Series. See Ekkehart Muller-Rappard, The European System, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
57. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987).
58. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 49.
59. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1.
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volving aggression to the ICC is an essentially political judgment ques-
tion which is so far not entirely resolved.
Irrespective of the policy question about its inclusion as a crime
within the ICC's inherent jurisdiction, "aggression" needs to be de-
fined. The 1974 General Assembly consensus resolution 6° can be a ba-
sis for the definition, but it is clearly unsatisfactory with respect to
providing the necessary elements required by the principles of legality,
and individual as opposed to State responsibility. Thus, this category
of crimes will require the greatest attention and work in the formula-
tion of its definition and legal elements. At the First Session of the
1996 PrepCom, a chairman's text was presented with the Bureau's full
support, and certain delegations added proposals which appear in a
compiled text in the 1996 PrepCom Report.61
Genocide - It seems settled that Genocide will be part of the ICC's in-
herent jurisdiction and that it will be defined as stated in Article 2 of
the 1948 Genocide Convention. 62 But that definition nonetheless has
several flaws: (i) it does not include social and political groups among
those protected; (ii) the genocidal acts protecting a certain group seem
to address only an entire homogenous group and do not specifically
cover groups within a group (for example, the intellectual elite); (iii)
the specific intent requirement makes its proof very difficult and it
seems geared only to perpetrators who are part of the highest echelons
of the decision-making process; and (iv) there is no stated intent re-
quirement for perpetrators who carry out superiors' orders that result
in or are part of a policy or plan to commit genocide.
Notwithstanding the above, the 1996 PrepCom's discussions re-
vealed a reluctance to alter the terms of Article 2 of the Genocide Con-
vention6 and it is unlikely to change in 1997. But some language in
the Commentary or in some other text could allow the ICC's jurispru-
dence to fill these legislative gaps in light of the law and jurisprudence
of the ICTFY and ICTR.
Crimes Against Humanity" - It also seems settled that this category
of international crimes will be part of the ICC's inherent jurisdiction.
Its definition is not, however, settled. Article 6(c) of the IMT6 and 5(c)
IMTFE6 6 define that category of crimes as does Article 5 of the
60. See Generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin Ferencz, The Crime Against
Peace, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRImINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
61. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1.
62. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1 UN GAOR Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946).
63. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, at 17.
64. See generally M. CHERiF BAssIouNi, CRIMEs AGAINST HuMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRImiNAL LAW (1992).
65. 82 U.N.T.S. 279, supra note 14.
66. T.IA.S. No. 1589, supra note 15.
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ICTFY67 and Article 3 of the ICTR s."6 All four definitions vary slightly
however, and all four of them have some general and vague terms that
need to be clarified. The following concerns have been raised in 1995
and 1996 need to be addressed: (i) rape and sexual assault should be
specifically included (as in the case of Article 5 of ICTFY); (ii) "exter-
mination," "deportation" and "enslavement" need to be clarified; (iii)
"other inhumane acts" needs to be clarified or narrowed to mean noth-
ing more than an interpretation ejusdem generis; (iv) the mental ele-
ment has to be specified with a distinction between decision-makers
and executors (preferably in the same way as with the intent require-
ments for "genocide," though bearing in mind that "crimes against hu-
manity" presently requires a general intent and not a specific intent
for all categories of perpetrators).
At the First Session of the 1996 PrepCom a Chairman's draft was
introduced with full support of the Bureau. Several delegations made
additional proposals. The compiled text appears in Volume II of the
1996 PrepCom Report. But the divergences between these proposals
need to be reconciled.
Notwithstanding the problems raised above, "crimes against hu-
manity" and the articulation of its elements do not pose any difficult
drafting problems and could be accomplished with relative ease.
War Crimes6 9 - The deliberations of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee and
the 1996 PrepCom revealed that the ILC's attempted distinction be-
tween "serious crimes against the laws and customs of war" and "grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention" was not felicitous. The so-called
"Law of the Hague" and "Law of Geneva" are in some respects so inter-
twined that it is neither appropriate nor feasible to make the type of
distinction made by the ILC, particularly since that category of crimes
is aimed at providing a comprehensive definition on the basis of which
combatants may face international criminal prosecution. "War Crimes"
must therefore be an appropriate combination of the "Law of Geneva"
and the "Law of the Hague" in connection with conflicts of an interna-
tional character and conflicts of a non-international character. This
includes:
(i) "grave breaches" of the 1949 Conventions and Protocol 1,70 as
well as violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions 71
67. SC Res. 808, supra note 8.
68. SC Res. 935, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
69. See generally HOwARD LEViE, TERRORiSM AND WAR CrMEs.
70. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
UN.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
71. Common Article 3 to: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No.1), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 US.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention of the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No.II),
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and Protocol 11.72
(ii) whether to define the customary law of armed conflicts in some
general terms, adding some specifics, or alternatively to make only
make a general reference to the laws and customs of war with
some specifics as in the case of ICTFY73 Articles 2 & 3. But that
approach may violate the principles of legality in many legal sys-
tems. Thus, a well-defined provision is more advisable than a gen-
eral statement purporting to incorporate by reference the custom-
ary law of armed conflicts. In either case, that part of the "war
crimes" provision will necessarily be more general than the provi-
sion dealing with the "Law of Geneva," and thus less responsive to
the requirements of legality in some States.
5. Jurisdictional Triggering Mechanisms for the Four Core
Crimes within the Inherent Jurisdiction of the ICC
34. On the assumption that a diversified approach is elected by
the 1997 PrepCom, the following may be considered:
(a) Aggression: The Security Council and a State Party may refer a
situation to the ICC for investigation by the Prosecutor and determi-
nation of whether a person may be prosecuted for such a crime. The
Prosecutor may refer a given individual case if it is deemed to be in
the best interests of justice, but subject to the approval of the Indict-
ment Chamber. If a case is pending before a national criminal jurisdic-
tion, at the request of the Prosecutor, the Indictment Chamber would
either ask a State to defer to it the investigation or prosecution of such
a crime. However, such a procedure would not be allowed if the situa-
tion was initiated by the Prosecutor without the Council's approval.
There should also be textual language in the Statute designed to avoid
conflict between the ICC, the Security Council, and the ICJ.
(b) Genocide: Initiation of the prosecutorial phase can be by a
State Party or the Security Council and also by any State Party to the
Genocide Convention. Deferral procedure and waiver of ICC jurisdic-
tion would be the same as for "Aggression."
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: Same as for "Genocide."
(d) War Crimes: Same as for "Genocide" and "Crimes Against Hu-
manity," but with the added formula that State Parties whose armed
forces are part of a UN or regional organization multinational force, or
are on a peace-keeping force sanctioned by the Security Council or any
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 US.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No.III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 UN.T.S.
135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (Ge-
neva Convention No.IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.TS. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1997).
73. UN Doc. SIRES808, supra note 8.
1997
DENV. J. INVL L. & POL'Y
other regional organization are first subject to the jurisdiction of the
national military justice of that State under whose flag the alleged
perpetrator acted. Additionally, if the individual legislation is not part
of the policy, a consistent practice of the armed forces to which the ac-
cused belonged, the national military justice system would have pri-
macy. The only exception would be wherever the national military jus-
tice system of that State is demonstrably unable or unwilling to act. In
this case, the Prosecutor can request the Indictment Chamber to act
before the ICC.
6. Institutional Relations Issues
35. There are two issues that arise in this context:
a. The role of the Committee of States Parties
36. The structure of the 1979 draft statute to enforce the
Apartheid Convention 74 envisaged the inclusion of a Committee of
State Parties. In article XVIII of the statute, it is referred to as the
'Standing-Committee.7 5 This body had a role in electing officials, deter-
mining the annual budget, ensuring compliance with court judge-
ments, and conducting general administrative oversight. The 1992 In-
ternational Law Commission Report on the creation of an
international criminal court draft statute included a similar body. It
was left out of the ILC's 1994 draft statute in an attempt to distin-
guish the ICC statute from that of the Apartheid Convention. In the
Updated Siracusa Draft,76 Proposed Article 5(e) envisages "a standing
Committee of States Parties" as one of the Articles of the ICC. Pro-
posed Article C creates a Standing Committee of States Parties con-
sisting of one member for each of the States Parties, electing officers
by a simple majority, and meeting at least two times each year for at
least a week each time. Regarding the role of the Committee in the
Updated Siracusa Draft:
Article 4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform
the functions expressly assigned to it under this Convention, plus
any other functions that it determines appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Tribunal that are not inconsistent with the
Convention, but in no way shall those functions impair the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Court [Tribunal] as a judicial body.
74. APARThEiD STATuTE, supra note 4.
75. Id. art. XVIII.
76. In June 1995, a group of experts acting in their individual capacity convened at
the International Institute of Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences (ISISC - Siracusa)
to contribute alternative and supplemental text to the International Law Commission's
1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. The outcome of the meeting was
the 'Updated Siracusa Draft' which was presented to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See also 9 & 10 NOuvELLES 9TUDES
PENALES with translation into French and Spanish.
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Article 5. In particular, the Standing Committee may:
a. offer to mediate disputes between States Parties relating to the
functions of the Tribunal;
b. encourage States to accede to the Convention; and
c. propose to States Parties international instruments to enhance
the functions of the Tribunal.
Article 6. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation
representatives of States Parties that have failed to provide financial
support for the Tribunal as required by this Statute or States Parties
that failed to carry out their obligations under this Statute
Article 7. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case
presented for adjudication to a chamber of the Court, the Standing
Committee may be seized with a mediation and conciliation petition.
In that case, the Standing Committee shall within 60 days decide on
granting or denying that petition, from which decision there is no ap-
peal. In the event that the Standing Committee grants the petition,
Court proceedings shall be stayed until such time as the Standing
Committee concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but not for
more than one year except by stipulation of the parties and with the
consent of the Court.
37. The role that the committee had in the 1992 ILC draft statute
structure has not been adequately filled in the 1994 ILC model. In or-
der to properly and effectively deal with the relevant issues, the com-
mittee should be re-established in the structure before the end of the
PrepCom sessions. There is an potential problem to be settled in re-
gard to the committee of States Parties and the law of treaties. The
statute should clarify the binding nature of decisions of the committee,
even with regard to such things as the possible adoption of new treaty
crimes into the jurisdiction of the court in the future. Were a negative
vote in the Committee of States Parties to be interpreted as equivalent
to a treaty reservation, this would lead to unnecessary problems in ju-
risdiction over international or transnational crime.
b. The relationship of the ICC to the UN
38. It is far more beneficial to have the ICC as a separate body
but part of the UN system, as opposed to a completely unrelated body
with a treaty relationship to the UN. Neither the implications of the
choice at hand or the nature of the relationship have been adequately
discussed by the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee or the 1996 PrepCom. Be-
cause this is such a complex issue there is a danger in relegating it to
the end of the 1997-98 PrepCom's work. Early discussion with senior
UN officials to ascertain the method and means by which either of
these options could be implemented is therefore necessary.
1997
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
c. Financing the ICC77
39. This issue has been briefly addressed by the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee and the 1996 PrepCom. Three options can be identified from these
discussions. The first is that the budget of the Court should come di-
rectly from the regular budget of the UN. But that depends on the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal's relationship to the UN. The arguments
used to support this position are that this would give the new institu-
tion a definite and dependable source of finance, and would avoid the
problems that other directly financed bodies have faced. It would also
encourage more States to ratify the Statute of the court, as there
would be no significant financial cost involved. The second option is
that the Court be funded directly by the States Parties either on a pro-
rata basis, or on the basis of some other assessment system such as
the UN assessment formula, where each member pays according to the
size of their economy, or the International Postal Union assessment
formula where assessments are calculated on the basis of a number of
categories of States (e.g., five), with each category receiving an increas-
ing number of shares, on the basis of which they pay a proportion of
the budget. The latter system is advocated on the basis that it allows
the size of the economy of a State to be taken into account, but pre-
vents overdependence on any single contributor. Proponents of the tier
system also argue that the precarious state of UN finances means that
it could not properly support the ICC. The third proposal is a form of
combination of the previous two approaches. There have been many
proposals regarding different forms of combination. There is general
support for a mechanism by which voluntary contributions can be
made to the coffers of the court in order to augment the regular in-
come. Some have argued that the complainant State should be re-
quired to pay some of the costs of any case that results from their
complaint, but there has been widespread disapproval of this. There
has also been the proposal that the Security Council budget pay for
any case that it brings to the court. The PrepCom should deal with
this issue bearing in mind the needs of the Court, or at least reduce
the broad proposals which have been made to bracketed texts which
can then be dealt with at the conference of diplomats.
IV. CONCLUSION
40. A number of delegations have also met regularly during the
1996 PrepCom sessions, and once inter-sessionally. This group of dele-
gations which is known as the "like-minded States" have been a signif-
icant driving force behind the ICC's momentum. Their contributions
77. See generally Daniel Mac Sweeney, Prospects for the financing of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Discussion paper of the World Federalist Movement, UNI NGO.
See also Thomas Warrick, Organization of the International Criminal Court: Administra-
tive and Financial Implications, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLY'333.
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have been effective and constructive. This group, which has benefitted
from the hospitality of the Canadian mission, has been growing in
number. At the November meeting of the Sixth Committee, it included:
Australia, Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Den-
mark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Lesotho, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sa-
moa, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago (representing 12 Caricon States), Uruguay, and Venezuela. Par-
ticipation by other delegations is expected to increase in 1997-98.
41. Significant progress that has been made since the ILC
presented its draft 1994 statute. Non-Governmental Organizations,
and particularly the 'NGO Coalition for an ICC'78 have played an im-
portant and useful part in the process. Their contributions have taken
the form of aiding the PrepCom through publishing expert NGO pa-
pers which contributed to a deeper understanding of the issues, and
78. NGO Coalition for an ICC participating organizations as of November 1996 are:
African Law Students - Young Lawyers Association, All Saints Newman Center, AL-
TERLAW, American Bar Association, Amnesty International, Avocats Sans Frontieres,
B'nai B'rith International, Baha'i International Community, Campaign for Tibet, Cana-
dian Network for an International Criminal Court, Carter Center, Center for Civil
Human Rights, Center for develoment of International Law, Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy, Center for UN Reform Education, Center for Women's Global Leader-
ship, Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations, Counselling and Mediation Center,
Crusade Against Violence, Drug Free Society, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights,
Equality Now, European Law Students Association, European Peace Movement, Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church in America, Federation Internationale des Ligues Droits de
1'Hommes, FN-Forbundet/Danish UNA, Global Policy Forum, Guatemala Human Rights
Commission/USA, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Human Rights Internet, Human Rights
Watch, Humanitarian Law Center, International Law Association (US Branch) Commit-
tee on an International Criminal Court, Institute for the study of Genocide, Istituto
Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali, Interkeekelyk Vredesberaad, Interna-
tional Bar Association, International Commission of Jurists, International Human
Rights Law Group, International Human Rights Law Institute - DePaul University
School of Law, International Indian Treaty Council, International League for Human
Rights, International Service for Human Rights, International Society for Human
Rights, International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, International Committee for
the Convention against Microwave Weapons, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, League of Human Rights, Legal Aid for Women
and Environmental Development, Leo Kuper Foundation, Manobik Unnayan Parishad,
Maryknol Society Justice and Peace Office, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP, No Peace Without Justice (TRP), Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
Nurnberger Menschenrecthszentrum, Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, Organiza-
tion for Defending Victims of Violence, Pace Peace Centre, Pace Law School, Parli-
mentarians for Global Action, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, Quaker
U.N. Office, Redress, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, SOS
Balkanes, Syracuse University, The People's Decade of Human Rights Education, Trans-
national Radical Party, United Church Board for World Ministries, United Nations Asso-
ciation, Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, War & Peace Foundation, Washing-
ton Office on Latin America, World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy,
Womens Environment and Development Organization, World Federalist Association,
World Order Models Project, and World Organization of Building Officials.
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creating opportunities for generating ideas, and for informal meetings
with delegates (such as that which produced the 'Siracusa drafts' and
the July 1996 meeting of delegates from the so-called "like-minded
States" which resulted in three major texts being presented at the
1996 PrepCom) through which experts can offer advice to the dele-
gates. Equally, the close attention which NGOs have paid to the pro-
ceedings of the PrepCom, the meetings which NGO Coalition have held
during the PrepCom with various States, groups of States, and other
influential elements inside the ICC process, and the lobbying which
has gone on at the UN, have all served to sustain and strengthen the
momentum of the process. At a broader level, outside of the PrepCom,
efforts to influence political leaders, to create worldwide awareness of
the Court issue, and hence support for the court has been crucial to
the level of development at which the court process finds itself today.
The influence which NGOs have had to date and will have until the
end of this process is crucial to its success, and should be acknowl-
edged as such.
42. The outcome of the 1997-98 PrepCom sessions will have a de-
termining impact on the convening and success of a diplomatic confer-
ence in 1998. However, if the 1997-98 PrepCom does not produce a
satisfactory Draft Statute, it will delay the convening of a diplomatic
conference, or else add so much work to that conference that it may
take several sessions extending beyond 1998 for its conclusion. To
avoid this potential situation the nine weeks of the 1997-98 PrepCom
must be used most effectively.
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Book Review
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation
of Prosperity
REVIEWED BY THOMAS MAXWELL*
FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF WEALTH; The Free Press, New York, NY (1995).
($24.50); ISBN 0-02-910976-0; 457pp. (hardcover).
When people ask me where I stand on the issue of fences and
neighbors in my poem 'Mending Wall", I simply point out to them that
the two key lines - "Something there is that does not love a wall", and
'Good fences make good neighbors" - appear an equal number of times
each, and I leave it at that. Robert Frost.
Modern cosmologists ask us to picture a saddle-shaped universe,
where time and space are curved essences. Francis Fukuyama, in
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Wealth, his first book
since his seminal post-Cold War work, The End of History and the Last
Man, suggests the consideration of saddle-shaped societies. With
strong families on one end and strong governments on the other,
Fukuyama contends that these societies lack structures of independent
sociability substantial enough to support their economic aspirations.
Thus saddle-shaped societies are in peril. Their economies are limited
by the inability to bridge the gap between tightly family-oriented busi-
nesses, which tend to burn out as family situations change over the
generations, and businesses which are really government ministries,
centrally controlled and regulated, pursuing goals which are absolute
and too often arbitrary.
Conversely, full, rounded societies develop modern, world-class
economies marked by possession of the greatest economic good, "scale".
These societies are characterized by self-regulation and independence
from absolute government control as well as continuous landscapes of
socializing opportunities free from narrow determination by familial or
* Professor of English, Red Rocks Community College; MHA, University of
Colorado.
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family-based proscription. This time-space warp Fukuyama calls
"trust", a concrete, tangible noun. From this larger category, two sub-
categories are formed: saddle-shaped societies, based on "low-trust",
and round societies, based on "high-trust". Using this hypothesis,
Fukuyama concludes that certain emerging economies, which at a
glance seem destined to join the big three - The United States, Ja-
pan, and Germany - as market-makers and market-controllers, are in
fact bound to peak at lesser levels because they will hit saddle-shaped
ceilings inherent in their societies. Korea and Taiwan/China he places
in this category. Other fully-vested economies - France and Italy are
those he treats in depth - are already experiencing this problem, be-
cause they too are low-trust.
If readers disagree that economies-of-scale are sine qua non to top-
tier success, they will disagree entirely with Fukuyama's hypothesis.
If, on the other hand, the necessity of developing scale seems self-
evident to readers, they will have little choice but to follow the author
in his claims. Trust is that sort of book which is hypothesis-driven and
simplistic, lending itself to thumbs-up or thumbs-down judgements. As
a scholarly technique, this is rather bold, standing in contrast to the
majority of today's cutting-edge economic theories, which take complex-
ity to levels of ambiguity and equivocation unheard of a few genera-
tions ago. Most modern economics is statistics and calculus on ster-
oids, post-Euclidean blurs rather than structures, penumbra rather
than focus. Fukuyama, however, is calm and consistent, gracefully
dedicated to testing his insular hypothesis under idealized, almost lab-
oratory conditions. He doesn't allow any troublesome slippery-slope
spectra of conflicting variables to compromise the edges of his re-
search, nor does he attempt to scour the entire global panorama with
exhaustive vigilance. Instead, he lets the simplicity of his high-trust/
low-trust hypothesis fill the available space, and the limited specimen
countries speak for themselves (the reader must decide if the choices
represent a wider field).
Fukuyama manages his presentation by sweeping his focus back
and forth among his target countries. His most interesting revelation,
the broadest leap in the book against the grain of popular wisdom, is
also his most expressive of his overall method. He states that the un-
disputed all-time best bumper-sticker message of America -that it is a
nation of individualists, and that fact misstates the truth by 180 de-
grees. Instead, the truth is, our rich custom of voluntary socialization
accounts for its greatness. Americans grant each other enough trust so
that a spontaneous sense of common existence leads to a sense of com-
mon purpose and a decision for common action. Thus, Americans can
create vast, sophisticated industries populated by aggressively compet-
ing autonomous companies, without depending on governmental or
family-based master-planning to do so.
This is how American society rounds out the saddle-shaped gap.
Other successful countries reach generally the same destination by va-
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rious other routes. It's important to readers of Trust to envision this.
Fukuyama, as a figure in intellectual history, is still young and lacks
the daring to pursue the social ethic very deep into the cultural woods.
He points to the obvious, countable things, like the boy scouts, various
societies, and the Protestant church tradition. In his End of History
mantle, Fukuyama tracked this phenomenon back to its intellectual
head-waters. In the case of the Protestant ethic, for instance, one
might revisit the Protestant Reformation, adding to the audiences'
knowledge the connection between that and the humanist Renaissance.
But to his credit, Fukuyama acknowledges in his introduction that his
present topic of economics grew out of his previous book on civil gov-
ernance as its natural offspring, and that his approach is essentially
intuitive, more Tarzan than Erasmus.
His swing through the treetops of Japanese society, especially as
it's evolved since World War II, is perhaps his best observation. He de-
scribes transformations to the faintly lit - to the West - social profile
of Japan as evolving in a manner that the casual observer might quite
miss. Fukuyama's handling of the transformation from the pre-war
zaibatsu system of commercial networking to the post-war construct of
keiretsu, reveals why the Japanese practice the art of dissembling
before all else. His snapshot of mid-nineties Japan shows a well-
tempered meritocracy which is taking full advantage of the elaborate
social trust the nation enjoys. This results in vast prairie-like expanses
of horizontal commercial structuring the likes of which the world is
not likely to see again for quite awhile.
Countries which show insufficient evidence of ample social capital
to Fukuyama, like Korea with its over dependence on governmental
planning, and Taiwan, which is tightly locked into a family-business
commercial structure. About France and Italy, Fukuyama will have
some readers scrambling for their globes, wondering why he is talking
about places which they don't find even vaguely familiar. Fukuyama
comes very close to making facile judgements even about French wine,
much less French society.
Fukuyama does not condemn as infertile the many spreading del-
tas of contemporary theories which are based on inclusiveness and di-
versity; he implies instead that the foundational mainstream is more
important to watch than all the sidestreams combined. He declines to
speculate that there might be something in human affairs that suc-
ceeds better than success itself. His deepest and most resonant impli-
cation is that there is a secret to success which is within the reach of
every society: as long as they realize the saddle-shaped declivities in
their social infrastructures can be filled and rounded, a way can be
found to express the will. "Maturity" might sum his message up the
best. The extended families and controlling governments are like par-
ents, and societies are their children. If the parents don't "let go", the
child will never grow into maturity and thrive. Societies must ramify
and proliferate without umbilical obligations calling the tune. One of
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Fukuyama's boldest moves is to emphasize "society" at the expense of
its more modish sibling "culture." "Society" seems rather plain by com-
parison. "Culture" wears the costumes and lights the candles and sings
the hymns, after all. Fukuyama is merely saying that there is a bus
called "modernity," and societies best hustle to catch it, whatever their
cultures might be.
"Modernity" stands as large in Trust as trust itself What is mo-
dernity's logical opposite? Nostalgia, authoritarianism, pyramided tra-
dition? Based on his lack of treating this matter as a topic unto itself,
one might infer that Fukuyama doesn't seem to care. Of course, in or-
der to correct itself, any given culture must examine how it uniquely
hamstrings its society, and culture-by-culture examinations occupy a
good portion of the book; but, then, every form of flabbiness requires
the application of some form of fitness regimen, and articulating the
tedious specifics is not the true vocation of the fitness-itself theorist.
Fukuyama's modernity is fitness in the other metaphorical sense
as well, the Darwinian sense, because he more than implies that he
foresees an era coming in which the economic margins, occupied by
lesser, non-scale players, will be narrower and more parsimonious
than they are now: a country must "emerge" all the way or risk sink-
ing back quite severely. It is on this score that most of the criticism
that Trust has collected around the world settles. Can it seriously be
suspected, the critics ask, that in an era of rising global prosperity,
measured in total wealth and number of transactions, that France, It-
aly, Korea, and China will command smaller and smaller pieces of the
pie, while those of Japan, the US, and Germany grow? That seems
preposterous on its face. And if a single given theory of determination
were to predict such a state of affairs, wouldn't it have to be one of
those Universal Field Theory jobs that does it, bursting with
supply/demand curves, comparative advantage evaluations, behavior
theory, and technology-impact factors? Mere details, Fukuyama's book
replies.
More intriguing to this reviewer than taking issue with his ap-
praisal of particular social trust situations, is to explore the notion of
trust as behavior. The book invites this, even if its author does not.
Fukuyama postulates a rather humble definition of trust, borrowing
freely and openly from previous sources, citing as well figures on the
kinds of non-familial and non-governmental organizations in which
members of various societies participate. His hypothesis evolves even-
tually to the topic of trust in the workplace, wherein vertically organ-
ized, task-oriented operations, the great majority of their employees
having no say in any corporate decisions, are found inferior to firms
with more horizontal, involving, participatory structures. He looks
with approval on the fact that the general trend in the United States
is a movement from the former to the latter, though he finds ours still
lagging behind Japan's efforts. The trend in America is not moving fast
enough for his liking, however, and in fact he worries that it might be
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slowing down as a consequence of an evident dwindling of trust in our
society. Not unlike most social commentators, or just about anyone else
for that matter, Fukuyama sees a serious threat to our society in sta-
tistics documenting crime, violence, incivility, moral indifference and
nihilism, educational decline, and all the other distressingly familiar
problems we face. Similarly, increasing levels of litigation, more,
America's increasing tendency to view all human interaction as poten-
tially actionable, as describable at any point in terms of the criminal
code, common law, the bill of rights, contract law, or whatever,
Fukuyama also red-tags as a sign of a lowering level of trust among
us.
If he's right about litigiousness representing lowering trust, one
should be alarmed, of course. Then again, he doesn't venture to sug-
gest how the coming into existence of an all-pervasive legalistic atmos-
phere could be reversed, and how things would be if it were. How
many people would voluntarily opt for less legal protection than they
enjoy now, merely for the purpose of demonstrating they are more
trusting and trustworthy? It might be argued, in fact, that mutual, ag-
gressive legalistic behavior actually limits legalism taking over our
lives, since so often "due process" and "stalemate" amount to one and
the same thing (while "settlement" and "collecting" often do not). And
might it not be argued even more fundamentally that a hearty legal
environment actually promotes and reflects a very high level of social
trust, real trust that is? An ability to maintain personal space through
rule of law in a complex, crazy, and changing society could be our
highest achievement as a people. Perhaps here Fukuyama's minimalist
hypothesis fails him. He doesn't seem interested in seeing trust as the
bedrock foundation for us to build upon, and its unquestionable exis-
tence as that which keeps our many and various palaces of individual-
ism, diversity, and even acrimony from falling down.
What is more, he relegates to problematic limbo the fact that the
destinies of individual countries are becoming interwoven in a global
tapestry that displays patterns in which strength and weakness are
sometimes juxtaposed so as to reverse roles. Trust, as the whole world
turns, is but an orphan in the storm, it often seems, too frail and pa-
thetic for even Diogenes to query in his search for the honest man.
"The end of history" means, I believe, the end of the horrid, self-
annihilating strife which has been the lot of humankind since before
history began. The winter of our discontent is maybe finally passing
on, and the season of renewal, of flat-out concupiscence, is at hand. As
springtime comes, the ice of night giving way to gentle happy growth
in the day, calm, kindly Francis Fukuyama asks us to remember to
trust the very most real thing we have: Something there is that does
not love a wall.
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M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, Transnational Publishers, Irvington, NY (1996);
($135.00), ISBN 1-57105-004-3; 1094 pp. (hardcover).
If the title of Professor Bassiouni's book states a relatively modest
subject - the law of the International Yugoslav Tribunal - what
emerges in over 1000 pages is much more ambitious. The book is all at
once a documentary of the Balkan conflict, a treatise and commentary
on the current state of international criminal law, a case-study-in-
progress on war-time atrocities occurring in perhaps the most intracta-
ble conflict of the post-Cold War to-date, and an account on the inter-
national community's attempt to give it legal significance. Bassiouni,
himself an active part of the Commission of Experts investigating alle-
gations of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and a contributor to the
effort to articulate the Tribunal's statute, takes the reader from the
background of the conflict to the establishment of the Tribunal, both
within the U.N. and the substantive and procedural provisions of its
organic statute. At each stage, the book offers a variety of voices sup-
plementing the author's own commentary, including fact-finding by the
Commission of Experts, commentary by U.N. bodies, statements by
Member-State representatives, views of the International Law Com-
mission, and scholarly opinion.
Chapter I gives a background to the conflict in the Former Yugo-
slavia, tracing the roots of the region, the migrations and activities of
the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empires that set the stage for the
"jigsaw puzzle" complexities of the conflict. However, Bassiouni finds
an overall plan to each phase of the conflict rather than senseless vio-
lence: indeed, the Commission of Experts found a strong probability
that "ethnic cleansing" existed in policy. The appendix to the chapter
details the findings of the Commission and the International Human
Rights Law Institute staff, including reports of Serb, Muslim and
Croat camps. Chapter II comprises a "legislative history" of the Tribu-
nal's Statute detailing not only the successive stages of Security Coun-
cil action but the historical precedents regarding international tribu-
nals. Chapter III discusses the competence of the Security Council to
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establish the Tribunal, and the Council's authority to articulate the
substantive legal provisions of the Tribunal. With regard to the later,
the U.N. recognized that, while the Security Council could not "legis-
late" the law, it could assign the Tribunal the task of applying existing
norms of conventional and customary international law.
The following three chapters deal with the problems of legality
and jurisdiction arising from the Statute. Bassiouni details the histori-
cal and present state of domestic and international doctrine, highlight-
ing the rather novel complexities posed by an international criminal
tribunal; for example, although many crimes under international law
remain undefined, the principle of legality is upheld via indirect en-
forcement, whereby States bring their municipal justice systems, with
corresponding national legislation, to bear on offenders. Insofar as the
Tribunal constitutes a direct enforcement mechanism, legality would
require the articulation of substantive offense within the Tribunal's
statute, or by reference to some other body of rules, e.g., national legis-
lation of the former Yugoslavia. In terms of jurisdiction, Bassiouni dis-
cusses the roots and ramifications of the Tribunal's "concurrent" juris-
diction, wherein the Tribunal maintains primacy of, yet generally
"shares", jurisdiction with the former Yugoslavia. Expanding on the is-
sue of personal jurisdiction, Chapter VI discusses the origins of indi-
vidual culpability in international criminal law and its application
within the Tribunal.
One particularly thorny issue arises from the characterization of
the conflict as either international or domestic. A threshold question in
the application of the Statute and international criminal law, the in-
creasingly "internal" nature of post-World War II conflicts, including
the Balkan situation, has challenged international lawyers and schol-
ars. Chapter VII documents the evolution of law applying basic hu-
manitarian norms in international and internal conflicts. The applica-
tion of international norms established, Chapters VIII and IX discuss
the substantive and procedural rules applied within the Tribunal, in-
cluding "rights of the accused" under the Statute, giving insight into
their development, and into their current statutes in the eyes of mem-
bers of the international community. Appendix II reproduces military
regulations of the former Yugoslavia in their original Serbo-Croatian
and English translation. Finally, the remaining chapters deal with the
organization of the Tribunal and its procedures. The table of authori-
ties offers an extensive bibliography on international criminal law.
The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia provides a comprehensive and painstaking anatomy of the law
in this area, from the vantage point of the complex effort by the U.N.
to establish an international tribunal to advance that law by giving it
effect. Written by an expert in the field, its breadth and significance
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surpasses the subject of the Tribunal to encompass a treatise for sub-
sequent development of international criminal and humanitarian law.
Marco Madriz
HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI (Ed.), SMALL ISLANDS, BIG POLIT-
ICS: THE TONBS AND ABU MUSA IN THE PERSIAN GULF, St.
Martin's Press, New York, NY (1996); ($45.00); ISBN 0-312-15910-2;
200 pp. (hardcover).
Despite their small size and lack of natural resources, the islands
of Abu Musa and the Tonbs have been the subject of big politics over
the years. Global powers, such as the U.S., Russia, and England, have
used the islands as a political tool, as have regional powers in the Per-
sian Gulf. Currently, Abu Musa and the Tonbs are the subject of a ter-
ritorial dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Small Islands, Big Politics presents the Iranian position on this dis-
pute from three different perspectives: historical, geographical, and
legal.
Hooshang Amirahmadi, the editor of the volume, takes a historical
approach to the problem. Amirahmadi contends that because Iran is
the oldest state in the Persian Gulf, its claim to the islands (which he
bases on historical claims to the islands as well as a 1971 compromise
with the British) outweighs that of the UAE. He ascribes the centu-
ries-long controversy over the islands, the largest of which measures
four square miles, to attempts by outside powers to contain Iranian
power and influence. The territorial dispute reflects, rather than feeds,
tension between Iran and its historical and contemporary political
opponents.
Taking a geopolitical approach to the problem, Pirouz Mojtahed-
Zadeh emphasizes the strategic location of the disputed islands off the
Iranian coast. He traces the attempts of foreign powers, particularly
Britain and Russia, to control the islands as part of their larger policy
of containing Iran. These historical trends, Mojtahed-Zadeh claims,
form an important backdrop to the current dispute over the islands
and illustrate the importance of a peaceful settlement and stability in
the region.
In the final two chapters, Davoud H. Bavand and Guive
Mirfenderski examine the legal basis of Iran's claims over Abu Musa
and the Tonbs, respectively. Both claims rest primarily upon centuries
of Iranian claims over Abu Musa and the Tonbs, and other states' rec-
ognition of Iran's sovereignty over the islands, which the authors re-
count carefully. Bavand and Mirfenderski assert that even Britain rec-
ognized Iran's ownership over Abu Musa and the Tonbs before the
British encouraged the Arab sheikdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah (which would later become part of the UAE) to occupy the is-
lands at the turn of this century. These two authors conclude that
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Iran's prior claim to Abu Musa and the Tonbs makes it stronger than
the Arab claim.
Small Islands, Big Politics presents a comprehensive survey of the
territorial dispute between the UAE and Iran by examining the con-
flict from historical, territorial and legal perspectives. Although the
book does not present both sides of the dispute, it does not claim to do
so. Amirahmadi noted at the beginning of the book that although ad-
vocates of the UAE's position had been invited to contribute to the
book, they had declined to do so. While the authors allude to the
UAE's position on Abu Musa and the Tonbs and the arguments in sup-
port of its claim to the islands, a more thorough and vigorous explana-
tion of the opposing position would have contributed significantly to
Small Islands, Big Politics.
Even without a thorough discussion of the UAE's side of the dis-
pute, Small Islands, Big Politics makes a useful contribution to the
understanding of the dispute over Abu Musa and the Tonbs. In addi-
tion to the chapters discussed above, the book includes an extensive
bibliography, maps, and reproductions of historical documents which
will prove helpful to anyone who wishes to learn more about this terri-
torial dispute.
Amy Eckert
GERD WINTER (Ed.), EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE; Dartmouth Publishing Company,
Brookfield, Vermont (1996); ($39.95); ISBN 1-85521-564-0; 443 pp.
(paperback).
Environmental law continues to expand internationally. European
Environmental Law: A Comparative Perspective examines and assesses
the fundamental concepts of environmental law in Europe. Divided
into five sections, this compilation of essays explores the foundation,
the framework and the future role of the environment in the European
political arena.
The collection begins by analyzing the command and control model
- government definition and regulation of environmental concerns.
Part one addresses the need for integration of environmental concerns
into policy areas not traditionally associated with environmental law
and the relationship with constitutional law, in particular, fundamen-
tal rights. Specific components of an environmental regime include: cri-
teria and instruments for regulation; environmental impact assess-
ment; public participation; judicial review; administration and freedom
of information, comprise the subject matter of the second section.
Although the command and control model dominates European en-
vironmental policy, alternatives to this structure are considered. Fo-
cusing on the individual, rather than the government, section three of
this book discusses potential reforms. Such changes include network
management, financial alternatives, liability schemes and self-
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regulation by industry. Radical revisions seem unlikely, however, these
authors believe that the aforementioned measures should be used to
enhance and to expand the existing structures.
With the theoretical frameworks explored, a concrete examination
of European law is undertaken. Part four discusses the evolution, the
objectives and principles and the decision-making structure of the Eu-
ropean Community (EC). Specifics of EC directives and policies are de-
tailed. Additionally, this section includes a case study of the transpor-
tation of transboundary hazardous material.
The final section concludes with an examination of emerging envi-
ronmental law schemes in Eastern Europe. Poland and Hungary are
utilized as case studies. A command and control regime provides the
basis for many former Warsaw Pact countries' environmental pro-
grams. The authors debate whether this regime is preferred or
whether market forces should dictate environmental policy. This dis-
cussion ultimately predicts the future of Eastern European environ-
mental law; namely, pursuing the course defined by the European
Community.
Overall, the authors provide a complete but general overview of
European environmental law. Although a straightforward comparison
of various states' regimes is not investigated, the inclusion of alterna-
tives to the typical command and control model gives the reader suffi-
cient information to appraise the existing scheme. This well-written
and well-organized compilation is a good starting point for anyone
wishing to become familiar with basics of European environmental law.
Nicolle M. Fleury
THOMAS C. FISCHER, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF AMERICA,
Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N.C. (1995); ($49.95); ISBN 0-
89089-751-4 342 pp. (hardcover).
This book provides a helpful understanding to the legal and fac-
tual basis for the formation and operation of the European Union. The
author strongly believes that every "American" should have knowledge
about what he considers to be the most important trading partner for
the US.
Fischer begins his book by reviewing some startling statistics con-
cerning US and European trade. After reviewing these numbers, one is
truly impressed as to the economic interdependence present between
these two regions. It is important to note that Fischer considers the
European Union ("EU") as a whole when tabulating these figures.
Outside of the context of each state separately reviewed, it becomes
apparent that the trade between the US and the EU is perhaps the
most important in economic terms to each.
The author, Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law at the New En-
gland School of Law and an honors graduate of the University of Cin-
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cinnati and the Georgetown University Law Center, then continues by
explaining the history of the formation of the EU. It is interesting to
see how the development of a coal and steel union between a few na-
tions fostered the growth of economic relations between former ene-
mies until the European Economic Community, European Community
and then finally the European Union.
The book's next section compares the federal system of the US and
the EU. Many similarities are drawn between the two and the author
points out that the EU has emulated the US agricultural and taxation
system to a degree in forming their own "federal" system. This is an
interesting note and perhaps supports the argument that the "federal"
system, as defined by Fischer, will become the dominant economic and
political system in the next century. Such an argument is ripe with de-
bate, and while it cannot be discussed at length here, interested read-
ers should review Fischer's statements considering this topic in this
book.
The main substance of the book describes the operations of the EU
at length. Included are descriptions of the structure of the Community
government, the substantive law of the EU and its enforcement mech-
anisms, the development of a single European currency, the use of
subsidies by individual member states and competition between EU
members. Fischer describes the problems associated with all of these
subjects, alongside the debate regarding the existence of a single Euro-
pean legislature.
Other dilemmas currently facing the EU are also considered. Dis-
parity among the member states is the topic of one chapter, a subject
which has remained controversial. The expansion of the Community
and the problems associated with the inclusion of new members states
is contemplated as well. The book concludes with a sharp comparison
between the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement and the EU.
Fischer concludes his work by considering the future of Europe.
While the author does not profess an absolute certainty in his predic-
tions, he does point out that the decisions made by the European
Union will have a significant affect on US citizens and their economy.
He makes a final and profound point that the next generation of
Europeans, with their new attitudes and understanding of one an-
other, will cause the new Europe to emerge. This, he states, may have
as important and sudden an effect on the world as the fall of
Communism.
The Europeanization of America provides its audience with impor-
tant information regarding the structure and operation of the EU. This
knowledge is important in reaching a greater understanding of the US
as well. Fischer's most important point, however, remains that the fu-
ture of the US and Europe are more dependent upon one another than
many realize.
W Q. Beardslee
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RATNA KAPUR AND BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES:
FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA; Sage Publishing;
Thousand Oaks, California (1996); ($28.00); ISBN 0-8039-9815-3; 352
pp. (hardcover).
Subversive Sites examines the contours of law in light of the femi-
nist struggle for social change. The authors recognize the law as a
method for overthrowing the oppression of women, since the law has
the power to impact the status and discrimination of women. In an ap-
parent contradiction, the law can both reinforce and challenge the ster-
eotypical roles of women. The authors focus Subversive Sites on the
state of the law and of women in India, however, the principles they
convey are not confined to that locality. Legal regulation in India is
congruent with the familial ideology that also reinforces notions of
equality. Equality in the law leads to unequal results due to discrimi-
natory enforcement and access. Further, informal reinforcement of
roles and inequality stems from the familial ideology. The authors ar-
gue that women must resist the familial ideology by not rigidly enforc-
ing gender roles, but at the same time affirming the roles and relation-
ships chosen by women.
The book opens with a discussion of the approaches taken in liter-
ature to help explain the dynamic nature of the feminist struggle. The
authors examine historical feminist movements through the perspec-
tive of the displacement of dominant notions of roles and identities for
women. Their perspective incorporates an understanding of the strug-
gle as a discursive one. Chapter two describes the familial ideology in-
cluding the sexual division of labor and roles in India. Familial ideol-
ogy shapes the moral, economic and criminal laws of India. Moreover,
familial ideology influences laws made to protect and benefit women,
thus furthering unequal consequences. Chapter three examines how
challenges to the law entrench the projectionist assumptions toward
women as weak and indifferent, undermining any substantive equality.
Chapter four depicts the channel from legal to political discourse. The
Hindu Right uses the forum to subvert feminist advances and cat-
echize conservative and communalist ideals.
In the last chapter of Subversive Sites, the authors characterize
law as an important site for discursive struggle and empowerment.
They urge feminist lawyers to complicate legal arguments made in fur-
therance of the struggle. They also urge feminist lawyers to challenge
the assumptions on which the law is based, for it is these assumptions
that influence society. Most importantly, we must understand the lim-
its to the use of law as a subversive site. Limitations may dictate that
the law is an option, but not always the best forum.
Tanya R. Langton
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